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Public policy making is generally pursued as a “one policy at a time” process. 
Additionally, policy is often confined to national boundaries, even for global public 
issues. As such, legislation is often temporally and geographically dispersed. Despite this 
approach, many public policies are pursued with the intent of working concurrently to 
produce a desired behavior in the context of a larger, highly complex system. If we look 
at the civil aviation industry (which can be classified as a system-of-systems) public 
policy aimed at mitigating the emission of greenhouse gases, namely CO2, has been a 
major push throughout much of the world in recent years. With the passing of various 
emissions trading schemes throughout the world aimed at service providers, and in 
upcoming years with planned regulations on manufacturers, the mitigation of CO2 into 
our atmosphere has been at the forefront of many civil aviation policy makers’ minds.  
Compared to the relative wealth of information surrounding design in the context 
of system-of-systems there has been little research surrounding policy making in system-
of-systems. Even recent pushes by select academics and policy makers have only 
addressed policymaking in system-of-systems from a conceptual level or under highly 
simplified system-of-systems architectures. While the adoption of a formal approach and 
lexicon for system-of-systems problems has been proposed by researchers, the specific 
inclusion of regulatory policies in system-of-systems is still largely absent or 
underdeveloped. Typically, there is no distinction between internal policies of an 
organization and exogenous policies coming through regulatory channels. Further, 
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researchers have yet to formally employ a standardized framework to regulatory policy 
problems in the context of a system-of-systems. As international regulatory bodies are 
calling on world States to identify and select “baskets of measures” to address CO2 
emissions from civil aviation, there is a growing recognition that doing so will require a 
framework for policy identification and selection. Despite this recognition, such a 
framework has yet to be established.  
In order to address these issues in policy making, the following research develops 
a formal lexicon for public policy as a part of system-of-systems, and employs a 
formalized process to explore multiple established, planned, and potential policies in the 
context of the global civil aviation system. The following research defines system-of-
systems characteristics, and provides a system-of-systems architecture for civil aviation 
based on previous work from academia. Existing architectures and lexicons are expanded 
to include regulatory policies that have often been treated as exogenous forcing functions 
in system-of-systems problems. This research addresses the obstacles documented in 
literature regarding the concurrent analysis of multiple policies throughout system-of-
systems, by establishing a process for informed quantitative decision making to support 
concurrent CO2 regulatory policy analysis and design in the civil aviation system-of-
systems.  The developed methodology allows policy makers to systematically identify 
effective policy space while maintaining the objectivity of the analyst.  
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CHAPTER  1 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OF THE AIR TRANSPORTATION 
INDUSTRY 
“When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the 
universe.” – John Muir 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the time of the Wright brothers’ first flight in 1903 aviation has grown to 
become one of the world’s most important transportation sources for both people and 
cargo. While the earth’s population was 1.6 billion in the year of that first flight, as of 
2009 more than 2.3 billion passengers and 38 million tons of freight were utilizing the 
world’s airlines each year [1, 2]. This growth is certainly a strong indicator of continued 
progress in the civil aviation industry, however, there are environmental costs associated 
with such progress that are only recently being addressed.  
Throughout the last two decades the impact of anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
(GHG) on global climate change has shaped much of the discourse regarding 
environmental policy. In large part, this is due to the recognition that “warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising 
global average sea level [3].” Agencies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have shown that this warming of the planet is a result of the stark rise in 
global increases of GHG concentrations throughout the atmosphere. While there are a 
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number of GHGs that impact global climate, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), methane 
(CH4), ozone (O3), and aerosols, the most abundant anthropogenic source of GHG 
throughout the atmosphere is carbon dioxide (CO2) [3]. As a result, many studies 
showing the growth in anthropogenic GHG concentrations will convert the effect of all 
gases to a CO2 equivalent. This is the case in Figure 1.1, where the growth in global 
anthropogenic GHG emissions is shown for the period from 1970 to 2004 [4]. As is 
evident in (a) of this figure, GHG emissions have risen steadily since the 1970s, driven 
primarily by CO2 emissions. From (b), the vast majority of this rise in CO2 concentrations 
has been due to our dependence on liquid hydrocarbons, which certainly serve a critical 
role in the air transportation industry.   
 
Figure 1.1: Global Annual Emissions of Anthropogenic GHGs from 1970 to 2004 [4] 
In fact, while the effects of global warming cannot be isolated to any single point 
source, it’s widely accepted that carbon dioxide in general is the most influential 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas. The global concentrations of CO2 have risen since the 
pre-industrial era by almost 100ppm, from 280ppm in 1750 to 379ppm in 2005  [3]. This 
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trend in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 far exceeds any natural ranges over the last 
650,000 years, as verified by ice core samples [3]. Further, growth rates of CO2 
concentrations over the past 10 years (1995 to 2005 average of 1.9ppm/yr) have been 
larger than since the beginning of direct atmospheric measurements in the 1960s (1960 to 
2005 average: 1.4ppm/yr), which indicates the potential for an even more exaggerated 
problem in the future [3]. Even if CO2 emissions were to be maintained at near current 
levels, they would still lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric 
concentrations for more than two centuries, approaching twice the pre-industrial 
concentration by the end of the 21st century [5].  
 These trends in global anthropogenic GHG emissions are certainly a cause for 
concern. Even if the continuous growth in emissions could be curbed to a sustainable 
level, the nature of CO2 residence in the atmosphere would still lead to global rises in 
concentrations, and thus warming of the planet. While this may seem to be a bleak 
indicator for the future of our planet, a large number of studies have provided evidence 
that there is substantial economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG emissions in 
the coming decades that could offset or even reduce emissions below current levels [4]. 
As a result, the push in the scientific and policy communities must be in the exploration 
of the realm of possible measures to help mitigate GHG emissions.    
1.2 Aviation and Climate Change 
As has been shown, the impact of climate change due to anthropogenic GHG 
emissions is a growing concern. This is especially true in the aviation industry where a 
substantial portion of the emissions occur at high altitudes. Due to this unique operating 
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environment, the impact of these emissions can often be greater than the same emissions 
released from the ground. As a result, there has been a call by a number of international 
and national regulatory bodies to impose controls on GHG emissions from commercial 
aviation.   
1.2.1 Aviation Emissions 
Before addressing the role of aviation in anthropogenic climate change, the 
composition of aircraft emissions must first be understood. As with most transportation 
sources, the primary source of emissions in aviation are aircraft engines, where emissions 
are composed of approximately 70% CO2, slightly less than 30% water vapor, and less 
than 1% each of NOx, CO, SOx, VOC, particulate matter, and other trace compounds [1, 
5]. In addition to the emissions coming directly from the engine, there are also a number 
of other sources of GHG throughout the aviation industry. These can be traced to land use 
changes, airport operations, contrail formation, manufacturing, and a large number of 
other activities related to the aviation industry [1].  
As a result of this activity, aviation currently accounts for between 2% to 3% of 
the worldwide CO2 emissions [3, 5-7].	  While this may seem like an insignificant portion 
of worldwide CO2 emissions, in 1992 alone the emissions of CO2 by aircraft were at 0.14 
Gt C/year, which can have a substantial effect on the global climate [5]. Further, one of 
the most worrisome trends throughout aviation is the projected growth in CO2 emissions 
to around 3% to 4% per year in the coming decade [2, 5, 8]. This accelerated growth is 
projected to outpace growth in most other industries, and certainly in other sectors of 
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transportation. This is primarily due to the increased globalization of the planet and its 
people.  
Complicating this issue is the fact that the bulk of aircraft emissions 
(approximately 90%) occur directly into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere 
(UT-LS) region of the atmosphere, where aircraft cruise at heights of approximately 
30,000 to 40,000 ft [1, 5]. This operating environment represents a relatively pristine 
portion of the atmosphere that is only episodically affected by weather events that can 
mix surface and stratospheric air [9].  As a result, CO2 emitted into this region of the 
atmosphere has a residence time with a half-life of approximately 100 years [5, 10]. This 
long residence time and relatively stable portion of the atmosphere provides the ideal 
conditions for CO2 emissions to become well mixed on a global scale. Subsequently, it is 
impossible to isolate the point sources of CO2 pollution throughout the world. Despite 
this, studies by the IPCC, as well as a number of other agencies, have been able to 
produce estimates for CO2 emissions from aviation through fuel sales, and have also been 
able to show scientifically that the impact of burning fossil fuels at altitude is 
approximately double that due to burning the same fuels at ground level [11]. 
Subsequently, if aviation emissions are allowed to grow at current rates, which outpace 
technological improvements, the impact of aviation on the global climate will continue to 
become more significant in the coming decades.  
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1.2.2 Effect on the Atmosphere 
Given this knowledge of the emissions species coming from aviation, it is 
important to follow with an understanding of the overall effect on the atmosphere. 
Climate scientists have been able to show that carbon dioxide, water vapor, sulphur, and 
soot particles coming from aviation activities have a direct impact on the atmosphere that 
can lead to warming of the earth’s surface [12]. These changes in the abundance of GHG 
throughout the atmosphere have a tendency to alter the energy balance of the climate 
system, in much the same way window panes alter the energy balance in a greenhouse. 
This energy balance of the global climate is generally measured through radiative forcing 
(RF), where the most influential contributors are CO2, NOx, aerosols, and increased 
cloudiness due to the formation of linear contrails and induced cirrus cloudiness [13]. 
Radiative forcing is ultimately a measure of the influence that a given GHG has in 
altering the incoming and outgoing energy in the earth’s atmospheric system, and is 
measured in watts per meter squared (W/m2) with respect to a pre-industrial baseline 
established by the overall concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere in 1750 [5]. For 
these measurements, a positive RF tends to warm the surface of the earth, while negative 
RF has a cooling effect. As reported by the IPCC, there is a very high confidence that the 
net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of global warming, with a net RF 
of +1.6 W/m2 [3].  
The IPCC has produced estimates of the relative contribution of each GHG that 
contributes to this warming and cooling of the planet. These estimates, based on a 2005 
baseline, can be seen in Figure 1.2. As can be seen from this figure, and discussed 
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previously, the release of the long lived gases, such as CO2, are the primary contributors 
to global warming. As a result, the release of CO2 due to aviation activities should be a 
primary concern for the global aviation industry as demand continues to increase. In fact, 
in 2005 the total RF from aviation was approximately 55 mW/m2 with a 90% likelihood 
range, which accounts for 3.5% of the total anthropogenic forcing [6, 7, 13]. At this 
point, it should be evident that aviation, which accounts for 2% of CO2 emissions and 
3.5% of RF, has a greater relative effect on the atmosphere than other pollution sources. 
The continued growth of aviation emissions will make this trend more pronounced in the 
coming decades. As such, if the sustainability of earth’s climate is to be addressed, the 
influence of aviation must not be ignored.  
 
Figure 1.2: Global Average Radiative Forcing in 2005 [4] 
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1.2.3 Addressing Aviation’s Impact on the Global Climate 
Given the importance of aviation’s impact on the global climate, action must be 
taken in order to avoid catastrophic effects on our planet. Currently, there is broad 
concern that unless much more is done to reduce aviation emissions, the inherent demand 
growth will ultimately cancel out the work done to reduce emissions in other sectors [12]. 
This concern has permeated a number of government and non-government bodies, and 
spurned a wealth of research throughout the civil aviation industry. A number of recent 
reports have noted that reducing aircraft emissions can and should be accomplished on a 
global level through a variety means, including improvements in technologies, 
operations, the use of sustainable alternative fuels, and regulatory policy instruments [1, 
2, 5, 6, 14-20].  
1.3 Trends in the Civil Aviation Industry 
To begin to understand how to accomplish such measures in aviation, there must 
first be an understanding of the trends throughout the civil aviation industry. In general, 
the dawn of the commercial jet age (1950s) spawned a significant amount of research and 
development, which has led to vast improvements in aircraft technologies and operational 
procedures. These improvements have typically been driven by the profit maximizing 
behaviors of the airline operators, for which fuel burn is tied directly to operating costs of 
the aircraft. As a result, CO2 itself has been implicitly tied to the overall profitability of 
the aviation industry. Despite this fact, the widespread acceptance, and reliance on 
aviation for globalization, has led to even greater increases in demand than the inherent 
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increases in efficiency. The net effect has been one of continual increases in fuel use, and 
subsequent CO2 emissions. Specific trends in technology, operations, and demand growth 
will be discussed here to provide a more complete view of the direction of civil aviation 
since the beginning of the commercial jet age. It should be noted that the trends described 
herein have motivated much of the policy discourse since the 1960’s, which is further 
expanded upon in Chapter  2.  
1.3.1 Technology is Improving 
Since the beginning of the commercial jet age, technological advancement, driven 
by a desire to reduce operating costs, has significantly reduced aircraft fuel consumption 
and subsequently emissions. In fact, over the past 40 years, aircraft fuel efficiency has 
improved by almost 75% and the noise footprint has been reduced by 90% through 
improvements in airframe design, engine technologies, and constantly rising load factors 
[1, 5, 20]. These efficiency improvements are even more impressive when considered 
relative to other transportation sectors, such the automobile, which has seen energy 
efficiency increases on the order of only 20% over the same period [1]. This trend is 
highlighted by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and reproduced in Figure 
1.3. As can be seen here, since the late 1960’s aviation efficiency has improved 
drastically through the integration of new technologies, especially on the engine and 




Figure 1.3: Relative Energy Efficiency of Automobiles and Aircraft [1] 
1.3.1.1 Engine Technology Improvements 
While the basic geometry of commercial aircraft has largely remained the same 
since the dawn of the commercial jet age, improvements in engine efficiency have been 
quite drastic. Much of this improvement was initially realized prior to the 1970’s due to 
the introduction of high bypass ratio engines [11]. The result of introducing high bypass 
ratio engines has been an increase in engine efficiency of approximately 40% over the 40 
year period from 1960 to 2000, as measured by the cruise specific fuel consumption 
(SFC). This increase in engine efficiency corresponds to an average annual improvement 
of 1.5% [11]. These trends are highlighted by Lee through analysis of actual commercial 




Figure 1.4: Historical Improvements in Specific Fuel Consumption [11] 
The efficiency improvements in engines have been largely driven by the increase 
in bypass ratio, which means that engine diameters have become larger. As a result of 
increasing the engine diameter, the overall weight of the engine has increased 
substantially, as well as the aerodynamic drag [11]. As such, the overall increases in 
engine efficiency do not directly translate to improvements in overall aircraft efficiency. 
Despite this fact, other routes of engine efficiency have also been pursued, primarily by 
increasing the peak temperature within the engine leading to a more complete burn of the 
fuel. It should be noted though that this route is physically limited by materials and 
cooling technology, increasing pressure ratios, and improving engine component 
efficiencies [11].  
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1.3.1.2 Aerodynamic Efficiency Improvements 
In addition to improvements on the engine, technological improvements are also 
impacting the aerodynamic efficiency quite substantially. Throughout the commercial jet 
age aerodynamic efficiency has increased by approximately 15%, corresponding to an 
average increase of 0.4% per year over the period [11]. This trend can be observed 
directly through analysis of the lift to drag ratio (L/D) of commercial aircraft, which is 
considered a measure of overall aerodynamic efficiency. The historical L/D of 
commercial jet aircraft is shown in Figure 1.5 below [11]. As can be seen, there is a 
general trend of increasing L/D, especially for long haul aircraft. This increase in 
aerodynamic efficiency has been largely driven by better wing design and improved 
engine-airframe integration, which has been enabled through more advanced 





Figure 1.5: Historical Improvements in L/D [11] 
1.3.1.3 Structural Efficiency Improvements 
While the historical improvements in engine and aerodynamic efficiency 
throughout the years have been readily apparent, improvements in structural efficiency 
are less evident. The overall structural efficiency is a measure of the necessary structural 
weight to the overall weight of the aircraft. As such, it can be measured through a proxy 
ratio of the operating empty weight to the maximum takeoff weight. The historical trends 
of this measure for actual aircraft are demonstrated by Lee, and shown in Figure 1.6 
below [11]. As can be seen, the trend has been relatively flat throughout the commercial 
jet age. Despite this fact, current advancements in composite materials and their 
integration throughout the airframe will likely change this trend to begin to see decreases 
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in OEW/MTOW. This is demonstrated to some extent by Lee in his projections of future 
aircraft, which are also shown in Figure 1.6 [11].   
 
Figure 1.6: Historical Improvements in OEW/MTOW [11] 
1.3.1.4 Fleet Efficiency Lags Aircraft Efficiency  
The trends in technological efficiency improvements shown thus far have been 
isolated to specific aircraft throughout commercial aviation. However, it should be noted 
that in order to assess future aviation fuel consumptions and emissions it’s important to 
consider the delay between technology introduction and full implementation throughout 
the fleet [11]. While the overall efficiency of individual aircraft may improve quite 
drastically from one generation to the next, this is not typically the case for the entire 
fleet in the same time frame. The reason is due to the time necessary to retire and 
purchase new aircraft for the commercial aviation fleet. This fleet evolution typically 
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creates a lag in technology introduction on the order of a decade [11]. As such, it will 
generally take 10-15 years for commercial aviation’s fleet to reach the same fuel 
efficiency as the newly introduced aircraft. This is mentioned here because it’s important 
to understand that there will be a lag between newly introduced aircraft and overall fleet 
efficiency improvements.  
In general though, it’s expected that this trend of constant improvements will 
continue into the future through the incorporation of more advanced aerodynamic 
technologies, weight reductions, new engine designs, and advanced control systems [22].  
1.3.2 Operational Efficiency is Improving  
As with technological improvements, airlines have a vested interest in the 
reduction of operating costs through operational efficiency measures. As such, there has 
been considerable effort throughout civil aviation’s history to create more efficient 
movements with aircraft. These improvements have been facilitated through better 
meteorological information, which has now become available in the cockpit in real time, 
allowing optimized flight planning and shorter routing to occur [1]. As a specific 
application of such improvements, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
under the United Nations (UN) has been pursuing improvements in air traffic 
management (ATM) by focusing on the Global ATM Operational Concept, which will 
potentially achieve interoperable global air traffic management [2]. The hope is to 
provide optimum economic operations and environmental sustainability, while 
maintaining the safety and national security requirements.  
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Additionally, further improvements have been possible through the development 
of yield management tools that have allowed airlines to dramatically increase load factors 
and per-aircraft capacity [1, 11]. In fact, the load factor on domestic and international 
flights operated by US carriers alone have climbed 15% between 1960 and 2000, albeit 
entirely occurring after 1970 [11]. This increase in load factor corresponds to an average 
of 1.1% growth per year since 1970, and is likely to continue until the overall load factor 
reaches approximately 0.85, or 85% of full capacity [23]. Generally, these trends are 
attributed to widespread deregulation of the U.S. national airspace system (NAS) and 
global air travel liberalization, which ultimately gave rise to the hub-and-spoke 
transportation systems largely implemented today [11, 24]. The historical trends in load 
factor and per-aircraft capacity are shown below in Figure 1.7. Increases in both of these 
measures of operational efficiency can be readily observed starting around 1970 as 
aforementioned. 
 
Figure 1.7: Historical Trends in Load Factor and Seating Capacity [11] 
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Despite these improvements in the operational efficiency of airlines, it is 
estimated that as much as 18% of fuel is still wasted [5, 25]. As such, the potential exists 
to reduce emissions further with inherent economic incentives. This has led organizations 
such as the IPCC to note that improvements in air traffic management (ATM) and other 
operational procedures have the potential to further reduce fuel burn by approximately 
8% to 18% in the coming decades [5]. The vast majority of these improvements will 
come from the implementation of advanced ATM procedures, which are anticipated to be 
fully incorporated in civil aviation in the next 20 years. Looking even further into the 
future, concepts such as formation flight could also be incorporated into the air 
transportation system given sufficient proof that safety would not be compromised. 
Formation flight has been shown to have the potential for significant induced drag 
reductions on the order of 30-40% depending on the formation and speed, which could 
lead to additional fuel savings not currently being considered [26]. Subsequently, there 
are a number of additional operational efficiency improvements that can be made to the 
air transportation system.  
1.3.3 Technological and Operational Efficiency Forecasting 
ICAO has been able to use these trends in technological development and 
operational efficiency to produce estimates of future civil aviation fuel efficiency. Figure 
1.8 provides an overview of those results extending fuel burn efficiency out to 2036 [2]. 
A fixed technology and operational baseline is provided for benchmarking, which is often 
referred to in literature as a business as usual case. Additionally, four cases of operational 
and technological improvement scenarios are assessed relative to ICAO goals for CO2 
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emissions. As can be seen, even optimistic aircraft technologies and advanced operational 
concepts will not fully address the goals set forth. Generally, this difference in 
operational and technological fuel burn improvements and international goals is referred 
to as a CO2 gap, and is the direct result of demand growth. Addressing this gap will 
ultimately be necessary for the health of the global climate, and is of paramount concern 
for policymakers in civil aviation. 
 
Figure 1.8: ICAO Commercial Aircraft System Fuel Efficiency (CASFE) for 
Technology and Operational Improvements [2] 
1.3.4 Aviation Demand Growth Overshadows Inherent Improvements 
As aforementioned, as aviation grows in popularity and the world moves toward a 
global society, the demand for civil aviation continues to grow without bounds. This is 
producing greater emissions of CO2 every year from civil aviation. In fact, the IPCC 
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notes that “although improvements in aircraft technologies and in the efficiency of the air 
traffic system will bring environmental benefits, these will not fully offset the effects of 
the increased emissions resulting from the projected growth in aviation [5].” In large part 
this observation is a result of the rapid growth of aviation in the past several decades, 
where aviation has been growing faster than other modes of transportation and is 
expected to continue to outpace them in the future.  
This rapid growth in aviation has been attributed to a 21.5% increase in 
population, a 32% increase in the labor force, and a 90% increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP) between 1980 and 2000 according to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (US BTS) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [1, 27]. Another 
important factor that has contributed to this trend in recent years has been the emergence 
of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs), which refer to their low operating cost basis. These new 
entrants to the civil aviation market have had a dramatic impact on air traffic growth in 
all parts of the world [2]. In fact, in analyzing Figure 1.9, it can be seen that the airline 
growth index, measured through revenue miles travelled (rmt) has actually outpaced both 
the GDP and vehicle miles travelled (vmt) by a considerable margin over the last few 
decades. These trends provide a good indication that aviation demand is growing much 
faster than most other markets, especially other transportation industries. As such, the 
relative impact of aviation compared to other transportation sectors is likely to grow 




Figure 1.9: Aviation Growth 1981 to 2001 [1] 
Analyzing more specific data on aviation demand growth, it can be seen that 
passenger traffic, expressed as a revenue passenger kilometer (RPK), has grown since 
1960 at nearly 9% per year, which is almost 2.4 times the average GDP growth rate [5]. 
While this growth rate has slowed in recent years, reaching an average of 5.3% per year 
between 2000 and 2007 [11, 13], many estimates put growth in global passenger traffic at 
about 5% per year in the coming decades [2, 5].  This growth in demand is expected to 
stay at such a high level due to the increased development of the Asia/Pacific region, 
specifically in China and India. This expectation can be seen quite clearly in the ICAO 
passenger traffic forecast provided in Figure 1.10. Obviously, this overall growth rate of 
5% per year will likely outpace the expected improvements in efficiency of 




Figure 1.10: ICAO Passenger Traffic Forecast [2] 
Another sector of the aviation industry that is likely to play a more significant role 
in the future is cargo air transportation. As consumer markets are becoming more global 
in nature, the need to quickly and efficiently transport large quantities of goods continues 
to rise. Subsequently the growth in cargo transportation will outpace that of passenger 
transportation, with a likely growth of approximately 6.1% per year over the next 20 
years according to the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP)The 
trends in freighter traffic from ICAO’s CAEP can be observed in Figure 1.11. The growth 
rate of 6.1% per year corresponds to the most likely scenario for freighter traffic in their 




Figure 1.11: ICAO Freighter Traffic Forecast [23] 
1.3.5 Summary of Efficiency Trends throughout the Civil Aviation 
Industry 
Given the historical trends in technology, operations, and demand growth 
throughout the history of commercial aviation, it should be evident that the overall effect 
has been ever increasing fuel use and CO2 emissions. This has certainly been the case, as 
reported by ICAO, and reproduced in Figure 1.12. As can be seen in this figure, even 
with a history of technological and operational improvements, significant increases in 
demand have led to continual increases in aviation fuel use. In addition to the increase in 
overall fuel use, the fraction of CO2 emitted from aviation compared to all other sources 




Figure 1.12: Summary of Aviation Fuel Use and CO2 Emissions Over Time [2] 
As a result of these historical trends in aviation fuel use, it’s expected that 
medium-term mitigation of aviation CO2 emissions can come from improved fuel 
efficiency, however, such improvements will not fully offset demand growth [2]. 
Subsequently, future projections of global aviation fuel consumption and efficiency 
through 2050 reveal fuel efficiency improvements over the period on a per flight basis, 
while in absolute terms an emission gap will persist relative to necessary emissions limits 
to achieve sustainability [2, 23].  This emissions gap is the direct result of demand growth 
outpacing expected technological and operational efficiency measures being considered. 
Subsequently there are two general paths that would need to be followed in order to close 
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the emissions gap, and mitigate the harmful effects of GHG emissions from civil 
aviation.  
The first, and most obvious, path forward to help close this emissions gap is to 
push for greater increases in technological and operational efficiency than is currently 
expected. This would likely require a mixed approach to efficiency improvements from 
aircraft manufacturers as well as airline owners and operators. Pushing technological 
advancements would necessitate increased expenditures in research and development 
from aircraft manufacturers, while improving operational efficiency in the short term 
would likely increase the complexity of airlines’ operational strategies. Given the 
additional cost and complexity of such an approach, it seems unlikely that these 
increasing rates of improvement will occur independent of intervention from outside 
bodies.  
Alternatively, closing the emissions gap can also be accomplished by curbing 
demand growth to levels at or below expected technological advancement, accounting for 
the lag between fleet efficiency and aircraft efficiency. With that said, a reduction in 
demand growth for commercial aviation is unlikely to occur given the historical trends 
and future forecasts aforementioned. As such, realistically reducing demand growth 
would have to occur by outside intervention as well, likely through creating a real price 
for CO2 and other GHG emissions from civil aviation.   
Ultimately, closing the emissions gap in civil aviation will likely come from a 
mixed approach, pushing efficiency improvements while at the same time limiting 
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demand growth. Since neither is likely to occur without direct intervention, addressing 
this emissions gap will need to come from external mechanisms to the aviation industry, 
namely the integration of regulatory policy measures. 
1.4 The Growing Importance of Regulatory Policy in Civil Aviation 
Recent efforts to mitigate the climate change impacts of civil aviation have looked 
toward regulatory policy as an answer. Despite this more recent concern for aviation’s 
impact on our environment, it should be noted that regulation in commercial aviation has 
only come about historically as a result of immediate concern or annoyance [28]. This 
fact will be explored more thoroughly in the Chapter  2, where it will be shown that from 
a regulatory perspective action is only taken once the potential for harm is occurring or 
imminent.  
Due to the fact that concern about the impact of aviation on climate change is a 
relatively new phenomenon, it lags more than a decade behind concerns about emissions 
in the vicinity of airports, and more than two decades behind noise impacts [28]. This is 
evident in the fact that the first report to consider aviation’s effect on the global 
environment was the 1999 IPCC special report titled “Aviation and the Global 
Atmosphere” [5].  As was noted previously, due to the long persistence of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, this delay in addressing climate concerns in aviation can be highly 
problematic for longer term environmental effects. It has been widely discussed by 
international regulatory bodies that significant lead time is required for prevention of 
climate change [5, 10], and yet we are only beginning to address these concerns.  
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In addition to this late entry addressing these environmental concerns, other issues 
associated with making regulatory decisions in the face of immediate concerns exist. 
When regulation is pursued to address immediate concerns, the resulting regulations are 
difficult to generalize, often aimed at meeting a singular environmental goal, and the 
potential to be disruptive to other policies or market mechanisms is sometimes poorly 
explored. These policy mechanisms are generally pursued one at a time, are 
geographically dispersed, and there is no standard framework on which to assess 
interaction among various policy measures. So, while regulatory policy aimed at 
mitigating CO2 in civil aviation may push the technological and operational efficiency of 
the aviation industry, there is little evidence to suggest they will impact demand growth 
and thus lead to lower CO2 emissions in the industry as a whole.   
Despite the issues associated with regulatory policy throughout civil aviation’s 
history, a number of policy options to reduce emissions beyond inherent market 
incentives exist. Typically, these emissions reduction policies fall into one of three basic 
policy schemes including: command-and-control policy, market-based measures, and 
voluntary agreements, each of which will be discussed here. While groups such as the 
IPCC and ICAO have considered many of these mechanisms in their analysis of the 
future of civil aviation, many of these approaches have not been fully investigated or 
tested in commercial aviation [5]. Further, the assessment of interactions between 
multiple implemented policies addressing a singular goal, such as CO2, has yet to be 
accomplished on an aviation system wide level.  
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A more thorough discussion of aviation specific policies is included in the 
Chapter  2. The following discussion however, will highlight the basic mechanisms of 
each type of policy scheme, as well as the benefits and challenges generally associated 
with each approach.  
1.4.1 Command and Control Policy 
Command and control policy mechanisms are those in which governments require 
or prohibit specific actions [29]. Typically this is manifested through a strict rule that 
must be met regardless of the situation for a firm or consumer. For instance, in the U.S., 
command and control policies exist in environmental policy, such as the Corporate 
Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards for automobile manufacturers. In these 
standards, a strict requirement exists for all automotive manufacturers. Each of these 
manufacturers must meet or exceed the standard, or they face high fines and possible 
exclusion from the U.S. market [30].  As is the case for CAFE standards, if sufficient 
resources are available for monitoring and enforcement, these approaches can be quite 
effective.  
However, it has been noted throughout literature that when governments are 
unable to offer such monitoring, when environmental damage comes from hard to detect 
sources, and when the need is to encourage innovation rather than prohibit action, these 
command and control approaches are often less effective than other potential measures 
[14, 29, 31, 32]. Additionally, due to the lack of flexibility for regulated entities to decide 
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how to best meet their emissions reduction targets, these types of regulations tend to be 
less cost effective than other market based measures [7].   
As such, the strength of command and control policy is the ability to achieve a 
stated goal through a well-defined course of action. By specifying a strict rule set to abide 
by, regulatory bodies are able to achieve these goals with very little uncertainty. 
However, this level of government control provides very little flexibility for the entities 
being regulated, and offers no incentives for further regulation beyond a stated goal.  
Subsequently, command and control policy is typically only effective in relatively 
homogeneous markets where regulatory bodies can provide significant oversight.  
For a more complete discussion of the results of command and control policy, 
such as CAFE Standards, please refer to Appendix A.  
1.4.2 Market Based Measures 
 Market based measures are those policies that provide an economic incentive for 
change. These options typically include environmental levies, such as charges and taxes, 
and emissions trading. The perceived benefit of such approaches is the potential to 
encourage technological innovation and improve efficiency, including the reduction of 
demand for air travel, which is a necessity for overall reductions in CO2 emissions [2, 5]. 
It has been mentioned throughout the most recent IPCC assessment report released in 
2007, that policies that provide a real or implicit price of carbon could create incentives 
for both producers and consumers to significantly invest in low GHG products, 
technologies, and processes [2, 33]. Further, researchers in regulatory policy, such as 
29 
 
Elinor Ostrom, have argued that financial instruments can provide incentives to achieve 
emissions reduction targets [29]. Ultimately, what is being indicated through economic 
research is that these market based approaches to policy are more likely to provide a 
balance between the costs and benefits of achieving GHG reductions. That being said, 
due to the more decentralized control of these mechanisms, there is greater uncertainty 
regarding how the goals set forth are achieved.  
 The following discussion will highlight both emissions trading and taxes, offering 
some examples of each policy scheme implemented in the U.S.  
1.4.2.1 Trading and Offsetting 
While trading and offsetting market based mechanisms provide incentives for 
environmental improvement, they can be quite varied in how they are implemented. 
Currently, one of the most popular schemes for market based policy mechanisms is 
through the establishment of trading and offsetting, which is also often referred to as cap 
and trade policy. GHG emissions trading and offsetting was initially introduced as a part 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which provided three distinct mechanisms to do so [2, 34]:  
1. Emissions Trading: Developed countries may transfer Kyoto units to, or acquire 
units from, another developed country.  
2. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): This project-based mechanism 
involves credits generated from the implementation of emission reduction projects 
or from afforestation and reforestation projects in developing countries.  
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3. Joint Implementation (JI): A project based mechanism where one developed 
country can invest in a project that reduces emissions or enhances sequestration in 
another developed country, receiving credits for the emissions reduction.  
The ideas surrounding trading and offsetting have become core tenets of a number 
of current regulatory policy mechanisms, with one of the most widely discussed globally 
being the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A more thorough 
examination of the EU ETS is provided in 2.4.2.2, as it pertains directly to commercial 
aviation. However, trading and offsetting policy mechanisms have been implemented in 
the U.S. as well in recent decades. In fact, one of the most celebrated domestic 
environmental policies is the U.S. EPA’s Acid Rain Program established under the Clean 
Air Act of 1990 [35]. In order to provide a more complete understanding of this cap and 
trade policy in the domestic U.S. the following discussion is provided.  
1.4.2.1.1 Clean Air Act of 1990 
Arguably one of the most influential cap and trade programs implemented 
globally was the U.S. Acid Rain program created under Title IV of the Clean Air Act of 
1990. The amendments implemented in the CAA of 1990 were specifically aimed at 
reducing the sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from electric utility 
generators [36]. In order to accomplish this objective, a permanent cap was set on SO2 
emissions from utility companies at about half of the annual emissions occurring in 1980 
[35, 36]. Additionally, one of the core tenets of this market-based approach to 
environmental regulation was the unrestricted trading of emission allowances by utility 
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companies. Each allowance ultimately represents one ton of SO2 emissions released from 
a plant’s smokestack, and they are issued based on the set cap and a relative measure of 
market presence [35]. If a given utility generator expects to emit more SO2 than available 
allowances permit, it must purchase allowances on an open market or implement 
technologies to control emissions. It is this flexibility in compliance that has been cited as 
a harbinger for efficient, inexpensive innovation in the U.S. coal power generation 
market. In fact, it has been noted in literature that the CAA of 1990 did not necessarily 
lead to “more innovation”, but rather produced “more environmentally-friendly 
innovation” [37].  
The result of this cap and trade policy was ultimately a substantial reduction in 
acid deposition in the environment. This quite obviously occurred due to the fact that the 
patents granted during the 1990s showed significant improvement in the efficiency of the 
scrubbers removing pollutants from coal power producers [37]. In fact, it has been shown 
that the rate of decline of acid deposition in the environment has accelerated since Phase I 
of the 1990 CAA was implemented in 1995, and as of 2005 emissions reductions totaled 
more than 7 million tons of SO2 from power plants, reaching almost 41% below 1980 
levels [35, 38]. As a result, it’s quite apparent that this type of market-based cap and trade 
policy has been shown to be effective at reaching substantial environmental goals.  
In addition to meeting environmental goals, one of the most widely discussed 
aspects of market-based policies is the potential to meet environmental objectives at a 
lower cost than through traditional command and control approaches. Interestingly, the 
regulation of emissions from coal fired power plants occurred under a command and 
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control regime prior to 1990, so the economic impacts of the two distinct policy 
mechanisms can be compared directly. What has been identified in literature is that the 
research and development for scrubbers performed under the command and control 
period did not result in a cleaner environment, but just in a lower compliance cost for the 
utilities [37]. It has been evident throughout implementation of this policy that the 
market-based approach has allowed for greater flexibility in how utility generators 
comply with the law, leading to more efficient and inexpensive mitigation of emissions. 
Despite this success, there has been some criticism of cap and trade policy in literature 
due to the uncertainty and volatility of allowance price created in an open trading market 
[39].  
In the end, what the CAA of 1990 was able to demonstrate was that for power 
producers, previous command and control policy incentivized innovation that lowered the 
cost of installing and operating scrubbers, while market-based policy produced a real cost 
of emissions incentivizing real improvements on the efficiency of the scrubbers at 
removing the pollutant species targeted [36, 37]. In the context of commercial aviation, 
some direct comparison can occur regarding aircraft owners and operators. If policy only 
dictates the types of aircraft that could be employed (command and control) then air 
carriers could be incentivize to utilize only those that lower the cost of operations without 
a direct link to any specific pollutant species. However, if a real cost is associated with a 
pollutant species, then it is likely that air carriers would be incentivized to reduce 
emissions in the most efficient manner possible.  
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1.4.2.2 Taxes and Levies 
Another widely discussed, although rarely implemented market based policy 
mechanism, is environmental levies, which include environmentally focused taxes and 
other charges. While some nations throughout the world have already imposed fuel taxes 
on domestic air services [40], direct taxation of the aviation industry is often a 
contentious issue [41-45]. Despite this political controversy, the idea is widely discussed 
among policymakers and the organizations they represent, especially in response to the 
current urgency to address environmental protection [2, 28]. In large part, this 
consideration is a result of the acceptance among economists and policymakers that 
emissions taxes are generally a more economically efficient policy tool to address GHG 
emissions than other policies, including trading and offsetting schemes [2, 7, 8]. The 
reasoning behind such claims is illustrated by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
in a 2009 report where it’s noted that higher fuel prices would make the costs of low-
emissions technologies relatively cheaper and would likely encourage their development 
[7]. However, the overall impact of these environmental levies is dependent on 
worldwide participation, since the existence of lower taxes in a given region could lead to 
a “race to the bottom”. As such, most studies considering the implementation of 
environmentally effective levies recognize the need to consider them in the context of an 
international framework [5, 46].  
Ultimately, both trading and offsetting schemes as well as environmental levies 
work from the same principle, which is to create a real price for emissions. While trading 
and offsetting tends to be viewed as more politically feasible [39], current legislation 
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exists throughout the U.S. that specifies a direct tax on gasoline sales. Typically, these 
taxes vary from state to state, however, they have all been shown to have a real impact on 
consumer demand for gasoline, and thus overall emissions of CO2 [47]. As such, they 
have proven to be an effective mechanism to curb consumer demand, and mitigate overall 
GHG emissions. Despite this fact, there have often been concerns raised regarding this 
form of environmental levy as being a regressive policy [48]. That is, a policy which has 
a disproportionate effect on less affluent members of society. While it’s recognized that 
this concern exists, research has shown that the disproportionate effects of such a tax in 
the U.S. have been less regressive than initially thought [49].  
1.4.2.3 Summary of Market-Based Measures 
In the end, the market-based policy measures discussed here operate in 
fundamentally the same capacity. That is, they create a real cost for GHG emissions in 
order to reduce demand, spur innovation, and incentivize new technology adoption. 
Given this, there are a number of differences between trading and offsetting schemes and 
environmental levies. While the previous discussion implicitly covers these differences, 
Table 1.1 is provided to summarize the main advantages and disadvantages of each 






Table 1.1: Comparison of Trading and Offsetting with Taxes and Levies 
 Trading and Offsetting Taxes and Levies 
Advantages • Creates a real price for 
emissions 
• Provides a known emission cap 
• Allows flexibility in meeting 
goals 
• Incentivizes technology 
investment 
• Creates a real price for 
emissions 
• Incentivizes technology 
investment 
• Produces real impact on 
consumer demand 
Disadvantages • Uncertain compliance cost 
• Potential volatility in 
allowance market 
• May produce disproportionate 
effects on entities 
• May be regressive 
• Creates uncertain 
emission totals 
1.4.3 Voluntary Agreements 
In addition to these market based policy mechanisms, there are also a number of 
voluntary agreements currently being explored in order to address GHG emissions 
reductions in aviation. These voluntary agreements are measures that are taken in the 
absence of relevant regulatory obligations, or those that extend beyond existing 
obligations. Typically, these types of agreements occur in the presence of “win/win” 
situations where environmental and economic progress coincide [40]. Currently a number 
of these voluntary arrangements are in place throughout the world, including the Asia and 
Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions (ASPIRE); GHG emissions targets set between 
Transport Canada and the Air Transport Association of Canada; negotiated agreements 
among airlines, air traffic control, government and manufacturers in Romania; and 
voluntary emissions trading schemes in Japan and New Zealand [2]. Despite this 
perceived progress addressing GHG emissions on a voluntary basis, behavior changes are 
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only likely to occur so long as everyone involved benefits from the reductions. As such, 
it’s anticipated that such behavior changes may occur through increased public awareness 
of climate change, but government intervention to encourage further change will still be 
necessary [39]. This is certainly the case in the face of situations where emissions 
reductions do not align with economic progress.  
1.5 Assessing Policy Interaction in Civil Aviation 
While a number of environmentally focused policies are being agreed upon 
throughout the aviation industry, one area that still remains relatively unexplored among 
policymakers is the assessment of policy interdependencies and interaction. That is not to 
say that it has not been considered though, as there is recognition among policymakers 
that taking on climate change mitigation will affect a number of policy areas [39]. Given 
the complexity of the civil aviation industry as an integrated system with tradeoffs and 
interdependencies, it is highly likely that no single solution will adequately address CO2 
mitigation throughout the entire industry. As a result, a number of policies must be 
pursued concurrently, and their interaction with one another and the civil aviation 
industry must be understood.  
Currently, the U.S. is pursuing a mix of solutions including advanced quiet, clean, 
and energy efficient aircraft technologies and alternative jet fuels, to the implementation 
of environmentally focused operational procedures and market measures [50]. Similarly, 
EU member States have been invited to voluntarily submit action plans outlining their 
“baskets of measures” and actions to reduce international aviation CO2 emissions through 
Resolution A37-19 with ICAO as the reporting body [51]. Ultimately, the implicit 
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assumption occurring in both the U.S. and the EU is that each region will know best how 
to meet their share of the global CO2 emissions targets. While regulatory bodies such as 
ICAO have pointed out that when selecting policy mixes, the interdependencies between 
environmental effects and policies ought to be considered, there has been no established 
framework on which to accomplish this assessment [52]. Despite this fact, as of 2010, the 
Group on International Aviation and Climate Change (GIACC) under ICAO has outlined 
the basket of measures to address CO2 mitigation, and called on EU member States to 
begin their selection process [52, 53]. ICAO invited voluntary submission of national 
action plans (NAP) to the GIACC by June of 2012, and has since made a number of those 
submissions public [54]. Despite providing some guidance for submission of these action 
plans, the result from each UN member state is often quite divergent, and there is little 
indication that international goals are recognized or addressed in the national plans 
submitted [55-71]. That being said, the publicly available NAPs do prove quite useful in 
identifying policies addressing CO2 mitigation that are common to a number of regions. 
Two of the most widely discussed policies are a new aircraft certification standard and 
various trading and offsetting schemes.  
Based on the evidence surrounding policy mix identification and selection from 
U.S. and international regulatory bodies, it is quite apparent that the approach is 
accomplished on a case by case basis. It’s unclear that the emergence of regionally 
specific policies addressing CO2 will work toward the same internationally accepted CO2 
goals, and further how they may impact other policies not currently being considered, 
such as CO2 taxes and levies. At the heart of this issue is the lack of a formalized process 
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to analyze the potential policy design space in the context of the global civil aviation 
system. Due to the inherent complexity of this system, policy is currently only discussed 
in isolation, and typically under highly aggregated models of system behaviors. By 
making policy decisions in this environment we risk over-constraining the industry, 
creating a patchwork of regional policies, and introducing policies that exhibit feedback 
on one another and the civil aviation system, potentially creating adverse emergent 
behaviors. This particular issue is the crux of the following research, which is intended to 
answer the following question. 
How can the knowledge of policy tradeoffs and interdependencies be used to help 
meet internationally established goals? 
1.6 Addressing the Need 
While it’s clear that the primary need in aviation is to address the continually 
growing CO2 emissions to provide a sustainable civil aviation system, a number of more 
specific issues regarding this pursuit have been identified in literature. ICAO has been the 
international body leading the charge in the study of options for limiting GHG emissions; 
however, they have not yet been able to devise or have chosen not to publicly formalize a 
suitable framework for implementing effective mitigation policies concurrently [4]. This 
is unfortunate since making sound decisions for investments in future technologies 
requires a stable international regulatory framework based on dependable scientific 
knowledge [2]. Further, with the GIACC recommendation that EU member States 
establish their own baskets of measures to address CO2 mitigation, the absence of such a 
framework could make coordination more difficult, create distortion among competition, 
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and create unnecessary burdens for compliance [53]. Unfortunately, the reality of 
effectively addressing CO2 emissions in civil aviation will require complex institutional 
arrangements, with redundancies nested in many layers. It is well understood that simple 
strategies for CO2 mitigation that rely exclusively on a single market level, centralized 
command and control, or that eliminate redundancies in the name of efficiency will fail 
[29]. Thus, the linking of regional and local emissions policy must be the road forward. 
This must be pursued cautiously as there is little experience in linking emissions trading 
schemes or other policies [2].  
Despite the lack of a standard policy analysis framework on which to make 
decisions, a number of policy options exist, including policies that set a price on 
emissions, market based measures, regulatory standards, and funding for research and 
development that can help reduce CO2 emissions for commercial aviation [7]. 
Additionally, there is agreement and a great deal of evidence that supports the view that a 
wide variety of national policies and instruments can be employed to create the incentives 
for mitigation action, and that each region of the world (member state) will be able to 
best decide how to meet international emissions goals [33]. Ultimately, their applicability 
and effectiveness will depend on regional circumstances and an understanding of their 
interactions.  
From the following discussion, it is quite evident that the mitigation of CO2 in 
civil aviation is a primary concern for policymakers throughout the world. As it’s 
unlikely that technology or operational efficiency alone will provide the necessary 
reductions in fuel use to stabilize GHG emissions from aviation, the only feasible course 
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of action is to pursue a range of mitigation measures. These measures will likely come in 
the form of internationally agreed upon aircraft CO2 standards, emissions trading 
schemes, and potential environmental levies. However, due to the current approach to 
policymaking it’s likely that various states throughout the world will pursue their own 
mix of policy options in order to best meet CO2 targets without a standard framework on 
which to assess interactions throughout the civil aviation industry. 
The purpose of this research will be to establish a formalized process that will 
serve as the needed policy analysis framework to allow policymakers to make informed 
decisions based on quantitative data of the civil aviation industry. This process will be 
exploratory in nature, in order to provide a basis to understand the full realm of possible 
consequences of regulatory policies and their interactions. The intent is to account for the 
interaction of policies, and provide a more open policy design space throughout the 
policymaking process. In addition to this primary goal, an expansion of the lexicon upon 
which regulatory policy can be discussed will also be pursued. The purpose of expanding 
this lexicon will be to provide a common language that can be used to discuss regionally 
specific policy and track potential interaction in a global context. Based on analysis of 
current literature and submitted NAPs, this research will focus on two distinct policies 
widely discussed throughout the world. Those policies are a a new certification standard 
aimed at increasing aircraft efficiency, and emissions trading schemes which will provide 
a real cost for CO2 emissions. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of formalizing a 
quantitative, concurrent policy analysis process, implementation within the domestic U.S. 
will serve as the geographic region of study. The hope is to provide evidence of success 
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that could then be applied to other regions of the world, ultimately helping to inform 
future versions of UN member states’ NAPs.  
42 
 
CHAPTER  2 
CURRENT PROGRESS ON DEFINING AND ADDRESSING CO2 
MITIGATION 
Given the need to provide a framework for the quantification and scientific 
analysis of environmental policy tradeoffs in civil aviation, the problem that CO2 
represents for commercial aviation must first be addressed. Following this, a discussion 
of the structure of the civil aviation system will be provided. Additionally, policymaking 
in the context of commercial aviation will be addressed, and the inherent uncertainty 
regarding both policy and the physical system will be discussed. Provided with this 
background on the problem of CO2 policy in civil aviation, the foundations for 
exploratory modeling proposed to address this need will be covered, in addition to 
suitable policy analysis frameworks that can be employed.  
2.1 Defining the CO2 Problem in Civil Aviation 
In order to establish an effective policy analysis framework that can account for 
multiple mitigation measures nested at different levels of a complex system, an 
understanding of the type of problem CO2 mitigation represents is first necessary. From a 
conceptual perspective, the problem can be stated as follows: the atmosphere represents a 
finite resource of clean air, as we externalize the costs associated with civil aviation 
activities through the emission of CO2 we deplete this finite resource. While this may 
seem to be a gross simplification of the problem, it serves to show that our CO2 emissions 
are the result of the cost of polluting being lower than the cost of removing those 
pollutants before they reach the atmosphere. As we continue to put these pollutants into 
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the atmosphere there may be a point in time when our pristine environment no longer 
exists in its useful state, and catastrophic climate impacts can occur. In this way, the 
problem of CO2 emissions in civil aviation can be viewed as a tragedy of the commons 
problem, where the atmosphere represents our global commons. There has been a great 
deal of discussion regarding these problems in the social sciences, and their relevance to 
pollution, including GHG emissions, is widely accepted [72].  
In addition to being a tragedy of the commons problem, the focus of this policy 
analysis framework is to assist the global civil aviation industry as a whole to meet very 
aggressive emissions goals. The air transportation system represents a highly complex 
system, with heterogeneous, geographically distributed, component systems working 
together to perform functions that could not be anticipated by a single system alone. It 
will be shown that this structure is typically classified as a system-of-systems (SoS). 
Subsequently, the mitigation of CO2 throughout civil aviation can be characterized more 
specifically as a system-of-systems tragedy of the commons. For more information 
regarding tragedy of commons please refer to Appendix B. 
2.2 Tragedy of the Commons as a System-of-Systems (SoS) 
It should be noted that many of these tragedy of the commons involve a number 
of systems or actors operating cooperatively in a hierarchical structure, producing 
aggregate effects at a level that cannot be predicted by the analysis of a single system or 
actor alone. Generally, these system structures are referred to in academic literature as 
complex systems or systems-of-systems depending on the criteria by which they act. In 
the canonical example of the shared pasture land, the individual herdsman can be thought 
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of as a system, as can the pasture itself. The community or village in which these systems 
interact could then be considered a higher level system. As was illustrated in the previous 
sections, while each component system (herdsman) maximized individual utility, the 
result for the higher level system (community) was ruin. 
In analyzing tragedy of the commons problems, it is observed that many 
(including the civil aviation industry) can be classified as system-of-systems problems. 
The following discussion will provide a background on system-of-systems, including a 
definition and criteria by which they can be categorized. In doing so, it will be shown that 
the civil aviation system can be classified as a SoS, and further that regulatory policy in 
the civil aviation system is an integral part of the SoS structure.  
2.3 System-of-Systems Background  
The numerous definitions provided by researchers in the field of system-of-
systems engineering (SoSE) can create some confusion around such an abstract concept 
as SoS. As a basis for understanding SoS, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines SoS 
as “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities [73].” Within this 
definition the system is treated as a group of regularly interacting elements forming a unified 
whole which are functionally, physically, or behaviorally related [73]. In the context of 
commercial aviation a system can be viewed at a number of levels. For instance, the aircraft 
itself is a system of physically and functionally related components making up a vehicle. In 
the same vein, the congregation and utilization of these vehicles at the level of air carriers can 
also be considered a separate system, where the interactions of the aircraft are behaviorally 
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related. This type of interplay among the systems ultimately continues through higher levels 
of the global air transportation system. 
2.3.1 System-of-Systems Types 
Given this generalized definition underpinning SoS, it should be recognized that a 
number of different types of SoS exist. There are four basic types of systems-of-systems 
identified by the DoD that are often cited throughout SoS literature, which include virtual, 
collaborative, acknowledged, and directed [73-75]. Each of these forms of SoS will be briefly 
introduced here, with specific attention paid to how the air transportation system fits into the 
provided definitions.  
2.3.1.1 Virtual System-of-Systems 
Virtual SoS are characterized by a lack of central management authority or 
control, as well as an unspecified agreed upon purpose for the system-of-system [73]. 
Ultimately the behaviors that emerge may be desirable, but the SoS relies on unknown 
mechanisms to maintain it. In a sense, the interaction of a community without a central 
housing authority could be considered a Virtual SoS. In this example, individuals in the 
community would act as independent entities lacking any centralized control or goal. 
While their interactions may produce emergence that benefits the community as a whole 
or not, the connections throughout the community remain relatively invisible.  
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2.3.1.2 Collaborative System-of-Systems 
Building from the Virtual SoS, Collaborative SoS also lack centralized authority; 
however, the component systems tend to interact voluntarily to accomplish agreed upon 
purposes [73]. As such, the component systems retain independence and individual 
control while working toward a more collaborative goal. The most widely discussed and 
established Collaborative SoS throughout literature is the Internet [73, 76]. In this SoS, 
the entities comprising the interconnected web services collectively decide methods for 
providing or denying service. So, while the Internet Engineering Task Force exists to 
work out standards (agreed upon central purposes) it has no actual authority on which to 
enforce them. Despite this lack of centralized control, the Internet tends to produce 
behaviors which enforce and maintain the standards established by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force. 
2.3.1.3 Acknowledged System-of-Systems 
Taking this buildup one step further, Acknowledged SoS are characterized as 
having recognized central objectives, a designated manager or authority, and resources 
for the SoS. However, the component systems in an Acknowledged SoS retain 
independent ownership, objectives, funding, and development and sustainment 
approaches [73]. In this sense, the commercial air transportation system can be viewed as 
an Acknowledged SoS. The ATS operates at a high level in order to transport people and 
goods throughout the world, and is ultimately managed by a number of control authorities 
and regulatory bodies, sharing common resources such as airports, air space, and the like. 
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Additionally, the component systems represented by air carriers and aircraft 
manufacturers operate independently, retaining ownership and funding of their individual 
activities. Ultimately, what is important to note from this recognition is that commercial 
air transportation can have agreed upon central goals (ie. the mitigation of CO2), has a 
designated managing authority (such as ICAO, the FAA, etc.), but the systems that 
comprise the ATS retain independent functionality.  
2.3.1.4 Directed System-of-Systems  
Finally, Directed SoS take the concept of integration within a SoS to its logical 
extreme where the system-of-systems is developed and managed to fulfill specific 
purposes [73]. These Directed SoS are centrally managed throughout the life of 
operations to fulfill any purposes the managers of the SoS may wish to address. While the 
component systems maintain the ability to operate independently, typical modus operandi 
subordinates control to the centrally managed purpose. An example of such a SoS would 
typically come from a national defense perspective, where a number of component 
systems operate to fulfill a specified mission under the control of a central command 
[77].  
2.3.2 Proposed Definition of System-of-Systems 
Moving beyond this generalized understanding, the underlying concepts of SoS 
tend to share a number of key tenets, and as such, SoS generally entail physically 
distributed systems with overall functionality dependent on linkages between 
heterogeneous, distributed systems [78]. Within some systems, such as the air 
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transportation system, many of these component systems are sentient, and involve the 
complex interactions of thinking and evolving resources. In order to capture this nuance 
of the particular SoS being studied here, a more complete definition adopted as provided 
by DeLaurentis: 
“[SoS are] a collection of trans-domain networks of 
heterogeneous systems likely to exhibit operational and managerial 
independence, geographical distribution, and emergent behaviors that 
would not be apparent if the systems and their interactions are modeled 
separately [79].” 
 
This definition provides a rather comprehensive summary of SoS, and 
incorporates the five principles of true SoS outlined by Maier [74]. These principles are 
operational independence, managerial independence, evolutionary development, 
emergent behavior, and geographic distribution. A summary of these properties is 
reproduced in Table 2.1, and is adapted from [74]. They will ultimately be used to define 
public policy as an integral part of SoS, and adapted to formally define systems-of-








Table 2.1: Properties of Systems-of-Systems (SoS) 
Principle Description 
Operational Independence of 
Elements 
The systems comprising the SoS can operate 
independently and are useful in their own right. 
Managerial Independence of 
Elements 
The systems comprising the SoS not only can 
but do operate independently in a useful way. 
Evolutionary Development The SoS is never fully formed. Functions are 
often added, removed, and modified.  
Emergent Behavior The principle behaviors of a SoS cannot be 
localized to any component system. They are 
emergent properties of the system as a whole. 
Geographic Distribution The geographic extent of the systems in a SoS is 
large enough such that information can be shared 
but not mass or energy. 
 
2.3.3 SoS Lexicon 
These definitions and principles provided by the DoD and academic researchers 
provide a foundational basis for understanding SoS; however, defining a SoS is only the 
first step in identification of true SoS problems. Moving past identification, to classify 
and discuss the SoS, a lexicon is required. This lexicon must serve as the common 
language among SoSE that allows ideas and solutions to be discussed throughout the 
community at large. Unfortunately, this formal lexicon has been largely absent or 
underdeveloped by many SoSE in the field, although in recent years the idea of 
promoting a lexicon and ultimately taxonomy specific to SoS has taken hold. Leading 
this effort has been academics such as DeLaurentis and Callaway, who in 2004 proposed 
one of the first explicit lexicons describing the categories and hierarchy of transportation 
SoS problems [80]. This lexicon has been adapted somewhat since first being proposed in 
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2004, and the lexicon provided here is an interpretation of Delaurentis’ work since that 
time. 
The lexicon consists of two primary structures, system categories and hierarchical 
levels of organization. The system categories provide a decomposition of the 
distinguishing traits of SoS problems, each of which is composed of multiple hierarchical 
levels, where each level represents a collection of systems organized in a network. The 
levels are given Greek symbols in order to avoid confusion with naming conventions (i.e. 
subsystem, system, system-of-system, architecture) [80]. DeLaurentis presents this 
overarching structure as an “unfolded pyramid”, and a reproduction of this pyramid is 
provided below in Figure 2.1 [80, 81]. Additionally, a more complete description of the 
system categories is provided in Table 2.2 below [80-82]. 
 





Resources Operations Economics Stakeholders Policy 
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Category Name Description 
Resources Entities that give physical manifestation to the SoS 
Stakeholders Non-physical entities that give intent to the SoS 
operation through established values 
Operations The application of intent to direct the activity of 
physical and non-physical entities 
Economics The non-physical, sentient systems that give a 
“living system” character to the operation of 
physical entities in a market economy 
Policy External forcing functions that impact the 
operation of physical and non-physical entities 
 
2.3.4 Civil Aviation as a Transportation SoS 
Civil aviation as a transportation SoS has been widely discussed throughout 
literature [78-80, 83-92]. As such, a discussion of the application of the principles of SoS 
will be directed to existing literature, while the discussion of civil aviation as a SoS here 
will illustrate the hierarchical structure of the air transportation system.  In order to begin 
to discuss civil aviation as a SoS, the lexicon previously developed will be utilized. As a 
starting point, the application of this lexicon for general transportation SoS is introduced 
in Table 2.3 [80]. This table provides a general description of the resources, operations, 








Table 2.3: Lexicon for Understanding Transportation System-of-Systems [80] 
 
In order to translate this table to the hierarchical structure of the unfolded pyramid 
previously developed, specific entities in each category and level can be mapped through 
their given interactions. To provide a brief look at how such a mapping could occur for 
the global air transportation system, Figure 2.2 provides a resource example of a notional 
SoS structure for civil aviation. This figure has been adapted from the previous work of 
DeLaurentis and Callaway [80]. As can be seen here, at the lowest level of the SoS 
hierarchy are individual system resources, such as aircraft, runways, and terminals. These 
resources serve as component systems of higher level systems, such as the airlines and 
airports, which in turn are grouped in the national airspace systems, and ultimately the 
global air transportation system. While the greek symbols representing the hierarchical 
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levels do provide a general structure for mapping, future discussions regarding SoS will 
utilize more descriptive names of levels. 
 
Figure 2.2: Resource Example of the Global Civil Aviation System-of-Systems 
Hierarchy 
It should be noted here that while policy is given a category in the SoS structure, 
there is no differentiation between the internal policies of an organization and policies 
coming from regulatory bodies. As such, there is still a great deal of confusion regarding 
the treatment of regulatory policy in these transportation systems. While select academics 
such as DeLaurentis and Augusdinata have discussed the implementation of regulatory 
policy analysis and design in a SoS, these ideas have yet to be implemented in such a 
context [78, 80]. Ultimately, one purpose of this dissertation is to provide a sound 
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foundational framework to include policy analysis in the context of such transportation 
SoS. This idea will continue to be explored throughout this document. 
2.4 Policymaking in Civil Aviation 
Given this understanding of the physical structure of the civil aviation industry, 
it’s next important to provide an overview of regulatory policy in the context of this SoS. 
The following discussion will provide an historical perspective on regulatory policy in 
commercial aviation, as well the environmental policies currently gaining traction 
throughout the industry. 
2.4.1 An Historical Perspective 
Since the late 1960s, regulatory policy has been a part of the civil aviation 
industry. As mentioned in the Chapter  1 of this document, regulation in the civil aviation 
industry has typically only come about as a result of immediate concern or annoyance, 
which will be highlighted in this discussion. Additionally, a number of unintended 
consequences have occurred and will be mentioned. 
While the Wright brothers’ first flight occurred in 1903, regulatory policy was 
absent from the civil aviation community until the late 1960s, when the noise resulting 
from the rapid growth in civil aviation began to become a nuisance. In 1969, less than a 
decade after the introduction of the Comet 4 and Boeing 707,  widespread complaints of 
noise around airports led the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to introduce its 
first aircraft noise regulations, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 36 [28, 93]. 
55 
 
Almost immediately after this ruling, ICAO followed suit in 1971 by adopting similar 
standards in ICAO Annex 16, Chapters 1 and 2, which outlined acceptable noise levels 
for both early jet engines, as well as the relatively new aircraft powered by the quieter 
low bypass ratio turbofans [28]. These rules were updated in 1977 when ICAO adopted 
Chapter 3 Noise Standards, setting much more demanding requirements for new aircraft 
entrants that could only be met by medium and high bypass ratio turbofan engines, and in 
1990 further regulations began to require all Chapter 2 aircraft to be withdrawn from 
service within 12 years [28]. In 2001, ICAO adopted Chapter 4 noise requirements, 
which now impact all new aircraft types certified after January of 2006 [28]. This 
progression of stricter noise requirements has occurred as a result of ever increasing 
demand and utilization of airports, which has created a great deal of noise pollution 
around many of the world’s largest airports.   
The main instrument through which newer aircraft have been able to meet noise 
requirements has been the progressive increase in engine bypass ratio, which was driven 
by the demand from airlines for better fuel economy and lower noise; however, there 
have been adverse consequences as a result of these decisions. While high bypass 
turbofan engines do reduce fuel burn and noise, they require higher engine pressure 
ratios, which in turn increase engine temperatures and thus NOx production [1]. 
Ultimately, the combination of increasing demand and increasing bypass ratio created an 
environment where local NOx pollution became a public health concern, and in the 1980s 
regulatory bodies began to consider air quality standards for civil aircraft. The first 
standard to address such concerns were the ICAO standards on soot, which came into 
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effect in 1983 [28]. The soot standards were followed in 1986 by additional standards on 
unburned hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and NOx [28]. This year represented a major 
milestone in international civil aviation regulatory history, as the Committee on Aviation 
Environmental Protection (CAEP) under ICAO established its first cycle for emissions 
monitoring.  
Despite the rapidly growing importance of regulatory policy in civil aviation 
through the 1980s, it was not until the late 1990s that the impact of aviation GHG 
emissions on global climate change became part of the regulatory discourse. The 
beginnings of this recognition occurred in 1996, following a request from ICAO, which 
directed the IPCC to produce a special report assessing the consequences of GHG 
emissions from aircraft engines [28]. This directive ultimately led to the 1999 IPCC 
report titled “Aviation and the Global Atmosphere”, which was the first report to consider 
the effects of aviation in global climate change [5].  While this report was being written, 
the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon, which committed signatories to cutting GHG 
emissions by 12.5% of 1990 levels by 2012; however, this agreement explicitly excluded 
international civil aviation [28, 94]. This type of exemption of international aviation from 
regulation is not uncommon, and in 2003 Council Directive 2003/96/EC, restructured the 
framework for the taxation of energy products while specifically exempting aviation fuel 
from taxes [40]. As a result, while the recognition of aviation’s impact on global climate 
change gained popularity in the late 1990s, little was done to actually address GHG 
emissions until the late 2000’s. Ultimately, the first binding resolution passed to address 
CO2 mitigation from civil aviation came from the adoption of EU Directive 
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2008/101/EC, which included aviation in the European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) starting in 2012 [95-97]. Despite this step forward in mitigating CO2 
emissions from commercial aviation, there has been substantial pushback throughout the 
world regarding inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS, especially in the United States 
[98, 99]. With that said, more substantial international collaboration on CO2 mitigation 
has occurred since 2009 in civil aviation, with the continued development of an aircraft 
certification standard under the direction of CAEP [100]. While it’s not clear when this 
standard will ultimately take effect, it is expected to be finalized within the coming years. 
Due to the fact that they are the basis of the case study explored later in this research, 
both the EU ETS and the concept of an aircraft CO2 standard will be discussed in much 
greater detail later in this chapter. 
Given this discussion, what should be apparent from this historical perspective is 
that regulation within commercial aviation has only come about as a result of immediate 
concern or annoyance. These concerns over noise, air quality, and the climate have 
developed as the demand for aviation has grown exponentially since the 1950s, with 
passage of regulation first addressing immediate annoyance (noise), then localized 
concerns (air quality), and only recently a global crisis (climate change). This fact is 
highlighted in Figure 2.3 [101], where the introduction of different types of regulation are 




Figure 2.3: Policy Introduction as a Result of Demand 
In order to provide a more illustrative representation of the history of regulatory 
policy in civil aviation, the reader is referred to Appendix E. Here, the timeline outlining 
the major regulatory policies discussed in this section is provided in a single figure.  
In the end, what is most evident regarding the history of regulatory policy in civil 
aviation is the order of attention given to the concerns of noise, local air quality, and 
climate change. What is meant by this is that the issues addressed first in commercial 
aviation were those that can be solved immediately, while the issues currently being 
addressed may take many generations to produce realizable results. It is unfortunate that 
climate change concerns are only recently being discussed, since ultimately they will 
require the greatest time and effort to produce sustainable behaviors.  
Noise	  Standards




2.4.2 Regulatory Policies Relevant to CO2 Mitigation in Civil Aviation 
Despite this inaction, in the last four years policymakers have been able to agree 
on a number of regulations specifically targeting CO2 emissions in civil aviation. In large 
part, these policies have come about as a result of growing interest in market based 
measures to regulate energy and transportation sectors, and have been focused on aircraft 
operators. However, more recently, there has been a push by ICAO to establish an 
aircraft CO2 certification standard for aircraft manufacturers. The following section will 
address the result of these recent pushes in international policymaking in civil aviation 
throughout the last few years. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a basis of 
knowledge for the regulatory policies in questions. Due to the fact that they are expected 
to have great importance in the coming years, this research is attempting to first answer 
“What are the impacts of an aircraft CO2 standard or ETS in isolation?” It is hoped that 
addressing this question will help answer, “How will the combined effect of these policies 
differ from their implementation in isolation?”  
2.4.2.1 Market-Based Measures 
Due to the fact that market based regulatory measures have gained popularity in 
recent years, a number of emerging national and regional trading schemes have begun to 
address CO2 emissions in civil aviation. The result has been the creation of a number of 
regionally specific CO2 policies throughout the world. Likely the most important of these 
trading schemes is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was 
established in 2005, and modified in 2008 to include aircraft operators in the EU starting 
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in 2012 [1, 2, 95, 102]. Other countries, such as New Zealand, Canada, and Japan have 
introduced their own emissions trading schemes (ETS) [2, 40]; however, in New Zealand 
and Japan participation in the ETS has been voluntary, and in Canada it is still unclear 
whether aviation will be included. In other parts of the world, such as the United States 
and Australia, cap and trade systems have been considered, but there has yet to be formal 
rules for the inclusion of aviation into such schemes [2].  
In addition to these trading schemes, other regionally specific policies are taking 
hold. For instance, Norway has implemented a CO2 tax on aviation fuel for the domestic 
civil aviation industry, and Switzerland has voluntarily agreed to an 8% reduction in 
domestic CO2 emissions from all transportation fuels, including aviation compared to 
1990 levels by 2012 [40]. The introduction of a fuel tax in Norway is actually a very 
progressive measure regarding civil aviation CO2 policy, and is a rather unique 
environmental levy in the civil aviation industry. There is the potential this type of 
environmental levy could become more common though, as it’s one of the measures 
proposed by a number of environmental groups to mitigate CO2 emissions in civil 
aviation [28].  
2.4.2.2 European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
As aforementioned, previous experience with cap and trade policy mechanisms in 
the United States have been somewhat limited, however, these policies have been in 
effect since the Clean Air Act of the 1970s [103]. Ultimately, the SO2 emission trading 
program created under the Clean Air Act of 1990 produced significant abatement of 
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emissions primarily from the power sector at a lower cost than expected [103, 104]. In 
this way emission trading tends to offer the ability to meet environmental goals in the 
most cost-effective way by creating a market price for carbon that is “equal to the lowest 
marginal abatement cost amongst all controlled sources” [103]. 
Further, it should be noted that cap and trade systems are also advantageous due 
to the fact that they provide environmental certainty on overall emissions levels from 
covered sources. This is accomplished through the establishment and enforcement of an 
overall cap on emissions. Given these facts, emission trading has been observed to be an 
effective way of meeting environmental goals while minimizing the distortions to 
competition in covered markets [103].  As such, in recent years it was deemed 
advantageous to integrate international aviation into existing emission trading schemes, 
namely the EU ETS, instead of designing a new trading model exclusively for aviation 
[105]. In order to become better acquainted with such schemes, Appendix C provides an 
overview of the EU ETS, performance throughout the trial period, known issues with the 
implemented policy, and insights from other studies on the EU ETS. The key features of 
emission trading schemes will be highlighted here for future work in this document.  
2.4.2.2.1 Aviation’s Inclusion in the EU ETS  
A number of aviation specific EU ETS studies have been conducted throughout 
literature. More frequently, these studies are becoming objective and quantifiable in 
nature, relying on established models of the EU economy and business practices of the 
regulated entities. Dr. Annella Anger provides a good overview of some of the most 
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widely cited studies in a recent review of the impacts of the EU ETS on aviation, which is 
reproduced in Table 2.4 from [106].  
Table 2.4:  Parameters and Assumptions of EU ETS Reviewed Studies  













Boon et al. 2007 2012-2020 15-45 4% 47.3%-100% 1% 
Ernst and 
Young 
2007 2011-2022 6-60 4% 29%-35% 1% 
Frontier 
Economics 
2006 2030 27-40 3.5%-5% Unclear 1% 
ICF 2006 2008-2012 5-21 4% Unclear 1% 
Mendes and 
Santos 
2008 2013-2017 7-30 4% 100% Unclear 
Morrell 2007 2005-2006 28 4%-30% 100% Unclear 
Scheelhaase 
and Grimme 
2007 2008-2012 15-30 0.5%-4% 100% 1%-1.5% 
SEC 2006 2010-2030 6-30 2%-4% 100% 1% 
Wit et al. 2005 2012 10-30 4% 100% 1% 
 
While many of these studies differ in design and theoretical background, a 
number of them have modeling similarities that can be addressed. For instance, Wit et. 
al., Boon et. al., and SEC all use the “Aviation Emissions and Evaluation of Reduction 
Options Modeling System” (AERO-MS) to forecast impacts of different policy 
constraints on the aviation industry for both the environment and economy [106-109]. 
The AERO-MS model is a disaggregated, sector-specific model requiring inputs of many 
different exogenous assumptions, namely economic growth rates, changes in fare levels, 
and changes in technology efficiency [106].  
In the EC’s Impact Assessment Report [109] the macroeconomic impacts, 
changes in transport demand, and changes in kerosene demand were all accomplished 
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using separate models [106]. This type of mixed modeling paradigm has been quite 
common throughout the literature on aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS, and often the 
design and theoretical background of the models are different enough to make them not 
comparable. As such, it’s proposed by Anger that a singular model or modeling paradigm 
be implemented to estimate these impacts, such as the Energy-Environment-Economy 
Model for Europe (E3ME) [102, 106, 110, 111]. The E3ME model is a described as a 
hybrid post-Keynesian macroeconomic dynamic simulation model designed to assess 
short and medium term GHG mitigation policies [112-114].  
While it’s agreed that consistency among modeling paradigms and assumptions is 
necessary for traceable policy analysis among different scientists, further discussion of 
such a specific modeling platform is not deemed useful for understanding the impact of 
aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS from current studies. It is proposed here however, that 
consistency in the modeling framework and traceable assumptions ought to be made in 
order to compare results across studies in the future. 
Despite these differences, there are a number of resulting trends that are 
consistent among the various studies on the impact of aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS.  
One of the most consistent results from these studies, which has been described 
subjectively in previous discussion, is the fact that the air transport sector will be a buyer 
of allowances at any price for EUAs [102, 106-111]. This observed phenomenon from 
various models agrees with the subjective reasoning that the abatement costs for the 
aviation sector are likely to be significantly higher than for those of other sectors covered 
under the EU ETS. Further, a number of studies also show that the impact to airlines is 
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dependent on the cost of EUAs, and will range from slight (~0.5%) to moderate (~5%) 
changes in demand over a business as usual scenario [102, 106, 115]. Despite the 
expected impacts to air travel demand, the overall effect on the EU Economy is expected 
to be insignificant in most studies [102, 106-111]. Subsequently, it can be argued that the 
results from a partial equilibrium model of the aviation sector will perform similarly to 
those anticipated through a general equilibrium framework.  
While there are many similarities among the resulting trends from these studies, 
there are still some differing opinions among many of the authors. One of the most 
evident is the determination of whether lost opportunity cost of freely allocated 
allowances will be passed onto consumers in the aviation market. Some authors argue 
that due to the level of competition and thin profitability margins, these costs will not be 
passed on in order to ensure competitiveness [115]. Others however, argue that like 
energy generators, airlines will treat all EUAs as having a market value that must be 
passed on to consumers, leading to potential problems with windfall profits [106]. At the 
moment it’s unclear how airlines will treat freely allocated EUAs, however, as long as the 
pass through of lost opportunity costs is treated as an input variable, any modeling 
framework can be useful in assessing the range of possible outcomes for the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS.   
2.4.2.2.2 Key Features of Emissions Trading Schemes 
While the preceding discussion detailed the impacts of the EU ETS during its 
initial phases of implementation and its expected impact on the inclusion of aviation, 
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there are a number of key features of any emission trading scheme that can be 
generalized for future study. It is proposed that these features can be discussed in terms of 
scope of applicability, cap setting, and the allowance allocation process for emission 
trading schemes.  
The scope of applicability is taken here to include both the entities covered under 
such a policy, as well as the effective date of applicability. For the EU ETS, trading 
initially began in 2005 (date of applicability) covering primarily power generators 
throughout the EU. Ultimately, this was expanded to include aviation activities starting in 
2012. In general, one of the main features of any emission trading scheme is a good 
definition of who is covered under the scheme, and the time frame for which it is 
applicable.  
Next, the cap setting process is necessary for any emission trading scheme. 
Ultimately, the absolute rule set by which the scheme will operate is intended to meet an 
emission target. This target is often based on scientific projections of necessary GHG 
emissions reductions in order to avoid catastrophic climate impacts, such as those set 
forth in the Kyoto Protocol and IPCC assessment reports aforementioned. The cap that is 
set must be reported, monitored, and verified by regulatory authorities, thus a key tenet of 
the cap setting process is that it must be easily measureable and the process ought to be 
traceable. For instance, in aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS, the cap is based on fuel 
sales (which can be equated to CO2 production) based on a reference year output (2004 to 




Finally, the allocation process provides the means by which allowances are 
allocated to trading entities covered in the scope of applicability. As has been shown in 
literature, this can be done through benchmarking, whereby covered entities receive 
allowances according to a benchmark of emission rates and a level of economic activity 
[105]. In aviation, this is accomplished through a benchmark period based on fuel sales, 
and a measure of market share through revenue-ton-kilometers [95]. In addition to this 
benchmarking, some harmonization may be necessary to mitigate unintended 
consequences in allocation to similar entities located in different member states covered 
under the same emission trading scheme [105]. This would be necessary for instance, if 
the U.S. were to adopt a cap and trade system for aviation with specific linkage to the EU 
ETS.  
Ultimately, the initial challenge with the establishment of any emission trading 
scheme is to demonstrate the potential to signal appropriate short and long-term GHG 
mitigation by providing a real price for emissions. By internalizing the cost of emissions 
in this way, a system can be created to demonstrate the societal decision that the abuse of 
our atmosphere is not free. 
2.4.2.3 Aircraft CO2 Emissions Standard 
At the other end of the regulatory policy spectrum are command and control 
policies. These policies provide a strict rule set by with covered entities must comply, 
such as the CAFE standards discussed previously. While not currently in effect, in 2009 
States representing 93% of global commercial air traffic reached an agreement to further 
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reduce aviation’s impact on climate change through the development of a global CO2 
standard for aircraft [10, 116]. The urgency of such a standard is quite apparent, since 
many airlines have indicated a desire for large fuel reduction goals in the next decade, 
driven largely through investments in fleet renewal [25]. The implicit expectation from 
such claims is that an aircraft CO2 standard will push manufacturers to produce fleet 
replacements getting airlines closer to their stated environmental goals. This represents an 
area where the interdependency of multiple policies is quite direct. Despite this, the 
interaction of this standard with emissions trading schemes, namely the EU ETS, has yet 
to be considered in depth.  
However, there has been a great deal of work on the establishment of the metric 
system [117], and on July 11, 2012 CAEP reached unanimous agreement on a CO2 metric 
system for the standard [118]. This has been touted as great progress throughout 
international civil aviation community. The next stage in this process will include the 
definition of certification procedures for parameters in the metric system, and the 
determination of the scope of applicability for the standard [118]. Following this, official 
approval of the CO2 metric system, and the final aircraft CO2 standard, is expected from 
ICAO in coming years [118]. The following discussion will highlight the information 
available publically regarding the possible metric system chosen by ICAO, as well as the 
potential form of a resulting Aircraft CO2 Standard. 
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2.4.2.3.1 Aircraft CO2 Standard Metric System 
While ICAO CAEP has yet to publically identify the specific form of the metric 
system that will be employed in the final standard, there has been some indication as to 
what it may be through literature. Despite this fact, literature is relatively limited, 
including just a few news releases from ICAO [116, 118], as well as a report from the 
U.S. FAA’s PARTNER Project 30 and a conference paper from researchers at the 
Georgia Institute of Technology [117, 119]. What is clear from this literature is that the 
metrics considered are simple and will directly reflect the physical properties of interest 
for the given standard.  
From the work of Lim et. al. a number of potential metric systems were 
investigated and ultimately analyzed through the use of evaluation criteria. These 
evaluation criteria (EC) were based on historical lessons throughout the metric setting 
process and include [117]: 
1. Differentiation of technology generation. 
2. Independence of purpose and utilization. 
3. Reflects fundamental design elements and capabilities. 
4. Fairness and equitability across stakeholders. 
Given the fact that CO2 emissions are directly proportional to the amount of fuel 
burned for a given fuel type, all candidate metrics considered for the notional standard 
were based on fuel burn performance and related to fuel efficiency concepts [117]. The 
metric systems considered generally fall into two basic types, being full mission metrics 
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and instantaneous performance metrics. Full mission metrics typically normalize fuel 
consumption with respect to a quantifiable measure of usefulness or capability as a 
measure of fuel efficiency. From literature, it is clear that a number of full mission 
metrics were considered throughout the metric setting process, including those shown 
below in Figure 2.4 [117]. In these metrics, FB represents block fuel burn, which is 
normalized by a number of proxy measures of useful capability, including R (range), P 
(payload), UL (useful load), and MTOW (maximum takeoff weight).   
 
 
Figure 2.4: Full Mission Metrics [117] 
Alternatively, instantaneous point performance measures of fuel efficiency were 
also investigated. The metric considered is known as specific air range (SAR), or nautical 
air mileage (NAMS), and is the air distance flown per unit fuel in steady-state flight 
[117]. In many ways this is analogous to miles per gallon (MPG) reported for 
automobiles. The advantage of such a measure is that it has been used historically in the 
aviation industry among operators and government agencies to classify aircraft fuel 
efficiency. SAR is often reported to airlines by manufacturers as a guarantee of product 
effectiveness. This measure is typically calculated as shown below in Equation 1 and 




Equation 1: Generic Form of Specific Air Range 





Here TSFC represents the thrust specific fuel consumption. Additionally, if we 
consider the case of steady flight where Thrust = Drag and Lift = Weight, Equation 1 can 
also be written: 
Equation 2: Alternative Form of Specific Air Range 







As can be observed in the above equations, SAR includes measures of efficiency, 
namely TSFC and L/D, as well as a measure of aircraft size through weight. Due to the 
fact that it’s currently also reported from manufacturers, it would likely have a lower 
certification burden in the future. While the results of Lim et. al. investigate both forms of 
metric systems, a recent news release from ICAO in 2012 indicates that the selected 
metric system was based on cruise point fuel burn performance, aircraft size, and aircraft 
weight [118]. While not explicitly stating this is the case, it seems quite apparent that the 
metric system chosen is based on a measure of 1/SAR, which would be consistent with 
the findings of Lim et. al. It should also be noted that the general observations of both 
types of metric systems indicated very similar characteristics between 1/SAR metrics and 
FB/R [117].  
In addition to a metric, it has been shown that metric systems should also adopt a 
correlating parameter in order to normalize the differences in size or capability, allowing 
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for uniform application across the fleet [117]. These metric systems, including a metric 
and correlating parameter, were tested against the EC aforementioned. As just one 
example of the tests considered, take EC1: separation of technology generation, for 
instance. In this EC, the goal is to see distinct separation among similar aircraft with 
different levels of technology. Taking information for the Boeing 737 family based on the 
proposed metric systems earlier, it can be quite obvious that some metric systems show 
distinct separation while others do not, as seen in Figure 2.5 below [117]. 
 
Figure 2.5: Evaluation of Separation of Technology Generation [117] 
Tests have also been conducted for a number of other specific vehicles for each of 
the ECs listed previously. In order to conduct these tests, the Environmental Design 
Space (EDS) was leveraged for analysis [117, 120]. For the study conducted by Lim et. 
al., five vehicle classes were considered using generic vehicles in EDS [117]. In order to 
test two of the ECs, EC1: differentiate technology generation and EC2: be independent of 
purpose or utilization, physical characteristics of the vehicle were varied. The main 
parameters varied were the design payload and range capabilities, in order to test 
independence of purpose, as well as increased fuel efficiency (red dots) and weight 
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reduction (green dots), in order to test differentiation of technology generations [117].  
Figure 2.6 shows the extent of the design payload and range changes implemented, and 
Figure 2.7 demonstrates the result of infusing those design change vehicles with 
technology integration [117]. 
 
 




Figure 2.7: Generic Vehicle Technology Integration 
By performing these changes simultaneously it’s possible to observe the potential 
overlapping of design changes and technology integration. In order to provide some 
understanding of how the tests for EC1 and EC2 were evaluated, it should be noted that 
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separation of technology generation would result in a clear distinction between the colors 
black, green, and red. Further, independence of purpose or utilization would be favorable 
in a metric system if each of the colors collapsed onto a single line or curve, indicating no 
spread in metric value [117]. Ultimately, this analysis was conducted for all five vehicles, 
and all metrics and correlating parameters were evaluated. For brevity here, the results 
for the SAR based metric systems for the small twin aisle aircraft will be discussed, and 




Figure 2.8: SAR Aircraft CO2 Standard Metric System Evaluation [117] 
As can be seen in the above figure, 1/NAMS correlated against MTOW shows the 
best collapse of aircraft in the same technology group, thus satisfying EC2 completely. 
Further, there is a relatively clear separation of technology generation within these metric 
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systems, and as Lim et. al. point out, this metric-CP combination has the advantage of 
being much simpler than any other metric system considered [117]. In the end, it’s likely 
the metric system decided on by ICAO CAEP is some form of 1/SAR correlated against 
MTOW, as ICAO has stated that the overall design of the aircraft is represented in the 
CO2 metric system by the certified maximum takeoff weight [118]. So, while it’s clear 
that no metric system fully satisfies all evaluation criteria across the fleet, the most 
promising candidates identified in literatureare the metric-CP combinations which 
include 1/SAR and MTOW. 
2.4.2.3.2 Aircraft Stringency Options 
In addition to a metric system on which to evaluate fuel efficiency, some level of 
stringency must be placed on manufacturers in order to push technology development and 
integration. These stringency options are in many ways analogous to the caps set in 
emission trading schemes, as they provide stringency to CO2 generators covered by that 
standard. For the notional standard, insight into these stringency options is provided by 
the work of the FAA’s PARTNER Project 30, where in a publically available findings 
report a number of notional limit lines (NLL) serve as the basis for analysis of a potential 
CO2 certification framework [119]. In order to establish the NLL, a database of 192 
vehicles is utilized. The aircraft included in the database are classified based on 
production status, and all applicable parameters to various metric systems under 
consideration are collected.  Additionally, a number of fitting procedures for the notional 
stringency lines is considered, and due to the fact that the 1/SAR based metric systems 
showed very simple trends, these fits tended to include linear and second order 
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approximations of in-production vehicles [119]. The establishment of such an initial NLL 
can be seen in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9: Initial NLL Fit for CO2 Metric System [119] 
While this provides a starting point for the study of different stringency options, a 
general rule for reducing the baseline trend needed to be established to study more 
stringent standards. Generally this was done through a fixed percentage reduction from 
the initial limit line, with preference given to levels which affected older certification 
dates first [119]. From the results of the PARTNER Project 30 findings report, insights 
from the EDS technology roadmaps were ultimately used to anticipate near-term 




shown above was reasonable for the updated limit under study [119]. This updated NLL 
can be seen in Figure 2.10.  
 
Figure 2.10: NLL Update for Aircraft CO2 Standard [119] 
2.4.2.3.3 Scope of Applicability 
The last major component of a new standard is the scope of applicability. As with 
the emission trading schemes discussed previously, this tends to include covered entities, 
as well as a basic timeline for implementation.  
As with any policy, timing can be very difficult to predict. However, it has been 




with introduction in 2018 [119] and an alternative s assumed to correspond to an adoption 
date of 2023 with introduction in the following year [119]. 
Further analysis of such a standard must keep this in mind regarding both timing 
and definitions of entities covered. However, this dissertation is focused on the concepts 
of policy decision tradeoffs, and the examples herein are notional. 
2.4.3 Policy Analysis Process 
Given this knowledge regarding emission trading schemes and a new certification 
standard, it’s important to address the policy analysis process pursued by regulatory 
agencies throughout the world. It has been noted in literature that economic policy 
analysis approaches commonly used for policy assessment include cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)  [121]. The use of these analyses varies 
depending on the study under consideration and regulatory body conducting the study. 
The benefits and drawbacks to each approach will be briefly introduced here. It should be 
noted however, that for each of these analysis approaches a well-defined baseline 
scenario must first be established. 
2.4.3.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis  
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires the effect of policy relative to the baseline 
scenario be calculated in consistent units, such as USD, in order to make the costs and 
benefits directly comparable, and is aimed at the assessment of social benefits [121]. This 
approach is often promoted as the recommended basis for assessing policy alternatives; 
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however, it requires the transference of benefits measured in any number of units to those 
used for cost [122, 123]. A number of regulatory bodies throughout the world have 
employed such approaches, most notably for noise and NOx standards in aviation [124]. 
Such an approach can be quite difficult given the complexities of calculating the 
monetary effects of releasing GHG into our atmosphere, since isolating the impacts of the 
release of any emission species to a climate change event is highly uncertain, as 
aforementioned.  
2.4.3.2 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis on the other hand is used to evaluate policies with 
similar expected benefits, such that all benefits and all costs associated with the policy 
can be grouped independently and directly compared [121]. The idea behind CEA is that 
the policy that achieves an expected benefit at the lowest cost can be shown to be ideal 
compared to all other policies considered [123]. Most government agencies throughout 
the world require the assessment of both the costs and benefits of any given policy. In the 
U.S., the Office of Budget and Management produces the executive orders and circulars 
that outline the regulatory framework on which to assess these costs and benefits [125-
127]. These documents outline a generic framework on which to assess costs and 
benefits, however, they do not specify whether CBA or CEA be used explicitly for policy 
analysis. Despite this, it’s quite apparent that CEA is the typical approach employed [128, 
129]. The likely reason for such an approach is that for each of these policies the benefits 
can be quantified using a singular measure, such as tons of NOx or number of people 
removed from a given noise contour. In the context of this study, where the primary 
79 
 
benefit being studied is the mitigation of CO2 from the atmosphere, this indicates that 
CEA is the appropriate technique for police analysis since the physical amount of CO2 
removed from the atmosphere due to policy can be quantified from both emission trading 
schemes and a new standard directly. As such, CEA will serve as the policy approach 
taken to satisfy the policy analysis requirements. 
2.5 Uncertainty in Policy Analysis 
Ultimately, one of the greatest challenges in approaching policy problems in such 
a holistic manner comes about due to the uncertainty associated with complex systems or 
SoS. Due to the desire for policymakers to pursue “robust” policies, the uncertainty of the 
physical system, as well as uncertainty introduced via exogenous policy, must be 
addressed. Here robustness is taken to mean policy that addresses a specified public 
issue. The following discussion will introduce the concerns regarding regulatory policy 
uncertainties, and follow with a foundation for understanding the framework of 
quantifying different forms of uncertainty analytically.  
2.5.1 Regulatory Policy Uncertainty 
The civil aviation industry constitutes a complex SoS with a number of 
organizations implementing individual strategies based on risk assessments to make 
strategic investment decisions. As such, they need to understand the regulatory 
uncertainties in order to fully assess those decisions, and policymakers must also 
understand these uncertainties in order to improve the effectiveness of regulatory policy 
actions [130]. From literature, regulatory uncertainty typically addresses the unknown 
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aspects of regulatory pressure originating from the unpredictability of an entity’s future 
policy environment [130].  
This perceived uncertainty can be broken down more generally as state, effect, 
and response uncertainty [130, 131], where state uncertainty is the inability to predict the 
future state of the economic or industry environment, effect uncertainty is the inability to 
determine the effect of such a future state, and response uncertainty is the inability to 
understand the ultimate consequences of those effects [131]. As an example of how these 
basic forms of regulatory uncertainty manifest throughout the world, consider the EU 
ETS. As of 2005, the regulatory policy environment provided no clear view of the 
regulatory schemes that would occur past the second phase of trading after 2012, which 
represents a case of regulatory policy state uncertainty [132]. A result of this regulatory 
state uncertainty is that the covered entities faced high ambiguity regarding future 
investment decisions with a payback beyond 2012, such as coal power plants with an 
amortization on the order of 20 to 30 years, leading many to purchase EAUs rather than 
invest, representing a form of effect uncertainty [133]. With this environment of effect 
uncertainty in place, many entities including the regulatory bodies had a high level of 
response uncertainty, which led to many of this issues associated with initial trading 
periods for the EU ETS, as aforementioned. 
It should be clear from this level of discussion that addressing regulatory 
uncertainty is most effective if the regulatory state uncertainty can be reduced. As such, 
the question that must be addressed is, “How can regulatory state uncertainty be reduced 
in the context of concurrent policy implementation?” 
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Analyzing regulatory uncertainty in the initial planning phases of policymaking 
can help alleviate some of the known issues with state, effect, and response uncertainty. 
Doing so requires a good understanding of the nature of uncertainty itself. 
2.5.2 Epistemic and Aleatory Uncertainty 
To begin to discuss uncertainty quantifiably in a policy context, the nature of 
uncertainty should first be addressed. Typically uncertainty can be divided into two basic 
forms, epistemic and aleatory uncertainty [78]. Epistemic uncertainty is the result of 
imperfect knowledge, and is characterized by the ability to be reduced through careful 
analysis and planning [78, 134]. Aleatory uncertainty, also often referred to as variability 
uncertainty, derives due to the inherent variation within a system, and cannot be reduced 
through further knowledge [78, 134]. 
In the context of the environmental policies facing civil aviation being discussed 
here, epistemic uncertainty relates primarily to the regulatory uncertainty previously 
discussed. It should be evident through the example provided by the EU ETS that state 
uncertainty can be reduced through more long term policy studies, and that reduction 
would ultimately flow through effect and response uncertainty. As such, when 
considering policy, precaution can be taken to deal with the epistemic uncertainty 
involved in policy analysis. This can be accomplished by paying specific attention to the 
impact of policy forecasted well into the future, considering different time frames for the 
scope of applicability, as well as various stringency options for either policy. 
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Aleatory uncertainty on the other hand, can be considered exogenous to the policy 
systems under consideration. While it cannot be reduced by definition, it can be 
quantified. Sources of aleatory uncertainty in the context of the policies under 
consideration may include, but are not limited to, factors such as fuel price and allowance 
price volatility, disruptive technology integration, or unexpected events that alter demand 
significantly, such as the financial collapse that occurred in 2007. Quantifying this 
uncertainty can be accomplished through both probabilistic and stochastic modeling 
paradigms. Doing so typically requires the determination of expected values and 
probability distributions for uncertain parameters. Moving forward in this study, many of 
the results of current literature may serve quite well in helping define the ranges for the 
parametric variables deemed important to quantify aleatory uncertainty for this policy 
study [106, 117, 119]. Attempting to address these aleatory variables is meant to answer 
the question, “How can specific forms of aleatory uncertainty be quantified in the 
presence of regulatory policy for commercial aviation?” 
2.6 Exploratory Modeling for Policy Analysis 
In order to provide information for all possible alternatives of these regulatory 
policies, the argument was made that an exploratory rationale ought to be employed. 
Appendix D provides a more formal overview of exploratory modeling, from its 
inception at RAND among researchers such as Steven Bankes, to its use for 
environmental policy analysis by academics such as Augusdinata. This discussion also 




2.7 Existing Policy Analysis Frameworks 
In order to assess these policies in the context of civil aviation from an 
exploratory rationale, a suitable policy analysis framework ought to be employed. 
Borrowing from literature, Walker provides a useful generic framework for policymaking 
that has been shown to work well with a number of different methodologies [135]. This 
approach is constructed around a general description of the policy field, and is 
reproduced in Figure 2.11 below [135].  
As can be seen, at the center of the process is a representation of the system 
domain. It has been noted that this does not necessarily have to represent a computer 
model of the system, but it does define the boundaries of the system and its structure 
[135].  Affecting the system domain are two distinct sets of external factors. The first are 
forces outside the control of actors in the policy or system domain, and can include a 
number of factors such as the economic environment, technology development, or 
behavior preferences of actors involved [135]. Next, are policy changes stemming from 
the policy domains that directly affect system behaviors. These policy changes are 
controlled by policymakers who construct policies based on stated goals. The process of 
attaining goals is measured through outcomes of interest, which act as a feedback loop in 




Figure 2.11: Walker's Generic Policymaking Framework [135] 
In a similar vein to Walker’s generic framework, Lempert, Popper, and Bankes 
also propose a classification for external factors and the system domain [136]. This has 
been termed the “XLRM framework”, where X represents exogenous uncertainties, L are 
policy levers, R the system relationships, and M are the measures. Policy levers (L) are 
the actions that make up the strategies employed by policy makers, while the exogenous 
uncertainties (X) are factors outside the control of decision makers that may determine 
the success of those strategies. The measures (M) are equivalent to the outcomes of 
interest proposed by Walker, and simply help to rank the outcome of various scenarios. 
Finally, the relationships (R) describe how these various factors relate to one another, and 
ultimately help describe overall system behavior under different scenarios [136].  
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More recent work by Augusdinata has combined the structure of Walker’s 
policymaking process with the ideas supporting the “XLRM framework” to provide a 
more structured policy analysis framework to act as the conceptual basis for studying 
policy in the context of highly complex systems. This adapted policy analysis framework 
has been termed the “XPIROV” framework, borrowing notation from both Walker and 
Lempert et. al., and is recreated in Figure 2.12 [78].  
 
 
Figure 2.12: XPIROV Policy Analysis Framework [78] 
As with Walker’s framework, the XPIROV framework is built around a 
representation of the system domain. Here, however, the system structure represented 
within the system boundary is more completely expressed than in either the XLRM 
framework or Walker’s generic policymaking framework. Each of the elements of the 
XPIROV framework are defined below [78]: 
• Policies (P) represent all instruments controlled by decision makers that can have 
an effect on the system. 
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• External forces (X) are analogous to the definition provided by Walker, and 
represent factors that cannot be controlled by the decision maker yet still 
influence the system (exogenous factors). 
• The system boundary, as seen in Figure 2.12, defines all relevant elements of the 
system model. This includes the set of internal factors (I) together with 
relationships (R). 
• The outputs from the system boundary are the outcomes of interest (O), which 
refer to the characteristics of the system that are deemed relevant to evaluate the 
performance of policy measures. These outcomes of interest result from changes 
in X and P which in turn change the states of I, and such changes are ultimately 
governed by the relationships, R. Thus, the outcomes of interest can be 
represented as: 
 
    𝑂 = 𝑅 𝑋, 𝐼,𝑃      
 
 
It should be noted here that these outcomes (O) are generally based on broad 
categories, but in practice are represented through proxy measures. As an 
example consider the health of the planet as an O, while this can’t be measured 
directly, other proxies such as global average temperature and atmospheric 
emissions can be measured that directly influence the health of the planet.   
• The relationships, R, are divided into three distinct classes: 
o Relationships between the system of interest and external forces (R1). 




o Relationships between the internal factors and outcomes of interest (R3). 
• Value systems (V) represent the goals of decision makers and stakeholders. The 
value system is used to evaluate policy outcomes measured through proxy 
indicators, and is typically one of the main responsibilities for policy makers. 
2.8 The State of Policy Making for Civil Aviation 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the growing importance of regulatory 
policy to mitigate anthropogenic CO2 emissions from civil aviation. In order to achieve 
system wide goals, a number of mitigation measures will certainly need to be employed 
throughout the world, nested at many levels of commercial aviation’s hierarchal 
structure. Two of the most widely considered policies are emission trading schemes, 
which will impact aircraft owners and operators, and a new certification standard, which 
will directly affect aircraft manufacturers. Understanding the tradeoffs and uncertainties 
associated with these policies will require a framework on which to make informed 
decisions based on testable quantitative data. Unfortunately, this framework does not 
currently exist. Despite this fact, there are established policy analysis frameworks that 
have been shown to work well for highly complex systems that can serve as a key enabler 
for an overall process of informed decision making for regulatory CO2 policy in civil 
aviation. Establishing this process will still require the expansion of a lexicon to discuss 
regulatory policy in the context of SoS, as well as modifications of existing policy 
analysis frameworks for inclusion in a SoS structure.   
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CHAPTER  3 
APPROACHING POLICYMAKING QUANTITATIVELY IN A SOS 
3.1 Quantitative Analysis of a Concurrent Policy Approach 
As indicated in recent civil aviation regulatory literature, an aircraft standard and 
emission trading schemes are two of the primary measures member states throughout the 
world are considering in order to address the mitigation of anthropogenic CO2 into our 
atmosphere. It is expected that significant reductions in CO2 emissions can be 
accomplished through these policies, yet the interaction and tradeoffs among them have 
not been fully addressed. Further, the policy analysis process for member states and 
regulatory bodies has been lacking a standardized framework on which to quantitatively 
assess the impacts of these “baskets of measures”. 
Subsequently, the aim of this study is to provide a suitable framework on which to 
assess quantitative concurrent policy analysis. Further, a methodology standardizing the 
policy analysis process will be defined to provide systematic and traceable quantitative 
policy analysis. The policy tradeoffs that will be assessed are the effects of a certification 
standard on aircraft manufacturers and emission trading schemes affecting air carriers. 
Due to the fact that ICAO’s GIACC is tasking all member states with identification and 
evaluation of policy mixes, these policies will be assessed to demonstrate the potential for 
assessment at this level. As such, the U.S. national airspace system (NAS) will serve as 
the applicable region of study. It is believed that providing this framework, and 
demonstrating the potential for exploratory policy studies will also aid in the reduction of 
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regulatory uncertainties previously discussed. Finally, the ability to assess forms of 
aleatory uncertainty, such as fuel price, will also be demonstrated under the defined 
framework.   
3.2 Quantitative Policy Tradeoff Research Objectives 
With the problem scoped to the study of a notional new CO2 standard and 
emission trading schemes in the U.S. NAS, the research objectives must be established. 
This will be introduced through research questions and hypotheses, which will serve as 
the metrics of success for the study of these policies. There are four main objectives of 
this research, which include: 
1. Quantitatively assessing regulatory policy in the context of an 
acknowledged system-of-systems (SoS).  
2. Demonstrating the ability to assess the concurrent implementation of 
multiple policies throughout a SoS. 
3. Objective identification of effective policy space.  
4. Reducing the regulatory uncertainty, and quantifying other forms of 
aleatory uncertainty in the presence of multiple regulatory policies.  
The following discussion will introduce the research questions associated with 
these objectives, and provide hypotheses of expected results.  
3.2.1 Quantitative Assessment of Policy in the Context of a SoS 
While the ultimate goal of this research is to identify a standardized process for 
the analysis and design of multiple policies throughout a SoS, the ability to quantitatively 
assess individual policies in a SoS must first be addressed. As such, the ability to 
90 
 
implement a single policy and quantitatively assess the impacts throughout a SoS must be 
established as a starting point.  
3.2.1.1 Research Question 1 
RQ1: What are the impacts to the U.S. NAS of a CO2 certification standard or a 
trading scheme in isolation? 
3.2.1.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
Due to the fact that a CO2 certification standard and emission trading schemes 
will impact different actors in the U.S. NAS, it’s expected that their impacts to the system 
will differ, although the overall effect, reduction in CO2, will be shared. As discussed, a 
new standardwill impact aircraft manufactures to drive technology insertion on future 
aircraft. As such, the primary impact of this policy will be increasing the efficiency of the 
aircraft available to operators. This increase in efficiency will ultimately reduce fuel burn 
over a fixed technology fleet, and lead to mitigation of CO2. Despite this, there are 
physical limitations and issues with technology readiness that will limit the overall 
potential of such policy. Further, the costs associated with such policy will be placed 
primarily on aircraft manufacturers, and as such, economic limitations may also be 
imposed that may prevent setting a standard that would overburden manufacturers. 
Subsequently, it’s expected that the implementation of a standard in isolation will reduce 
CO2 emissions over a fixed technology fleet, although it’s unlikely to stabilize emissions. 
Further, it’s expected this standard will not impact expected demand growth, and thus 
will only work to increase efficiency of aircraft in service. The impacts of this policy will 
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be measured using the non-recurring cost to manufacturers to meet potential stringency 
options, and the overall reduction in CO2 over a fixed technology fleet.  
While an ETS will also reduce CO2 emissions over a “no action” scenario, the 
mechanism by which this is achieved will be quite different. The expected effect of this 
type of policy is to reduce demand through the pass through of costs imposed to aircraft 
operators by providing a real price for CO2. This is accomplished by using an established 
rule set outlining an emissions cap and allocation process. Since it’s expected that 
demand growth in civil aviation will outpace efficiency improvements, it’s likely the civil 
aviation industry will have a performance gap from the cap, and will be a net purchaser 
of emissions allowances. The cost of these purchased allowances will ultimately be 
passed through to consumers, reducing demand based on price elasticity of demand 
assumptions from literature. The actual mechanism by which this works will be detailed 
later in 4.10.2. Ultimately, the impact of an ETS on the U.S. NAS will be measured 
through cost-effectiveness analysis. This will include determining the recurring costs 
associated with aircraft owners and operators, as well as the policy induced costs due to 
the implementation of an ETS. Further, the overall reduction in demand will be compared 
against a reference demand forecast of a fixed technology fleet used to initialize the 
simulation environment, and the overall reduction in CO2 will also be presented. 
3.2.1.2 Research Question 1.1 
Due to the fact that an ETS is anticipated to impact demand in the U.S. NAS, 
understanding the mechanisms and extent through which this occurs will be vitally 
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important to the overall success of quantitative policy assessment. Subsequently, two 
further sub-research questions are posed for the study of the ETS.  
RQ1.1: What are the impacts of an ETS on demand for passenger transport? 
3.2.1.2.1 Hypothesis 1.1 
The main effect of market based policy mechanisms creating a real price for CO2 
emissions for air carriers is to increase ticket prices, and thus reduce demand for air 
travel. Due to the expectation of a performance gap under an ETS, this will occur through 
the requirement for air carriers to purchase allowances. Ultimately, the cost of purchased 
allowances will be passed through to consumers, creating a change in price. Literature 
has been surveyed to equate this change in price to a change in demand for air travel 
through the use of established air travel demand elasticities based on carrier type [137]. 
All price elasticity of demand values found for air carriers are negative, which indicates 
that an increase in price will ultimately lead to a decrease in demand. Ultimately, an 
equilibrium demand will be reached. This reduction in demand will be quantified by 
comparing future demand increases or decreases to a “no action” scenario. Further, 
through analysis of recent literature it is expected that demand reductions will be on the 
order of 1% to 2% per year for moderate allowance prices and caps, such as those seen 
under the EU ETS [106, 115]. As such, there are two expected outcomes from this 
research question: 1) demand will reach an equilibrium value lower than the input 
forecast, and 2) that reduction can be quantified and will be shown to be comparable to 
existing literature.  
93 
 
3.2.1.3 Research Question 1.2 
Due to the fact that different types of air carriers operate within the U.S. NAS, 
namely legacy carriers and low cost carriers, it’s expected there may be disproportionate 
effects of an ETS based on carrier type.  
RQ1.2: What are the relative impacts of an ETS to different air carriers? 
3.2.1.3.1 Hypothesis 1.2 
As revealed in literature, price elasticity of demand for air travel varies depending 
on air carrier type. For instance, PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimates a demand elasticity 
of -1.23 for full service carriers and -1.38 for low cost carriers [137, 138]. Due to the fact 
that price elasticity of demand is equivalent to the change in demand over the change in 
price, it’s expected that a similar change in price for low cost carriers would produce a 
greater change in demand over full service carriers. Further, due to the typically lower 
ticket prices of low cost carriers over full service carriers, it’s expected that meeting the 
cap under an ETS will result in a higher change in price for low cost carriers over full 
service carriers. Subsequently, it’s expected that the relative change in demand will be 
greater for low cost carriers over full service carriers. This will be measured by 
comparing the change in demand for individual air carriers over a notional demand 
forecast used to initialize the modeling environment, with the expectation that low cost 
carriers will reach lower equilibrium demand than full service or legacy carriers.  
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3.2.1.4 Addressing Quantitative Assessment of Policy 
In order to address the quantitative assessment of these policies in the context of 
the U.S. NAS, the XPIROV policy analysis framework established by Augusdinata and 
adapted from the work of Walker, can be applied directly to the system of interest. To 
provide an illustrative example of how this framework can be applied to a SoS, such as 
the civil aviation SoS aforementioned, Figure 3.1 is provided. As can be seen, this figure 
provides a notional example of how current policy, such as the EU ETS, can be analyzed 
in the context of the global air transportation SoS. Here, the entire SoS represents the 
system boundary, and policy, goals, and outcomes of interest are tracked treating the SoS 
as a single system. From previous work in literature [78], there is strong evidence that the 
application of such a framework will be adequate for the study of the interaction of a 




Figure 3.1: Notional Application of XPIROV Framework to Civil Aviation 
3.2.2 Concurrent Quantitative Assessment of Policy throughout a SoS 
Given the ability to quantitatively model individual policies in the context of a 
SoS, the next step to concurrent policy design and analysis for the purpose of informed 
quantitative decision making must be to account for the existence of multiple policies 
impacting individual systems within the SoS. While the XPIROV framework is able to 
account for multiple policies, those policies are only directly tied to a single system of 
interest. As such, the implementation of such a framework may prove too general for the 
U.S. NAS where policies such as emission trading schemes and a CO2 aircraft standard 
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apply to different systems and at different levels within the air transportation SoS.  This 
recognition leads to the next question driving this research.  
3.2.2.1 Research Question 2 
RQ2: How will the combined effect of these policies differ from their 
implementation in isolation? 
3.2.2.1.1 Hypothesis 2 
Due to the fact that a CO2 standard affects aircraft efficiency, and an ETS will 
impact demand, there is an obvious tradeoff between the two policies. Subsequently, it’s 
expected that when both policies are implemented concurrently there will be a reduction 
in overall cost for an expected effective reduction of CO2. This is due to the fact that as 
manufacturers are required to produce more efficient products for aircraft owners and 
operators, their fuel burn will be reduced helping them meet the cap for an ETS, and 
ultimately reducing the number of allowances needed to be purchased. As such, there will 
be a relative reduction in cost for aircraft owners and operators to meet an emissions cap, 
effectively sharing the costs of CO2 reduction between the manufacturers and airlines. 
However, due to the fact that increases in efficiency will reduce the overall cost 
associated with emission trading schemes, there will also likely be a reduced impact on 
demand reduction. This effect may offset the overall impact of an ETS in the presence of 
a new standard, which will be quantified through cost-effectiveness analysis. Particular 
attention will be paid to the costs imposed on manufacturers and air carriers, in addition 
to the overall cost on the system. This research question is expected to show two primary 
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outcomes, 1) the impact to demand in the presence of an ETS and an aircraft standard 
will be lessened (ie. higher demand) over a comparable ETS in isolation, and 2) meeting 
a predetermined reduction in CO2 can be accomplished through a combination of policies 
and at a reduced cost over either policy in isolation.  
3.2.2.2 Policy Analysis Benchmarking Question 2.1 
Providing a policy analysis framework that will allow such a combination of 
policies at different hierarchical levels of a SoS to be tested, requires a structure more 
specific to real world SoS than is provided by the standard XPIROV framework. As such, 
to operationalize this second research question the following sub-question must first be 
answered. 
RQ2.1: Can existing policy analysis frameworks, such as Augusdinata’s XPIROV 
framework, be used in the design and analysis of systems of policies? 
3.2.2.3 Hypothesis 2.1 
Existing policy analysis frameworks can and should be implemented in the design 
of systems of policies, however, these frameworks must be modified to account for their 
implementation in a SoS with multiple policies. This can be achieved by modifing the 
XPIROV framework to allow external forces, outcomes of interest, and policies to be 
applied directly to their respective systems, while policy goals at high levels of the SoS 
are tracked for policy decisions. In order to illustrate this concept, Figure 3.2 provides a 
notional example of how two policies can be concurrently analyzed throughout the global 
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air transportation system. Due to the fact that this type of expansion of XPIROV can 
occur for any number of systems, policies, or external factors, this policy analysis 
framework will be labeled the Generalized Policy Assessment Framework (GenPAF). 
 
Figure 3.2: Notional Application of GenPAF to Civil Aviation 
3.2.3 Objective Identification of Effective Policy Space 
With the demonstration of policy interactions for point designs of multiple 
policies, and the GenPAF policy analysis framework in place to quantitatively assess the 
concurrent implementation of multiple policies throuhgout the U.S. NAS, the 
identification and analsysis of effective policy mixes can now be addressed. As has been 
recognized by international regualtory bodies, there are number of policy measures that 







allowed to decide on the most efficient means of meeting international CO2 emissions 
reductions targets [2, 53]. Despite this recognition, it is clear that this will require the 
exploration of a number of policies in the context of the U.S. NAS. Establishing the 
realm of policy measures that may be implemented can be accomplished by exploring all 
possible mixes of policies, levels of stringency, and types of compliance mechanisms. 
Doing so will require a method for identification and evaluation of these systems of 
policies. 
3.2.3.1 Research Question 3 
RQ3: How can this knowledge of a policy tradeoff be used to help meet goals, 
such as those established under the Kyoto Protocol? 
3.2.3.1.1 Hypothesis 3 
Areas of effective policy space can be identified through the population of policy 
alternative space and downselection using inverse design principles, in which a heuristic 
(or many heuristics) provide the basis for data filtering. It is extremely likely that the 
region of effective policy space is dependent on both the heuristic used to measure 
effectiveness and the absolute measure used for downselection. As such, there may be 
great jumps in effective policy space based on small perturbations of heuristic value 
especially where a number of categorical parameters exist. Further, this filtered 
alternative policy space approach can provide insight into the value systems driving 
policymaking. This is due to the fact that such an approach will likely reveal Pareto 
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frontiers in effective policy space, highlighting the tradeoff between different policy 
approaches througout the SoS.  
In the context of studying the cost-effectiveness of two policy options in the U.S. 
NAS, the heuristics used to measure effective policy space will be the overall mitigation 
potential of the policy mixes given through CO2 reductions, and the costs associated with 
both aircraft manufacturers and air carriers. The U.S. State Action Plan submitted to 
ICAO indicates that the primary goal of all efficiency measures is to produce carbon 
neutral growth relative to 2005 emissions levels by 2020 [63]. While this stated goal can 
be used to identify effective policy, a number of alternative measures are also being 
pursued. As such, the implementation of goals throughout this research are purely 
notional, and not necessarily tied to specfic SAP goals. The purpose here is to 
demonstrate the usefulness of policy tradeoff assessment for any potential goal. It is 
expected that using these heuristics will reveal reductions in overall effective policy 
space as either greater reductions in CO2 are attempted to be achieved, or reduced costs to 
market actors throughout the U.S. NAS. This will ultimately be shown through the 
variation of these heuristics during filtering of the policy alternative space.  
3.2.3.2 Addressing Research Question 3 
To accomplish this, a design of experiments (DoE) [139] on the physical 
attributes of the SoS and policies comprising the policy mixes can be experimentally run 
through the virtual cost-effectiveness environment of the U.S. NAS to populate the policy 
design space. This will require varying the exogenous factors in addition to the metric 
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systems, stringency levels, and compliance mechanisms. The result will be a populated 
policy design space, which can be visualized in any dimension of the problem of interest. 
As a notional example, consider Figure 3.3 below which shows the policy design space 
represented by varying stringency limits for two separate policies in a SoS. Here, the 
stringency level of two notional policies are varied independent of one another while all 
metrics of interest are tracked throughout the SoS.   
 
Figure 3.3: Notional Policy Space from DoE 
Due to the fact that metrics of interest are tracked throughout the SoS, data filters 
can be applied to this Monte Carlo Simulation in order to identify effective policy space. 
Continuing with this example, consider these two policies to be various CO2 mitigation 
measures throughout civil aviation. If international bodies were to agree on a limit for 
CO2 emissions from global aviation, the effect can be tracked on these potential policy 
measure stringency limits. The effect may be similar to Figure 3.4. Here, the emergence 
of a Pareto frontier is obvious. It’s apparent that in meeting this notional CO2 limit there 
will be a tradeoff in the stringency of these two policies. While it is not the goal of the 
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scientist to select the mix of policies, in this manner the scientist can describe the inherent 
tradeoff in policy space.  
 
Figure 3.4: Filtered Notional Policy Space from DoE 
In addition to being able to visualize the tradeoff between different policy 
measures, such an approach would also allow the visualization of other factors relevant to 
the problem. For instance exogenous factors, internal parameters of the system, and other 
high level goals, such as economic measures of the civil aviation system, can be assessed. 
As such, this method of analysis is suitable even for problems of high dimension.  
It is expected that implementing this method for exploratory policy studies will 
reveal effective policy space in an objective manner. For the two policies under 
consideration, high level goals such as those established under the Kyoto Protocol can be 
used for effecitveness filtering, while anticipated levels of economically viable costs can 
be used for cost filtering. The result should be the ability to objectively visualize effective 
policy space to help inform policy decisions.  
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3.2.4 Reducing and Quantifying Uncertainty in the U.S. NAS 
As aforementioned, there are two basic forms of uncertainty to consider in the 
context of policymaking for acknowledged SoS. These are the regulatory uncertainties 
associated with the policies themselves, and the uncertainty in the physical system. Due 
to the fact that these types of uncertainty are philosophically different, reducing and 
quantifying uncertainty in the U.S. NAS under policy implementation will be explored 
through two distinct avenues.  
3.2.4.1 Reducing Regulatory Uncertainty: Research Question 4.1 
Regulatory uncertainty includes state, effect, and response uncertainty due to 
policy implementation. As aforementioned, the response uncertainty is compounded by 
effect uncertainty, and effect uncertainty is in turn compounded through state uncertainty, 
thus reducing regulatory uncertainty inherently necessitates control over regulatory state 
uncertainty.  
RQ4.1: How can regulatory state uncertainty be reduced in the context of 
concurrent policy implementation? 
3.2.4.1.1 Hypothesis 4.1 
Due to the fact that regulatory state uncertainty concerns uncertainty in the 
specific policies, stringencies, and dates of applicability, it is anticipated that regulatory 
uncertainty can be reduced through the identification of effective policy space. This 
identification of effective policy space will be the outcome of RQ3, and will provide 
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greater certainty regarding the range of potential policy measures that may be 
implemented earlier in the policy analysis process. Further, it is anticipated that as greater 
emissions reductions targets and reduced costs to market actors are sought, the effective 
policy space will shrink. This reduction of effective policy space will inherently lead to a 
reduction in regulatory state uncertainty. As such, it’s expected that reducing regulatory 
state uncertainty will be dependent on the desires of policymakers to mitigate CO2 
emissions and impact the aviation industry.  
3.2.4.2 Addressing Research Question 4.1 
In order to address the relative regulatory state uncertainty associated with 
effective policy space identification, the results from the objective identification of 
effective policy space will be used. It is posed that the relative regulatory state 
uncertainty of the policy system can be assessed through the range of potential policy 
measures occupying the effective policy space, thus the size of effective policy space can 
be used as a measure of regulatory state uncertainty. Subsequently, it’s expected that as 
desired CO2 mitigation potential increases and allowable costs decrease, effective policy 
space and thus regulatory state uncertainty will be reduced. Conclusions will be drawn 
from these observations regarding the relationship between regulatory state uncertainty, 
and the policymaker’s willingness to impact aviation through regulatory policy.  
3.2.4.3 Quantifying Uncertainty in the SoS: Research Question 4.2 
Uncertainty in the system is typically discussed in terms of epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties. Epistemic uncertainties are those that can be reduced through greater 
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knowledge, and in the context of this study are largely represented by the regulatory 
uncertainties aforementioned. Aleatory uncertainty however, is the result of natural 
variability that cannot be reduced, but can be quantified. For commercial aviation, some 
common forms of aleatory uncertainty that may be considered are atmospheric 
conditions, such as wind and other weather, as well as economic considerations outside 
the control of the aviation industry, such as fuel price volatility. Quantifying these 
impacts is ultimately necessary to understand the relative cost-effectiveness of the policy 
measures in question, since a drastic change in a factor such as fuel price can have a 
substantial impact on the overall cost to the system.  
RQ4.2: How can specific forms of aleatory uncertainty be quantified in the 
presence of regulatory policy for commercial aviation? 
3.2.4.3.1 Hypothesis 4.2 
It is anticipated that the GenPAF policy analysis framework established for the 
study of the policy measures in question will also be suitable for the quantification of 
aleatory uncertainty through the mapping of exogenous factors to specific systems of 
interest within the system boundary. As such, specific exogenous factors impacting the 
U.S. NAS can be identified and varied while tracking changes to the relative cost-
effectiveness of policy measures. It’s anticipated that a change in the associated costs for 
a given effect under a predefined policy mix will be shown as uncertain parameters, such 
as fuel price, are varied.  
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3.2.4.4 Addressing Research Question 4.2 
In order to demonstrate the ability to quantify aleatory uncertainty of the physical 
system, fuel price will be varied under policy considerations for a notional aircraft CO2 
standard. It will be shown later in this document that two of the biggest cost drivers for 
air carriers are capital costs and fuel costs. As the fuel price varies, the relative impact of 
fuel costs and capital costs will change based on policy implementation, especially in the 
presence of a new standard, as it will impact the price and fuel burn of new aircraft. 
Subsequently, it’s anticipated that the marginal abatement costs will be reduced for a 
lower fuel price. What is meant, is that as a standard is made more stringent there will 
likely be a point at which increases in capital expenditures from technology adoption may 
outweigh reductions in fuel cost. As a result, there tends to be a natural limit to the 
stringency of such a standard that is deemed economically viable, called the marginal 
abatement cost. As fuel price is reduced, its relative impact will be lower, thus the 
increases in capital expenditures, as a result of increasing stringency, will outweigh the 
fuel cost reductions more rapidly. This type of uncertainty quantification can be tested 
under the given framework, and will be limited to fuel price uncertainty to demonstrate 
the capability.  
3.3 Considering Regulatory Policy in Civil Aviation as a SoS 
With these research objectives in mind, it’s quite clear that understanding 
regulatory policy’s role in a SoS context is necessary to complete this research. Many 
government bodies are now pursuing policies as “baskets of measures” [10]. As has been 
discussed, these baskets of measures include a number of individual policies which are 
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operationally and managerially independent, yet are meant to address the mitigation of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) from a holistic perspective. They are often considered and 
passed on an individual basis, and the geographic extent of their applicability can be 
widely distributed. Despite this, they are meant as a whole (basket of measures) that is 
greater than the sum of its parts (single policy). In this way, a new approach to regulatory 
policy making can include treating public policies as SoS themselves, or as will be 
outlined here and described by academics such as Agusdinata, as a system-of-policy-
systems (SoPS). In order to solidify the assertion that public policy should be approached 
as an integral part of SoS, a number of existing European legislation relating to the global 
aviation system [140] will be discussed in the context of the aforementioned SoS 
principles and definitions.  
 
Figure 3.5: Subset of Environmental Policies throughout Europe 
It has been well documented throughout literature that transportation systems, and 
specifically the air transportation system (ATS), fit well into the accepted definition and 
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principles of SoS [78-81]. In fact, much of the aforementioned work relates specifically 
to the ATS. Here the purpose is not to redefine the ATS as a SoS, as such the following 
discussion will serve to formally define public policy within the ATS as a SoPS. While 
the public policies mentioned here relate primarily to environmental regulations on 
airlines and aircraft manufacturers throughout Europe, other public policies regarding the 
ATS, such as safety and air traffic management, can also be included. However, for the 
purpose of this discussion only environmental policy throughout the European ATS will 
be discussed. Given this example of a basket of measures, the defining principles and 
definition for SoS can be applied to check for consistency in the statement that public 
policy in the European ATS is a SoS. In order to accomplish this, each of Maiers 
principles of a true SoS will be discussed in relation to Figure 3.5.  
3.3.1 Operational Independence of the Elements 
In order to prove the operational independence of the system elements, if the 
system of environmental policies provided in Figure 3.5 were to be broken, leaving only 
the constituent parts, each piece of legislation must be able to continue to operate. This is 
absolutely the case, as the independent nature of each of the mentioned policies is an 
inherent characteristic. For instance, the ICAO Annex 16 Vol. 1 noise standards at an 
international level can operate independent of local noise action plans. Despite the fact 
that there is an obvious connection between aircraft noise certification requirements 
(ICAO Annex 16 Vol. 1) and operator noise emission limits (Local Noise Action Plan), 
neither policy is explicitly dependent on the other. While the usefulness and ultimately 
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true lack of connection between these constituent parts is dubious, the ability to operate 
these elements independently is quite clear.  
3.3.2 Managerial Independence of the Elements 
The managerial independence of these policies is quite clear as we consider many 
of the policies regarding aircraft and operator noise and emissions standards throughout 
Europe. While it has been shown that these elements can operate independently, they 
currently do operate independently. All of the policies mentioned are currently 
implemented and each is operating in an independently useful way. In order to minimize 
noise and emissions at the aircraft level, ICAO has certification procedures outlined in 
Annex 16, and to mitigate noise and other emissions at airports other policies such as 
Local Noise Action Plans and the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
are in effect [140]. The simple fact that these policies are currently managerially 
independent serves as proof of both the operational and managerial independence of the 
system of policies.  
3.3.3 Evolutionary Development 
The evolutionary development of policy in any system is one of the defining 
characteristics of regulatory policy. As has been mentioned throughout this document, 
policies are typically passed one at a time, although there can be concurrent work on a 
number of policies, and the number, scope, and goal of policy systems, such as that 
pictured above in Figure 3.5 is updated over time. In fact, the Committee on Aviation 
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Environmental Protection (CAEP) under ICAO operates on three year cycles during 
which current policies are updated and new policies are discussed. In this respect, 
evolutionary development is one of the most readily apparent traits of policy systems. 
3.3.4 Emergent Behavior 
The topic of emergence can be contentious due to a multitude of definitions 
surrounding what constitutes an emergent behavior. However, borrowing directly from 
Maier’s principle, emergence will be taken to mean that the system performs a function 
that does not reside in any component system. For the example in Figure 3.5 above, an 
emergent behavior may be a reduction in demand for air travel throughout Europe. While 
it’s obvious that no single policy system accomplishes this, as it’s not a stated goal of any 
of the policies mentioned, the interaction of these constituent systems within the SoS has 
the potential to affect consumer demand.  
Synergies between policies could also lead to other forms of emergence within the 
ATS, such as unexpected changes in fleet mix, infrastructure growth, technology 
investment, aircraft utilization, and so on. While it’s important to understand and track 
emergent behaviors of the system to avoid unintended consequences, it should be quite 
clear that the policy system considered has the potential to produce an emergent behavior 
that does not reside in any single policy.   
111 
 
3.3.5 Geographic Distribution 
Finally, this discussion defining public policy systems, in terms of accepted SoS 
principles would not be complete before mentioning the geographic distribution of the 
constituent parts. Typically for physical SoS, geographic distribution is taken to mean 
that the geographic extent of the many interacting systems is so great that only 
information can be shared, and not mass or energy. Obviously public policies are merely 
pieces of paper that are enacted through the rules and regulations they spell out. They 
cannot physically share mass, energy, or even information without the government bodies 
acting on their behalf. Additionally, they can all potentially be stored in the same 
location. It will be argued here however, that despite these issues with the conventional 
treatment of geographic distribution in SoS, policy systems can be defined as 
geographically distributed.  
It should be noted that geographic distribution of typical SoS regards spatial 
relations of the constituent systems. Public policy as well can be spatially distributed in 
terms of region of applicability. While all of the policies mentioned are European 
specific, they are geographically distributed in the sense that some, such as Noise Action 
Plans, are spatially local, while others, such as Annex 16 Vol. 1, are international. 
Further, as has been outlined in this approach, ICAO’s GIACC is calling on world 
member states to determine policy mixes best suited for their own region, inherently 
creating a geographically distributed system of policies. Ultimately, this distribution of 
the region of applicability is similar to geographic distribution in physical SoS. 
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In order to avoid future confusion, the following discussion defining SoPS will 
include an adaptation of the principles, as well as the definition of SoS. However, it 
should be quite clear in the preceding discussion that public policies fit quite well into 
SoS definitions and principles.  
3.4 Defining Systems-of-Policy-Systems (SoPS) 
Due to the unique nature of public policy and its interaction with the physical 
SoS, the notional policy system considered will be defined separately as a SoPS. In order 
to formalize this idea, the following definition is provided for SoPS as an adaptation of 
the SoS definition aforementioned. 
SoPS are a collection of multi-domain heterogeneous public policies 
that exhibit operational and managerial independence, geographical 
distribution, and emergent behaviors that would not be apparent if the 
policies, physical systems affected, and their interactions are modeled 
separately. 
 
Additionally, the principles of SoPS, operational independence, managerial 
independence, evolutionary development, emergent behavior, and geographic (region of 
applicability) distribution, are more formally defined. A summary of these properties is 









The policies comprising the SoPS can operate 
independently and are useful in their own right. 
Managerial Independence 
of Policies 
The policies comprising the SoPS not only can but do 
operate independently in a useful way. 
Evolutionary 
Development 
The SoPS is never fully formed, and is typically 
approached a single policy at a time. Functions are often 
added, removed, and modified.  
Emergent Behavior The many behaviors of SoPS cannot necessarily be 
localized to any component system. They are emergent 
properties of the SoPS and corresponding physical system 
as a whole. 
Geographic (Region of 
Applicability) Distribution 
The region of applicability of the policies in a SoPS is 
diverse enough such that general information can be shared 
but is not directly related. 
3.5 A Look at the SoS Lexicon for SoPS 
The uniqueness of SoPS also warrants a look into the usefulness of the established 
SoS lexicon for regulatory policy. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the SoS categories 
include “Policies” [81]; however, this system category does not distinguish between an 
organization’s internal business policies or regulatory policies enacted by external agents. 
The definition provided simply describes policies as external forcing functions that 
impact the operation of the SoS. While regulatory policy and organizations’ policies 
certainly can impact the operation of a SoS, and do in the ATS, the mechanisms through 
which this is accomplished may not be captured if policy is viewed as a simple forcing 
function.  In large part, this is due to the fact that policies, like the many distributed 
systems seen in SoS, can be quite varied in their form, function, and implementation. In 
order to pursue robust regulatory policies in the context of SoPS, these nuances ought to 
be captured in the modeling of policies, and as a first step, in the lexicon used to discuss 
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SoPS. The following discussion will attempt to identify and classify the distinguishing 
traits of regulatory policies to create a formal lexicon for SoPS. 
3.6 Expanding SoS Lexicon for SoPS 
It should be noted here that the policies considered for this new lexicon in SoPS 
are regulatory policies, specifically relating to transportation SoS. For this reason, the 
following expansion of DeLaurentis’ SoS lexicon may be incomplete or lacking for other 
applications outside this domain. With that said, most regulatory policies currently in 
place or being considered in the ATS tend to have four distinguishing traits: a metric 
system, providing a traceable measurement; a stringency level that gives intent to the 
metric; some form of compliance mechanism to operationalize the standard; and of 
course a set of policy stakeholders enacting and overseeing compliance. These policy 
traits can be considered system categories for SoPS in the same way resources, 
stakeholders, operations, and economics are for SoS. Each of these SoPS categories will 
be expanded on, and the similarities to the existing SoS lexicon will be discussed.  
3.6.1 Metric Systems 
Metric systems are the quantifiable entities that give traceability to the SoPS. 
They provide the measurements by which vehicles, organizations, and other physical 
characteristics of the SoS can be assessed. In a sense, metrics in the SoPS act similarly to 
resources in the SoS, in that they give “physical manifestation” to the SoPS.  For the 
ATS, a number of quantifiable measurements serve as metrics at multiple levels of the 
hierarchy. At the base level of the SoPS metrics include Dp/F00 for engine NOx 
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certification, and for the planned manufacturer CO2 standard metrics will likely involve 
specific air range (SAR) [117]. At other levels of the hierarchy, the aggregates of these 
metrics, or some equivalent, can serve as metrics for higher level policies. For instance, 
SAR at a vehicle level may provide some indication for fleet-wide fuel burn at the 
operator level, and ultimately total CO2 emissions at the global ATS level. While there is 
no direct relationship, and there are a number of other contributing factors between levels 
of the SoPS hierarchy, mapping the relationship between metrics throughout the SoPS 
can provide valuable insights for policymakers. 
3.6.2 Stringency Level 
The stringency level is the application of agreed upon quantifiable entities (metric 
systems) that demonstrate intent in the SoPS. In effect, a stringency level applies a given 
value system by placing a limit for the metrics used for assessment. The value system 
applied through a standard is set by the policy stakeholders, but the stringency level is the 
measurement through which values are quantified. Stringency levels can take many 
forms, such as a single value stating a maximum or minimum limit, or could be more 
complex involving correlating parameters for metric systems as well as stringency lines 
or even surfaces. One of the primary areas of policy uncertainty is in the setting of 
stringency levels, because of the potential for many forms and levels of stringency. For 
this reason, the setting of policy stringency, especially in the context of SoPS ought to be 
of paramount concern for analysts and policy makers involved with this type of work. 
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3.6.3 Compliance Mechanism 
The compliance mechanism is the application of intent meant to direct the activity 
of the entities involved in the corresponding SoS. The purpose of the compliance 
mechanism is to enforce the standards set by policymakers, which, as with stringency 
setting, can be accomplished in a number of ways. As has been shown, typical 
compliance mechanisms for regulatory policy can be classified as either market based or 
command and control approaches, which were discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.4 of 
this document.  
3.6.4 Policy Stakeholder 
Finally, the policy stakeholders are simply the organizations and other entities that 
provide the values systems and oversee compliance in the SoPS and corresponding SoS. 
This SoPS category is very similar to the stakeholders as described by DeLaurentis for 
SoS, however, due to their interaction with the SoS as external agents to its operation, 
they ought to be treated separately from SoS stakeholders. Policy stakeholders can appear 
at different levels of the SoPS hierarchy depending on the intended application of policy 
at a given level. For instance, a given policy stakeholder may be involved at the base 
level of a SoPS where Dp/F00 is being measured to assess compliance with the NOx 
standard, as well as at higher levels assessing fleet-wide implications of different 
standard levels. The purpose of understanding these policy stakeholders and their 
interactions throughout the SoPS is to track values applied at various levels of the SoPS 
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through different policies, in order to assess consistency of value systems across the 
SoPS. 
3.6.5 Summary of SoPS Lexicon 
Table 3.2: System-of-Policy-Systems (SoPS) Categories Description Summary 
Category Name Description 
Metric Systems Quantifiable entities that give traceability to the SoPS 




The application of intent to direct the activity of physical and non-
physical entities in the corresponding SoS 
Policy 
Stakeholder 
Organizations and other entities that provide value systems and 
oversee compliance in the SoPS 
3.7 Operationalizing the Policy Analysis Process 
Utilizing the GenPAF through a DoE approach and discussing these policy 
systems in the context of a SoPS will provide the individual methods supporting 
informed quantitative decision making for regulatory policy in the U.S. NAS. However, 
before attempting a full scale implementation of such an approach, an underlying process 
must be established in order to operationalize the method. This process will serve as the 
methodology on which informed policy decisions can be made. With the recognition that 
this approach to policy design and analysis is top down (ie. starting with high level 
objectives and propogating to lower level decisions), the proposed process for the 
identification and analysis of a SoPS is based on an adaptation of the Integrated Product 
and Process Design (IPPD) process [141]. Typically this process is employed for product 
design, however here the product is a system of policies addressing environmental 
mitigation in civil aviation. This process is generally considered to have six primary 
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steps, which include 1) establish the need, 2) define the problem, 3) establish value, 4) 
generate feasible alternatives, 5) evaluate alternatives, and 6) make decisions. Each of 
these steps will be expanded in the following sections with specific application to CO2 
mitigation in civil avaition, noting that the process is extendable for other policy 
scenarios. In order to provide an overview of this methodology, Figure 3.6 is provided 
illustrating the links between the top down policy support process, applicable systems 
engineering methods, and policy analysis methods developed in this research.  
 











Integrated Policy Support Process











3.7.1 Establish the need  
As with most design problems, the first step is to establish the need. Obviously, 
this process will be different for each type of problem, but what should be identified here 
is a problem that must be addressed through regulatory policy. For the civil aviation 
industry, the need comes from a recognition that anthropogenic sources of CO2 emissions 
are leading to global climate change effects that can have a catastrophic impact on the 
planet. As such, the mitigation of these anthropogenic CO2 emissions must be addressed.  
3.7.2 Define the problem 
Given this recognition of the problem, the type of problem and specific aspects 
must be defined. Here, the goal is to identify the structure of the systems being studied, 
including all exogenous and endogenous variables, as well as all metrics of interest to 
track throughout the system or system-of-systems. It should be noted here that the metrics 
of interest identified at this stage will be measures of performance for the system. These 
measures of performance should relate to the overall need established in the first step of 
this process, as well as factors passed from one system to another throughout the SoS that 
are aggregated to higher level measures of performance in the SoS. Due to their 
implementation in policy design, these measures should be made comensurable with 
measures of performance in the real world system. For a new aircraft CO2 standard and 
emissions trading schemes in the U.S. NAS, these measures of performance will likely be 
measures of fuel burn, CO2 mitigation potential, and economic considerations for both 
aircraft manufacturers and aircraft owners and operators.  
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3.7.3 Establish value 
In this step, the overall objectives of the problem are established. While the final 
setting of objective values does not need to occur here, at least the identification of 
parameters to be tracked for eventual down selection of alternatives should be the goal. 
This step will have a direct impact on the “Goals” used in the GenPAF policy analysis 
framework, and in fact the V represents the values established here. While there may be 
some confusion surrounding this step and the identification of measures of performance 
in the previous step, the values identified here are more closely associated with measures 
of effectiveness. These parameters will serve as the basis on which effective policy space 
can be identified in the systems of policies studied throughout the process. For the 
primary problem being discussed here, the measures of effectiveness used for eventual 
downselection of effective policy mixes will be total CO2 emissions and the costs 
incurred on aircraft manufacturers and air carriers. The idea is that these measures 
establish value in both the mitigation of harmful anthropogenic GHG, as well as the 
economic sustainability of the industry.  
3.7.4 Generate feasible alternatives 
In the typical product design process, generating feasible alternatives can be 
accomplished through the use of morphological analysis [141], and the parameterization 
of baseline architectures. Using these methods, all feasible alternative products can be 
identified. While a similar approach can be taken for policy design, there are some unique 
features of policy that ought to be addressed more thoroughly. For these policy systems, 
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the decisions that must be made are in the form of possible metrics, the range of 
stringency levels for the standard, and the type of compliance mechanism.  
The combination of these categories establishes the possible alternatives for 
policy implementation. However, due to the fact that almost any measurable parameter 
on a system of interest can be used to establish a metric system, using morphological 
analysis as a basis for policy alternatives selection can be prohibitive. This is easily 
understood as a curse of dimensionality. As the number of possible parameters increases, 
and are combined to form metric systems, the number of metric systems will increase 
exponentially. Subsequently, this approach can lead to an unmanageable number of 
metric system alternatives to be evaluated.  
Due to the large amount of research conducted by the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration investigating metric systems for a new aircraft CO2 standard, a possible 
metric system consisting of 1/SAR and MTOW can be utilized as the foundation of the 
methodology demonstration conducted herein [119]. Further, due to the wide availability 
of research on the EU ETS, the metric of fuel burn, translated into CO2 emissions, will be 
used for cap setting purposes [95]. A more complete description of these metric systems 
is provided later in this document on policy modeling in the U.S. NAS and 
implementation of this approach.  
Once potential metric systems are established, the identification of stringency 
levels must be completed. For many metric systems this will simply require the setting of 
a range of possible metric levels, as with emission trading schemes; however, as is the 
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case for the notional aircraft CO2 standard, the setting of stringency levels will require the 
establishment of notional limit lines [117]. This is due to the existence of both a metric 
and correlating parameter as part of the metric system, which requires the identification 
of a functional relationship between the metric and correlating parameter for the 
establishment of a stringency level. For the policies studied in this research, this will be 
assessed on a case by case basis, and is also more thoroughly explored later in 4.10.  
The final aspect of generating feasible alternatives for policy design and analysis 
is the selection of a compliance mechanism. As aforementioned, these compliance 
mecahnisms can either be command and control or market based mechanisms. Command 
and control policy is easily implemented, as the stringency level is considered a hard 
standard that must be met, and this is assumed to be the case for aCO2 standard, as with 
the NOx and the noise standards. The market based mechanisms will typically either fall 
into the category of trading and offsetting or environmental levies. In order to implement 
these market based mechanisms, a generalized rule set will need to be established for the 
trading and offsetting schemes in order to effectively study implementation of an ETS.  
3.7.5 Evaluate alternatives 
Once the possible metrics, stringency levels, and compliance mechanisms are 
established, they can be evaluated in a virtual environment. As previously mentioned, the 
population of policy alternative space will be accomplished here through design of 
experiments (DoEs). A number of sophisticated DoEs exist in literature that can be 
applied in this step. A combination of Central Composite Designs (CCD), Latin 
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Hypercube runs, and randomized designs are employed on all continuous variables of the 
problem, and a full factorial is run for all categorical parameters, such as the 
implementation date. The specific designs implemented to generate the alternative space, 
and corresponding ranges on all parameters, is provided in 5.5.  
The selection of a suitable virtual environment can be highly dependent on the 
specific problem being addressed. The effects and interdependencies of an aircraft CO2 
standard and emission trading schemes in the U.S. NAS is the primary thrust of this 
research. As such, a suitable environment will be able to adequately capture the impacts 
of these policies in the region of interest. At the time of this study, two potential 
candidate environments have been identified: the Global and Regional Environmental 
Aviation Tradeoff tool (GREAT) [119] and the U.S. FAA’s Aviation environmental 
Portfolio Management Tool for Economics (APMT-E) [142]. While APMT-E has been 
used to study policy such as emission trading schemes and NOx standards, the substantial 
run time on the order of many hours makes this tool ill suited for exhaustive exploratory 
studies, such as the research proposed here. GREAT has also been used to study policies, 
such as the aircraft CO2 standard as noted previously, however, the ability to isolate air 
carriers for consideration of emissions trading schemes does not currently exist. Despite 
these limitations, the framework of the virtual environment provided by GREAT does 
offer the computational speed needed for exploratory studies. As such, the development 
of a virtual environment has been pursued here using this framework as a starting point. 
This virtual environment is representative of the U.S. NAS, and provides the ability to 
study the interdependencies of the policies in question. As such, it has been termed the 
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U.S. Policy Interdependency Tradeoff tool (U.S. PoInT). A more complete discussion of 
the development and usefulness of this virtual environment is provided in Chapter  4. 
3.7.6 Make decision 
Once all experiments have been run through the virtual test bed, the measures of 
effectiveness and measures of performance can be gathered and analyzed. Here the goal 
is to identify the region of effective policy space. This is accomplished through 
visualization of the results using any dimensions of interest for the problem and data 
filters on the measures of effectiveness. The idea is that a policy maker can see all 
dimensions of the problem concurrently while high level goals for CO2 emissions targets 
and economic sustainability are applied to remove any ineffective policies as defined by 
the given stakeholder. The final selection of the set of policies or SoPS is left to the 
policiy maker, and as such the scientist is able to objectively provide the ability for 
quantitative downselection.  
3.7.7 Goal of the Integrated Policy Support Process 
In the end, the purpose of applying this adapted top down policy support process 
to the identification and quantification of systems of policies is to provide a systematic 
methodology for policy analysis. By formalizing this methodology and the policy 
analysis framework, a traceable process is established that can be used to select the best 
policy mixes to meet high level environmental goals. One of the benefits of this 
methodology is that it’s inherently exploratory in nature, providing the ability to fully 
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analyze the potential policy alternative space before applying constraints for down 
selection. These methods have shown great success in product and process design, yet 
have never been fully implemented for policy analysis and design. Ultimately, 
formalizing this process for policy analysis and design is expected to be one of the 
primary contributions of this research.  
3.8 The Role of the Scientist and Policymaker in Public Policy 
As an integral part of this process, the role of the scientist and policy maker ought 
to be discussed. Literature has pointed out that many of the world’s greatest problems, 
such as global climate change, can lead policy makers to require technical solutions from 
the scientific community and scientists to require public policy responses from policy 
makers [143]. However, it’s quite apparent that there is a link between science and public 
policy, and the solutions to our planet’s problems will require an integration of the 
disciplines. It is the author’s belief that in pursuing this path, the goal of the scientist is to 
remain objective, predicting all possible outcomes to policy implementation. The 
subjectivity of applied value systems are left to the policy maker, which can be made 
transparent through the visualization of the policy tradeoff selections. The process 
outlined here provides specifc steps where a clear dilineation of these roles can be 
applied. As such, the objectivity of the scientist can be maintained while including the 
subjectivity of policy makers.  
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CHAPTER  4 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
U.S. NAS 
In order to accomplish the research objectives through the methodology 
established, there is a need for a suitable cost-effectiveness modeling environment for the 
study of both a notional aircraft CO2 standard and emission trading schemes. The 
following section will detail the creation of such an environment for the U.S. national 
airspace system (NAS), which is named the U.S. Policy Interdependency Tradeoff tool 
(U.S. PoInT). This environment will employ the basic framework and assumptions of 
other applicable models, and account for the specific needs of the policy studies in 
question. As such, great effort has been put forth to capture the impacts at both the 
vehicle level, and on notional air carriers at the fleet level of the U.S. NAS. While more 
complete detail will be provided throughout this section, the following is an overview of 
the methodology employed in the creation of this model. 
The model is initialized through the use of a baseline database of movements 
developed from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for all U.S. air carriers [144]. This 
database provides not only information on the specific routes and air carriers operating in 
the U.S. NAS, but also provides specific aircraft types utilized throughout each fleet. 
With the known aircraft types in operation, fuel burn estimates are created at the vehicle 
level from BTS and augmented by utilizing state of the art aircraft performance analysis 
tool, EDS [120]. Ultimately, the database of aircraft movements and fuel burn estimates 
of specific aircraft are integrated to develop fleet level fuel burn performance estimates 
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for the base year of operation. In order to finalize initialization of the tool, it’s also 
necessary to determine the initial fleet mix and age of aircraft for each air carrier. This air 
carrier inventory is utilized for determination of retirements and capital costs in other 
modules of the simulation environment, and is determined through reported inventories to 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics [146].  
In addition to providing estimates of the benefits throughout the U.S. NAS, the 
simulation environment also captures the costs associated with the operations of aircraft, 
development of new technologies, and the policies under study. The costs captured in this 
environment have been determined through analysis of both the CAEP and U.S. FAA 
cost-effectiveness studies available in the public domain for prior noise and NOx 
standards [52, 124, 129, 142, 147-149]. These costs can most generally be discussed in 
terms of the non-recurring costs (NRC) to aircraft manufacturers, and recurring costs 
(RC) to aircraft owners and operators. It should be noted here that the policy induced 
costs will be those associated with the implementation of a notional aircraft CO2 standard 
and emission trading schemes. Ultimately, the technology investments occurring through 
the CO2 standard will be captured in the NRC to aircraft manufacturers, and the costs 
associated with emission trading schemes will be captured in the RC to aircraft owners 
and operators. While these are the cost elements considered herein, additional parameters 
may be included depending upon the specific policies under investigation.  
While these basic modules initialize the tool developed and provide performance 
and cost estimates, studying future policies also requires forecasting through future years. 
This is accomplished through employment of a notional operations demand forecast, 
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loosely based on the 2011 Terminal Area Forecast published by the FAA. . Applying 
forecasts of revenue-tonne-kilometers (RTK) allows the operations database to be 
extended to future years for the assessment of fuel burn, CO2 emissions, and associated 
costs. One of the major efforts included in this forecasting is in determining the 
retirements, replacements, and additions of aircraft into air carrier fleets. This is 
accomplished based on retirement curves, and assessment of a gap between operations 
covered by aircraft in service and total operations forecasted. An assumption for average 
aircraft utilization of 9.4 hours per day is employed, as well as an assumption of a fixed 
passenger load factor of 75%. 
Next, as aforementioned, the study of the policies under question requires 
implementation within the modeling framework developed. As such, modules for each of 
these policies are developed. For the notional aircraft CO2 standard, the metric system is 
based on MTOW and 1/SAR for particular aircraft included in the operations and 
inventory databases based on previous literature research [117, 119]. Additionally, the 
implementation date for stringency options is provided as an input to the module in order 
to account for the uncertainty of the actual implementation. The notional stringency 
options themselves are predefined based on a study by Boling et.al. [119]. This 
implementation will provide all necessary information in order to calculate relative 
technology insertion levels used to estimate NRC to manufacturers, as well as fuel burn 
characteristics of new vehicles for fleet fuel burn performance estimation.  
The module determining the impact of emissions trading schemes is based on the 
structure of the EU ETS discussed previously. This structure is largely taken from EU 
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Directive 2008/101/EC in terms of setting a cap and providing allocation of allowances to 
specific air carriers [95]. The cap setting process will be based on average emissions from 
an input reference year, which the modeler is free to set. The allocation of allowances 
will be based on relative market share of each notional air carrier included in the study 
based on the two previous years of operations, as is done in the EU ETS [95]. In addition, 
the potential to include the lost opportunity costs associated with freely allocated 
allowances is provided in the modeling framework to study the potential implications of 
windfall profits, as identified previously in literature. Allowance prices are assumed 
based on previous literature review, and can be varied parametrically. Since the aviation 
sector will likely be a net purchaser of allowances, it has been determined that linkage 
with an established ETS would provide a market suitable for realistic inclusion. Finally, it 
should be noted that as with the prior policy, the implementation date of the ETS can also 
be varied directly in this module.  
The main effect of the ETS will be a reduction in demand over the provided 
forecasts, as noted throughout literature [96, 102, 106]. This is accomplished through the 
creation of a partial equilibrium model of demand, in which the opportunity costs 
associated with allowances increase ticket prices in future years, reducing demand based 
on known demand elasticities [137]. Accomplishing this task requires the determination 
of average ticket prices for all air carriers, which is assessed from information contained 
in the BTS [150]. Further, it is assumed that there is a one year lag in price increases due 
to opportunity cost pass through, however, consumer demand responds instantaneously. 
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This method of ETS employment proved to show similar trends to other studies regarding 
aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS.  
Each of these pieces of the modeling environment developed will be explored 
more completely in the following sections, and all applicable benchmarking will also be 
discussed. In order to provide a more illustrative view of this environment in the context 
of SoS structures included in this study, Figure 4.1 is provided.  
 
Figure 4.1: U.S. Policy Interdependency Tradeoff Tool (U.S. PoInT) 
4.1 Operations Database Creation for U.S. NAS Fleet Analysis 
The first major effort in the creation of this virtual environment is the 
establishment of a database of operations for the U.S. NAS. This is accomplished through 
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the collection of BTS Form 41 T100 Segment data for U.S. carriers for years 2004 
through 2012 [144]. The reason for extending the database back to year 2004 is to 
account for possible study of the EU ETS, in which average emissions from years 2004 
through 2006 are used for cap setting purposes. Additionally, data is collected through 
the year 2012 as this is the most recent year for which a complete set of operations data is 
available by the BTS at the time of this study.  
This data provides information for operations on specific origin-destination (OD) 
pairs with identification of the unique aircraft type. Additionally, each air carrier is 
identified through a unique airline identifier. In order to save internal computational 
memory and speed up analysis, only a subset of the data is carrier through analysis, and 
all text data is converted using numerical mappings. The data analyzed for this study 
included the number of departures performed on each OD pair, the corresponding 
payload, number of seats available, passengers carried, freight and mail payload, distance 
traveled, operational block time, air time, airline identifier, origin and destination, aircraft 
type and configuration, year and month of operation, and the service class of the air 
carrier involved. While all of this information is not fully utilized in other modules of the 
environment, this metadata may be useful in other studies. Additional metadata is also 
needed for this database, namely the definition of seat classes for all operations, which is 
accomplished using the definitions given in Table 4.8 and the number of available seats 
by aircraft type. 
In analyzing the resulting database for years 2004 through 2012 it has been 
determined that 193 unique air carriers are represented. While studying the effects of 
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policy such as the ETS necessitates analyzing the effects on distinct carriers, only a small 
percentage of the carriers identified dominate the U.S. NAS market. Further, it is 
expected that showing the impact on different carrier types, namely low cost carriers 
(LCC) and legacy carriers, will not require the analysis of each unique air carrier 
operating in the region. In order to capture the most influential carriers operating in this 
region, the relative market share of each carrier is determined through analysis of both 
the revenue-passenger-miles (RPM) and revenue-ton-miles (RTM). This market share 
analysis is conducted for the most recent year data is available, 2012. Analyzing only this 
year is deemed acceptable because when market share analysis is completed for all years 
data has been collected a number of carriers no longer in service are shown to hold 
significant market share, namely Northwest Air Lines and Continental Air Lines. 
4.1.1 Revenue-Passenger Mile (RPM) Market Share Analysis 
The revenue-passenger mile (RPM) is a measure of consumer throughput for each 
airline. It is calculated on a per flight basis using Equation 3. The RPM for each OD pair 
is then aggregated over the year 2012 for each airline represented in the dataset, and the 
results provide a rank order of air carriers dominating the market.   
Equation 3: Revenue-Passenger Mile (RPM) 
𝑅𝑃𝑀 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠  ×𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛 
As aforementioned, only a small percentage of the 193 unique carriers dominate 
the U.S. NAS market. When analysis is performed for the top 80% of all RPM, it is found 
that only six air carriers are included, and when the top 90% of all RPM is analyzed, only 
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11 carriers are present. The relative market share of the top 80% of air carriers based on 
RPM is displayed below in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. As can be seen, the air carriers 
included are United Air Lines, Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, 
US Airways, and JetBlue Airways. This set of air carriers includes both legacy carriers 
(United, Delta, and American) and low cost carriers (Southwest, US Airways, and 
JetBlue). As such, it represents a good minimum set of specific air carriers for the study 
of emission trading schemes, and will likely produce the high level trends of the U.S. 
NAS generally. 
Table 4.1: Relative Market Share of Top 80% of Air Carriers (RPM) 
Carrier %Share 
United Air Lines Inc. 21.59% 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 20.13% 
American Airlines Inc. 15.38% 
Southwest Airlines Co. 10.42% 
US Airways Inc. 7.60% 
JetBlue Airways 4.09% 





Figure 4.2: Relative Market Share of Top 80% of Air Carriers (RPM) 
Despite the fact that the six air carriers already identified can adequately represent 
the different carrier types and dominant effects of the U.S. market, the top 90% of air 
carriers based on RPM is also analyzed for completeness. The relative market share of 
these air carriers is presented below in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3. As can be seen, 11 
distinct carriers are represented, meaning an additional five carriers account for 10% of 
the market not captured in the previous set. These five carriers are all different low cost 
and regional carriers operating throughout the U.S. As such, inclusion of this larger set 
would not be likely to produce additional information beyond the reduced set provided in 
Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.2: Relative Market Share of Top 90% of Air Carriers (RPM) 
Carrier %Share 
United Air Lines Inc. 21.59% 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 20.13% 
American Airlines Inc. 15.38% 
Southwest Airlines Co. 10.42% 
US Airways Inc. 7.60% 
JetBlue Airways 4.09% 
Alaska Airlines Inc. 2.97% 
AirTran Airways Corporation 2.11% 
ExpressJet Airlines Inc. 1.93% 
SkyWest Airlines Inc. 1.73% 
Hawaiian Airlines Inc. 1.49% 
All Others 10.57% 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Relative Market Share of Top 90% of Air Carriers (RPM) 
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4.1.2 Revenue-Ton Mile (RTM) Market Share Analysis 
Revenue-ton miles (RTM) are also a measure of throughput for an airline, 
although instead of number of passengers carried, it is based on tons of payload. As such, 
this metric also provides a good measure of relative market share for air carriers. This 
RTM market share analysis is completed by calculating RTM on a per flight basis using 
Equation 4. As with RPM market share analysis, the results of these calculations are 
aggregated over the year 2012 for each airline, and provide a rank order of air carriers 
dominating the market.  
Equation 4: Revenue-Ton Mile (RTM) 
𝑅𝑇𝑀 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  ×𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛 
The relative market share of each airline is calculated based on this measure, and 
the air carriers representing 80% of the market based on RTM are presented below in 
Table 4.3. While similar analysis could have been accomplished for the top 90% of the 
market, as was done with RPM market share analysis, the additional airlines included 
tended to be other low cost carriers, as was observed previously.  As can be seen in this 
set, many of the same carriers are represented with the addition of two cargo air carrier 






Table 4.3: Relative Market Share of Top 80% of Air Carriers (RTM) 
Carrier %Share 
United Air Lines Inc. 18.04% 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 16.53% 
American Airlines Inc. 13.35% 
Federal Express Corporation 8.92% 
Southwest Airlines Co. 7.39% 
US Airways Inc. 6.14% 
United Parcel Service 5.40% 




Figure 4.4: Relative Market Share of Top 80% of Air Carriers (RTM) 
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4.1.3 Comparison of RPM and RTM Market Share Analysis 
While the absolute market share of the top air carriers varies depending on 
whether RPM or RTM is used as the metric, the variability is on the order of 3%. Further, 
in analyzing the air carriers with the greatest market share in the U.S. NAS it is noted that 
the passenger air carriers in the top 80% of the market for both RPM and RTM are 
ranked the same order regardless of which metric is used. As a result, the passenger 
airlines representing the top 80% of market share will be carried throughout this study. 
Their names and respective market share based on both RPM and RTM are provided in 
Table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4: Relative Market Share of Passenger Air Carriers 
Carrier %Share (RPM) %Share (RTM) 
United Air Lines Inc. 21.59% 18.04% 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 20.13% 16.53% 
American Airlines Inc. 15.38% 13.35% 
Southwest Airlines Co. 10.42% 7.39% 
US Airways Inc. 7.60% 6.14% 
JetBlue Airways 4.09% 2.83% 
 
Based on this analysis of relative market share, the BTS Form 41 T100 Segment 
data included in the database is down-selected, keeping only the six air carriers with the 
greatest market share. This list of carriers includes both legacy carriers, such as American 
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Air Lines, as well as low cost carriers such as 
Southwest and JetBlue. For this reason, the resulting seed database for this study should 
be suitable for exploring the effects of policy such as emission trading schemes on the 
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U.S. NAS. In order to provide some level of anonymity to these air carriers, their names 
and respective placement will be replaced with generic labels, such as Legacy Carrier 1 
and LCC 1 (Low Cost Carrier). All future analysis will present results for individual air 
carriers in this way. 
4.2 Fuel burn estimation for baseline database movements 
Due to the fact that the BTS Form 41 T100 Segment data collected for the seed 
database did not include fuel burn estimates for specific flights, fuel burn calculations 
must be included. Further, the ability to fully study the impacts of a notional CO2 
standard also necessitate the inclusion of baseline fuel burn models for specific aircraft 
types represented in the database of operations. The calculations for the performance 
model will be dependent on the aircraft type, payload carried, and range flown. Estimates 
of block fuel are included based on simple regressions of specific aircraft types, as a 
function of both payload and range.  
The data used for fitting these regressions can be generated using a number of 
existing tools, such as the Environmental Design Space (EDS), or the Advanced 
Emissions Model [120, 145]. There are number of advantages and disadvantages to each, 
which will be discussed. However, before evaluating the tools that can be used, it’s 
important to understand the specific types of aircraft that are included in the database. In 
order to accomplish this, the database is queried for unique aircraft types, and the specific 
names are generated using the mapping provided by the BTS. This will be used to ensure 




4.2.1 Aircraft Emissions Prediction Tools Comparison 
Creating fuel burn performance estimating relationships for the aircraft included 
in the seed database requires data for each aircraft type over their respective payload-
range envelope. There are a large number of existing, vetted environments suitable to 
produce these estimates; however, at the time of this study, two specific modeling 
environments were available for use. These include the Environmental Design Space 
(EDS) and Eurocontrol’s Advanced Emission Model (AEM) [120, 145]. Each of these 
tools provides aircraft level performance estimates based on a large number of input 
parameters. In order to assess the relative usefulness for this endeavor, basic criteria are 
established, which include: the model has been proven useful for aircraft level emissions 
prediction, payload and range can be varied parametrically, results can be published, and 
all aircraft are represented.  
Assessing these criteria requires a closer look at each of the identified tools. The 
first step is to establish that the tools can predict emissions through fuel burn estimation. 
Since that tends to be one of the primary measures of performance predictions, it has 
been determined that both tools are fully capable in this respect. Next, the ability to 
parametrically vary the payload and range of specific aircraft types is analyzed in order to 
fully understand performance throughout the payload-range envelope. EDS allows these 
parameters to be parametrically varied, however, the version of Eurocontrol’s AEM 
available only allows for the range to be varied, as payload is fixed at a 65% load factor 
for all aircraft. Finally, one of the most crucial aspects of these tools is that all aircraft in 
the seed database need to be represented. In analyzing this criterion, it was found that 
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EDS provides generic representations of aircraft in different size classes; however, only a 
few calibrated models representing real aircraft exist. As such, only a small number of the 
aircraft in the seed database could be represented using this tool. However, Eurocontrol’s 
AEM included most aircraft in this study. Subsequently, a mixed modeling approach for 
individual vehicle surrogates is completed through the use of Eurocontrol’s AEM and 
supplemented with data provided by the Environmental Design Space. 
4.2.2 Aircraft Emissions Predictions  
For each vehicle represented in the database, Eurocontrol’s AEM is implemented 
to perform a mission sweep of range, and the corresponding fuel burn has been collected. 
Range is varied in 500 nautical mile (nmi) increments from 500 to 8,000 nmi. Estimates 
for the fuel burn impacts of payload are determined using vehicles in the Environmental 
Design Space and payload is varied as a percent of maximum allowable payload from 0% 
to 100%. The data generated from these tools is utilized to fit surrogate representations of 
the individual aircraft.  
Equation 5: Aircraft Fuel Burn Surrogate 
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!
+ 𝛽! ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! 
Fitting of the block fuel burn surrogates for each vehicle is accomplished using 
the nonlinear regression tool box in Matlab. All block fuel surrogates are of the form seen 
in Equation 5. In analyzing the goodness of fit for these regressions it has been noted that 
all coefficients of determination (R2) are above 0.99, and fall along a nearly one to one 
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mapping of actual against predicted data. Fit statistics for select regressions are provided 
in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. It should be noted here that the figures provided are 




Due to its wide use, the EDS representation of the Boeing 737-8 is used as a test 
case for further statistical analysis. It has been determined that the results seen for this 
vehicle were similar across all other vehicles analyzed. Provided in Figure 4.5 are the 
actual by predicted results. As can be seen there’s a nearly one to one mapping, 
indicating a very good fit. Further, the residual by predicted observations are also 
provided in Figure 4.6. As can be seen here, the spread in the residuals at the predicted 
values is on the order of 1%, also indicating very good predictive capabilities of the 




Figure 4.5: EDS Boeing 737-8 Representation Actual by Predicted Fuel Burn 
 
Figure 4.6: EDS Boeing 737-8 Representation Residual by Predicted Fuel Burn 
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4.3 Utilizing Aircraft Fuel Burn Surrogates for the Fleet 
Given these block fuel burn surrogates, fuel burn for all flights in the operations 
database are calculated for the years 2004 through 2012 on a per flight basis. When fully 
implemented the block fuel estimates will be manipulated directly in forecasting out to 
future years, and altered for new technology vehicles due to the notional CO2 standard, 
both of which will be discussed later. Further, it should be noted that estimating fuel burn 
also provides a direct estimate of overall CO2 emissions, using a conversion factor of 
3.15 lb CO2 per lb of fuel [119]. 
In order to validate this method of fleet fuel burn estimation, the resulting fuel 
burn is compared directly to fuel sales for each air carrier included in this study. This is 
accomplished by comparing the fuel burn predictions for 2012 against data extracted 
from BTS Form 41 Schedule P12A for the air carriers included [151]. This data set 
provides actual fuel sales reported by all U.S. air carriers. Gross fuel sales for each air 
carrier are provided along with estimates resulting from this technique in Table 4.5. 
Additionally, the error is also reported. From this comparison the validation results reveal 
that the fuel burn estimation technique closely matches actual fuel sales, typically within 
2% error, with the exception of LCC 1. It’s unclear why LCC 1 estimates are 
significantly lower than expected, and with the available data it’s not possible to 
determine. However, due to the fact that the bias in estimated fuel burn is below actual 
sales it seems probable that LCC 1 may have employed a fuel price hedging strategy by 
purchasing additional fuel not needed in the year used for validation. Despite this, it is 
generally clear that the method behaves appropriately for most air carriers included in 
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this study. Accuracy can obviously be improved with higher quality fuel burn estimates, 
if available. It will be assumed that the reported fuel sales to LCC 1 included fuel not 
specified by flights reported in the BTS T100 Segment data, but the predictions for LCC 
1 are still reasonable for the purpose of this thesis. In addition, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 
are provided to provide a more visual representation of actual against predicted fuel sales 
and the associated error respectively. 
Table 4.5: Fleet Fuel Burn Validation 
Carriers Fuel Sales (lbs) Fuel  Estimates (lb) Error (%) 
Legacy Carrier 1 22950442925 22410179495 -2.35% 
Legacy Carrier 2 20685011182 20488292259 -0.95% 
Legacy Carrier 3 16168207178 16360998184 1.19% 
LCC 1 11879918800 10240069887 13.80% 
LCC 2 7392023242 7234788679 -2.13% 
LCC 3 3779636995 3764968257 -0.39% 
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Figure 4.8: Percent Error in Predicted Fuel Sales for 2012 
4.4 Air Carrier Inventories 
To finalize initialization of the tool, it’s necessary to determine the number of 
aircraft and aircraft age for each air carrier. This will allow determination of retirements 
and capital costs in other modules of the simulation environment. Inventory data has been 
collected from the BTS Form 41 Schedule B-43 Inventory datasets for all applicable 
years [146]. The data collected for these air carrier inventories includes the year of first 
delivery for each aircraft, number of seats available, maximum payload capacity, 
acquisition date of the vehicle, operational status as of 2012, and aircraft type. In addition 
to collecting this data, the aircraft types present in the inventory for each air carrier are 
also cross referenced with aircraft used for operations reported in the dataset used for 















then stored for each air carrier as the existing inventory list for the year used for future 
projections, 2012. Table 4.6 is provided, giving the number of aircraft for each air carrier 
included in the study to demonstrate the fleet mix present in 2012. As can be seen, most 
legacy carriers operate a more diverse fleet than the low cost carriers, especially LCC 1 
and LCC 3, which each only operate a few specific aircraft types.  







Carrier 3 LCC 1 LCC 2 LCC 3 
Boeing 737-700/700LR 72 45 0 1343 0 0 
Boeing 737-800 260 366 543 34 0 0 
Boeing 737-500 93 0 0 95 0 0 
Boeing 737-400 0 0 0 0 131 0 
Boeing 737-300 91 0 1 547 97 0 
Boeing 757-200 485 777 607 0 165 0 
Boeing 757-300 42 48 0 0 0 0 
Boeing 767-400 32 105 0 0 0 0 
Boeing 767-200 15 0 75 0 54 0 
Boeing 767-300 148 399 243 0 0 0 
Boeing 777-
200ER/200LR 274 80 204 0 0 0 
Boeing 737-900 109 0 0 0 0 0 
McDonnell Douglas 
DC-9-50 0 82 0 0 0 0 
McDonnell Douglas 
DC9 Super 
80/MD81/82/83/88 0 596 594 0 0 0 
McDonnell Douglas 
MD-90 0 164 0 0 0 0 
Embraer 190 0 0 0 0 76 210 
Airbus A330-300 0 96 0 0 63 0 
Airbus Industries A320-
100/200 393 197 0 0 255 511 
Airbus Industries A330-
200 0 15 0 0 23 0 
Airbus Industries A319 228 169 0 0 312 0 
Airbus Industries A321 0 0 0 0 208 0 
Boeing 747-400 115 48 0 0 0 0 
B787-800 Dreamliner 6 0 0 0 0 0 
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4.5 Cost Calculation Module 
As aforementioned, the costs captured in this environment are the recurring costs 
(RC) to aircraft owners and operators, as well as the non-recurring costs (NRC) to aircraft 
manufacturers. The costs included have been determined through analysis of prior cost-
effectiveness studies for both the noise and NOx standards [52, 124, 129, 142, 147-149]. 
All costs are reported in 2012 U.S. dollars (USD), as this represents the base year of 
operations used for forecasting. The following section will detail the implementation of 
recurring costs and non-recurring costs included in this study. It should be noted 
however, that the recurring costs associated with emission trading schemes will be 
covered later in 4.10.2.  
4.5.1 Recurring Costs 
The recurring costs (RC) captured in this simulation environment are the direct 
operating costs (DOC). The following section will detail the methodology used to 
calculate DOC, which include the fuel costs, capital costs, crew and maintenance costs, 
and route and landing fees.  
4.5.1.1 Fuel Costs 
Fuel costs are estimated directly utilizing results from the fuel burn performance 
module of this tool, as well as an assumed price of fuel of approximately $3 per gallon 
based on the Energy Information Administration’s spot price for kerosene type jet fuel 
[152]. The primary reason for considering this cost as a constant value is due to the 
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relative stability in recent years where kerosene type jet fuel has hovered around $3 per 
gallon. This can be seen below in Figure 4.9, which displays the spot price in 2012 USD. 
Despite this, the cost assumption can be varied directly in the cost calculation module to 
account for uncertainty regarding future fuel prices. As such, scenarios can be assessed to 
quantitatively account for the aleatory variability of fuel price. 
 
Figure 4.9: Spot Price for Kerosene Type Jet Fuel 
4.5.1.2 Capital Costs 
Capital costs are those associated with ownership or leasing of specific aircraft, 
and include consideration of both financing and depreciation. These costs are ultimately 
annuitized over the useful life of the vehicle, and are calculated based on the aircraft 
price, finance rate, depreciation rate, number of years financed, and scrap price of the 
aircraft after its useful life. Subsequently, the primary assumptions for the calculation of 
capital costs are the finance and depreciation rates, which are assumed to be 5% and 3% 
respectively. While information regarding actual rates for airlines is not readily available, 
these values produce trends consistent with other tools. 
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Due to the fact that the capital required for aircraft investments are very high, 
vehicle costs are typically annuitized through loans or lease arrangements. The proposed 
method for determination of annuitization utilized in this study is based on an annuity due 
formulation, which would be consistent with lease payments made at the beginning of 
each period, where a period could be considered by year. This is accomplished by first 
calculating the present value of the scrapped item at the end of its useful life, determining 
the present value of the annuity due, and finally calculating an equivalent annual cost 
associated with vehicle purchase [153, 154]. Calculation of the present value of the 
scrapped item is accomplished using Equation 6. 
Equation 6: Net Present Value of Scrapped Item 
𝑃𝑉!"#$% = 𝑆𝑉×
1
1+ 𝑑 ! 
Here, SV is the scrap value, d is the depreciation rate, and n are the years of useful 
life. It has been assumed here that the scrap value of each aircraft is 10% of the initial 
price, and the number of years of useful life is equivalent to the years in service.  
Following this, the present value of the annuity due is then calculated using 
Equation 7. In this equation, i represents the finance rate.  
Equation 7: Present Value of Annuity Due 
𝑎!" =




Given the present value of the scrapped item, the annuity due, and purchase cost 
(PC) of the vehicle, the equivalent annual cost (EAC) can be determined through 
Equation 8. 
 





This calculation is completed for all vehicles maintained in the air carrier 
inventories, and the EAC is applied throughout the useful life of the vehicles. Ultimately, 
the overall capital costs associated for each air carrier are determined by summing the 
EAC for each vehicle in operation in each year throughout the simulation.  
4.5.1.2.1 Determining Aircraft Price 
One of the key pieces of information needed for these capital cost calculations 
that has not been addressed yet is the purchase cost (PC) or aircraft price associated with 
the vehicles in operation. The aircraft price has been collected for a number of available 
vehicles based on existing literature, and the CPI-U is used to translate all costs to 2012 
USD [155]. The list of vehicles included in the inventory list aforementioned and their 
associated costs in 2012 USD are provided below in Table 4.7. Additionally, the sources 
are also provided in this table. Due to the fact that the BTS inventory grouped a number 
of similar aircraft, determining the base price for the group proved challenging. In order 
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to overcome this obstacle, the price for each vehicle is determined, and the average price 
for the group is ultimately input for capital cost calculations. 
Table 4.7: Aircraft Purchase Price (2012 USD) 
Aircraft Price (2012 USD) Source 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 172,488,706.16  [156] 
Airbus Industries A300-600 73,923,731.21  [157] 
Embraer 170 26,119,718.36  [158] 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-30 45,000,000.00  [159] 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-40 45,000,000.00  [159] 
Fokker 100 29,569,492.48  [160] 
Boeing 737-100/200 59,264,770.41  [161] 
Boeing 737-700 74,909,380.96  [162] 
Boeing 737-800 89,201,302.33  [162] 
Boeing 787-8 208,760,616.94  [162] 
Boeing 777-200ER 257,747,409.49  [162] 
Boeing 777-200LR 291,752,325.85  [162] 
Boeing 777-300ER 315,605,049.78  [162] 
Boeing 777 AVG 288,368,261.05  [162] 
Boeing 767-300ER 183,133,723.45  [162] 
Airbus A320 90,186,952.08  [163] 
Airbus A321 105,760,218.12  [163] 
Airbus A330-200 212,998,910.86  [163] 
Airbus A330-300 235,964,550.03  [163] 
Airbus A330-200F 215,955,860.11  [163] 
Boeing 737-500 52,023,850.54  [164] 
Boeing 737-400 65,805,003.00  [164] 
Boeing 737-300 59,603,484.39  [164] 
Boeing 757-200 95,434,480.79  [164] 
Boeing 757-300 106,459,402.76  [164] 
Boeing 767-400/ER 166,751,944.78  [164] 
Boeing 767-200/ER 157,901,089.87  [165] 
Boeing 737-900 89,600,000.00  [162] 
DC-9-50 45,000,000.00  [159] 
DC9 Super MD80 57,191,782.71  [166] 
MD-90 66,838,589.44  [167] 
Embraer 190 31,540,791.98  [168] 
Boeing 747-400 244,270,927.37  [164] 
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Due to the fact that the aircraft prices for new vehicles are unknown, a method for 
determining aircraft price based on available information must be identified. It is 
expected that the aircraft price is likely a function of the size of the vehicle, as well as the 
relative technology generation. Given this, it’s proposed that a model of aircraft price can 
be developed based on these two parameters, provided a suitable quantitative mapping 
for each. Aircraft size is readily quantified through the maximum takeoff weight 
(MTOW), and given the wide availability of this data it is selected as the size parameter. 
Technology generation however is much more nuanced, and a simple, widely available 
parameter does not exist. While the year of production may be a suitable measure of 
technology generation, if the technology generation can relate specifically to the notional 
aircraft CO2 standard it may be more appropriate in this context. As such, technology 
generation will be measured by the aircrafts’ margins to a “no action” notional stringency 
scenario. A more thorough explanation of this “no action” stringency scenario and 
determination of the margin for particular aircraft are included in 4.10.1. 
Subsequently, future aircraft prices are modeled as a function of the maximum 
take-off weight (MTOW) of the vehicle and the respective margin to a “no action” 
stringency scenario. To accomplish this, the existing vehicles in the inventory database 
are employed to map aircraft price against MTOW and the margin to a “no action” 
stringency option, which is explained in detail later. This mapping can be seen more 
visually through analysis of each dimension (MTOW and margin), which is provided in 




Figure 4.10: Impact of MTOW and Margin to Aircraft Price 
As can be seen in Figure 4.10, price tends to increase for larger vehicles, as well 
as for more technologically advanced vehicles (ie. those with a larger negative margin to 
the “no action” stringency). It’s also quite obvious these trends are not entirely linear. As 
such, the three dimensional space should be analyzed to determine a suitable functional 
form for modeling. Figure 4.11 is provided to visualize the functional space of the aircraft 




Figure 4.11: Visualization of Aircraft Price to MTOW and Margin 
Due to the relatively tight formation of points, it has been determined that a 
response surface equation would likely adequately predict the data observed above. 
Further, it is noted that the nonlinearities observed in the data will likely require a 
nonlinear response surface equation. As such, a second order response surface equation, 
including terms for twist, is used to fit price as a function of MTOW and margin to the 
stringency. The resulting response surface is found to have a coefficient of determination 
(R2) of 0.98, indicating the predicted values closely matched those used to fit the curve. 
In order to more fully check the goodness of fit for the resulting response surface 
equation, the actual by predicted values and residuals are also analyzed. The actual by 
predicted price values can be seen in Figure 4.12. As is shown, the predicted values 
follow a very close 1:1 trend with actual prices. Additionally, the spread of the residuals, 
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as seen in Figure 4.13, are within approximately 10% of the predicted prices which is 
deemed acceptable. Subsequently, the resulting 2nd order response surface for price is 
determined to be acceptable.  
 
Figure 4.12: Aircraft Actual by Predicted Price 
 
Figure 4.13: Aircraft Residual by Predicted Price 
The response surface equation for price as a function of MTOW and the margin to 
a “no action” stringency scenario is provided in Equation 9. The surface is further 
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illustrated in Figure 4.14. As is expected, price is shown to increase for increases in both 
MTOW and margin. 
Equation 9: Aircraft Price Response Surface Equation 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = −9032297+ 591.77 ∙𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 − 33596460 ∙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 − 0.000341 ∙𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊!
− 131.73 ∙𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ∙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 + 18420359 ∙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛! 
 
Figure 4.14: Aircraft Price Response Surface 
4.5.1.3 Crew and Maintenance Costs 
Both the crew and maintenance costs are based on an assumed cost per 
operational block hour, which is consistent with other aviation cost-effectiveness 
analyses. These costs are reported based on a seat class categorization, which are 
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provided in Table 4.8. The assumptions associated with these costs are generated using 
the Aircraft Life Cycle Cost Analysis (ALCCA) tool in conjunction with five generic 
vehicle classes represented in the Environmental Design Space (EDS). For all seat classes 
not represented by the generic vehicles, linear interpolation is used to determine an 
estimate of crew and maintenance costs per block hour. This combination of tools is 
chosen for their availability, but it’s anticipated the results will be similar to other studies. 
Here, the assumptions are provided as simply a cost per block hour for each seat class, 
with maintenance costs differentiated based on production status.  
Due to the fact that both crew and maintenance costs require the determination of 
block hours for each seat class, this must also be assessed. The operations database used 
to seed forecasting includes operational block hours in the form of ramp to ramp time. 
This time is reported in minutes, and ultimately converted to total block hours. Given the 
mapping of specific aircraft types in the operations database to seat classes, the overall 
block hours for each seat class can be aggregated for all air carriers considered. This 
block time can further be used in forecasting, and is assumed to be constant per operation 
for all future years considered. Ultimately, this assumption negates any consideration of 
operational speed changes in future aircraft, but can be updated if such changes are 






Table 4.8: Seat Class Definition 












Crew costs are distinguished based on aircraft use. Due to the fact that the air 
carriers considered in this study all provide passenger service, only the passenger crew 
costs from the ALCCA estimates are provided here. These assumptions are given in 
Table 4.9.    
Table 4.9: Crew Cost Assumptions (2012 USD) 














Maintenance costs are distinguished based on operational status. This assumption 
stems from the fact that maintenance costs tend to be age dependent, increasing for older 
vehicles, which is a well-documented phenomenon in aviation literature [169]. Using 
both EDS generic vehicles and ALCCA, these costs can be determined as a function of 
block hours, which are provided for both out of production and in production vehicles. 
The production status for the vehicles included in the operations and inventory databases 
are based on information from BTS Form 41 Schedule B-43 [146]. Due to the fact that 
data is not available for future maintenance costs, the assumptions used for in production 
vehicles are also applied to all vehicles added to the fleet in forecasted years. Table 4.10 
provides the assumed values for these maintenance costs. 
Table 4.10: Maintenance Cost Assumptions (2012 USD) 
Out of Production (OP) Aircraft In Production (IP) Aircraft 
Generic Type $ Per Block Hour Generic Type $ Per Block Hour 
SC19 OP 252.30 SC19 IP 253.10 
SC1 OP 252.40 SC1 IP 308.30 
SC2 OP 252.40 SC2 IP 308.30 
SC3 OP 391.57 SC3 IP 463.46 
SC4 OP 490.30 SC4 IP 557.10 
SC5 OP 514.70 SC5 IP 589.00 
SC6 OP 563.20 SC6 IP 783.58 
SC7 OP 724.61 SC7 IP 966.50 
SC8 OP 845.71 SC8 IP 1149.42 




4.5.1.4 Route and landing Fees 
The final component of the DOC calculations are the route and landing fees 
associated with operations. These charges are typically based on seat class, and also 
include consideration of the region of operation. In order to provide estimates for these 
costs a subset of data acquired through the Bureau of Transportation Statistics is utilized 
[170, 171]. 
Route charges are typically provided based on a cost per distance for each seat 
class and region of operation. Due to the structure of available data provided by the BTS, 
a singular route charge per nautical mile is determined for this analysis. While this 
approach does not directly model reality, these costs in the U.S. NAS are relatively small 
compared to all other cost elements, and the estimates provide useful values.  Based on 
analysis of a subset of the BTS Form 41 Schedule P-5.1the route charge is assumed to be 
approximately $0.01 per nautical mile.   
Landing fees are a result of airport charges to air carriers to maintain facilities. 
These fees are dependent on the airport, and the landing fees are also typically based on 
the size of the aircraft. As such, the assumptions for landing fees utilized here are given 
per operation. These estimates have been determined through analysis of a subset of the 
BTS Form 41 Schedule P-6 [171]. They are assessed using the mapping of the seat 
classes in the operations database, and aggregated for each air carrier. Table 4.11 




















4.5.2 Non-Recurring Costs 
The other major cost element included in the cost calculation modules of this 
environment, are the non-recurring costs (NRC) to aircraft manufacturers. These costs are 
quite separate from the RC to aircraft owners and operators, as they impact manufacturers 
and not air carriers, thus they are accounted for independently. The NRC to 
manufacturers is the cost associated with technology investments for future aircraft 
development incurred as a result of the notional CO2 standard. Estimating these costs in a 
bottom up approach can be accomplished through extensive analysis of future technology 
packages and impacts [172, 173], but such detailed analysis would require resources and 
time outside the scope of this study. As such, a normative forecasting approach is taken 
here utilizing an NRC estimating relationship based on the policy under consideration. 
This NRC estimating relationship includes consideration of both airframe and engine 
costs for an entire aircraft family.  
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While data associated with the new development of aircraft families is relatively 
limited, some expected improvements in aircraft from manufacturers in the 2018 to 2020 
time frame provide a useable dataset to fit such an NRC curve. Typically, the reported 
investments must be taken from news sources, thus are gross estimates in the billion 
dollar range. Despite this fact, the method ought to be adequate for the purpose of 
analyzing the resulting trends in technology investments due to the notional standard. 
Further, it should be noted that since this cost is a result of the notional standard, the 
metrics used in the assessment will appear in the formulation of the NRC curve. As with 
future aircraft price mapping, the NRC method will employ MTOW as the size parameter 
and the percent improvement in metric value, measured through 1/SAR, as the level of 
technology insertion.  
Data for 14 different aircraft families were identified throughout literature with 
corresponding estimates for airframe and engine development costs. While these aircraft 
families do not necessarily directly correspond to the aircraft included in the air carrier 
inventories, it does provide a sufficient set of data to fit an NRC estimating relationship. 
The data used for this purpose is provided in Table 4.12 with all sources identified. It 
should be noted here that the improvement in margin provided below has been calculated 
based on a “No-Action” limit line for the Aircraft CO2 Standard. The methodology by 
which this line has been constructed will be discussed in upcoming sections of this 
chapter. The improvement is simply the percent difference in these vehicles compared to 











(billion USD) Source 
Airbus A320neo 170000 7.54 1.3  [174] 
Airbus 
A330/A340 609406 11.13 5.1  [175] 
Airbus A330-200 524552 19.64 0.67  [176] 
Airbus A340-
500/600 837520 15.04 3.7  [177] 
Airbus A350 679000 32.26 15  [178] 
Airbus A380 1267300 16.40 14  [179] 
Boeing 747-8 986731 17.88 4.2  [180] 
Boeing 777-
200/300 774789 27.28 9.4  [181] 
Boeing 787-8 502363 29.09 11  [182] 
CRJ-1000 91774 2.36 0.32  [183] 
CRJ-700 74979 7.03 0.88  [184] 
Cseries 146000 13.70 3.5  [185] 
E170/E190 115247 0.63 1.3  [186] 
E2 Family 111973 -0.27 1.7  [187] 
  
Due to the fact that technology costs can increase drastically beyond 
economically viable technology insertion, an exponential relationship for technology 
insertion is chosen as a function of the percent margin captured through the notional 
standard, and MTOW as the size parameter. The basic functional form of this equation is 
provided in Equation 10.  
Equation 10: NRC Estimating Relationship 
𝑁𝑅𝐶 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼! ∙ 𝑒!!∙!"#$%& + 𝛼! ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 !! 
The resulting NRC estimating relationship can be visualized in Figure 4.15, which 
provides a mesh showing the contours of the surface. As is expected, the NRC increases 
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with the size of the aircraft, and exponentially increases with increasing improvements in 
margin. This behavior is expected, as there is likely a technological limit to 
improvements in future aircraft, which can now be assessed through an associated cost to 
aircraft manufacturers or maximum reduction of the metric. One other aspect of this 
relationship to note is that there is a positive cost associated with 0% improvement to the 
margin. This is ultimately deemed acceptable, as there is likely a cost associated with 
even considering changes, whether they are made or not. 
 
Figure 4.15: NRC Estimating Relationship Surface 
4.6 Operations Forecasting 
Given the ability to assess operations, inventory, and costs for the fleet, the next 
component necessary to determine policy implications is forecasting into future years. 
This is accomplished through the employment of a notional traffic and fleet forecasts out 
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to year 2036 [23]. The growth forecasts are provided for three different scenarios, and 
provide growth in revenue-tonne-kilometers (RTK) for route groups representing the 
global air transportation system. While this forecast is notional, any specific demand 
forecast can be used. The percent growth per year for this forecast is provided for the 
route group covering the domestic U.S. and global trends below in Table 4.13. Further, it 
should be noted that this forecast of RTK is used to seed performance and cost 
forecasting, but the overall growth per year for each air carrier is updated under emission 
trading scheme scenarios. This fact will be explored more completely in 4.10.2. Applying 
this forecast to the 2012 operations database ultimately provides estimates for fuel burn, 
CO2 emissions, and cost.  
Table 4.13: Notional Demand Forecast Projection 
Sector 2006-2016 2016-2026 2026-2036 
North America 3.0 2.5 2.0 
Total International 5.4 5.0 4.6 
 
4.7 Fleet Evolution 
In addition to forecasting the growth in operations, the evolution of the air carrier 
fleets must also be assessed. This necessitates predictions for the retirements, 
replacements, and additions of aircraft to air carrier inventories throughout the 
simulation. In order to provide a more illustrative representation of what corresponds to 
retirements, replacements, and additions, Figure 4.16 is provided [23]. As can be seen, as 
aircraft age they are retired from the fleet, which necessitates the replacement of those 
vehicles to cover the operations no longer in service. Moreover, as the number of 
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operations grows, additional aircraft are needed to cover that growth. The following 
discussion will provide more detail on the specific method employed for retiring, 
replacing, and adding vehicles to the air carrier fleet. It should be noted here though, that 
these actions are ultimately stored in the aircraft inventories throughout the simulation by 
adding data on the date of retirement, new date of acquisition, replacement aircraft type, 
and whether the new aircraft is a technology derivative.   
 
Figure 4.16: Retirements, Replacements, and Additions [23] 
4.7.1 Retirements 
Assessing when aircraft will retire is based on probability of survival curves, 
which are shown in Figure 4.17 [23]. The inventory in 2012 for the air carriers 
considered has been cross referenced, and it is determined that only the curves for narrow 
body and wide body aircraft are applicable. Utilizing these curves however requires the 
distinction within the inventory dataset between narrow and wide body aircraft. Further, 
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the curves provided are strictly visual, thus must be mapped to an analytic measure that 
can be used to assess probability of survival. To address the first issue, the distinction 
between narrow body and wide body aircraft is based on the number of available seats. 
Typically, wide body aircraft tend to have more than 210 seats, thus this cutoff was used 
to establish aircraft type. Next, the curves are converted to a functional form that can be 
analytically assessed. The functional form is provided in Equation 11, where β represents 
the age at which a 50% probability of survival occurs, γ controls the slope of the curve, 
and n corresponds to the aircraft age. Based on visual inspection, it has been determined 
that for the narrow body probability of survival curve, β = 0.19 and γ = 30.7, and for the 
wide body, β = 0.36 and γ = 24, produce nearly identical results to those seen in the 
figure below.  
Equation 11: Aircraft Probability of Survival 





Figure 4.17: Probability of Survival Retirement Curves [23]  
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With this analytic representation of the probability for survival, the initial 
inventory database for each air carrier is assessed based on age of the aircraft present to 
produce a probability of survival into future years. Next, a random number generator is 
implemented to determine the future year at which each aircraft will retire. It should be 
noted here that due to the implementation of random number generation this process is 
inherently stochastic. In order to ensure repeatability of results the random number 
generator is seeded. It should be noted that a number of seeds have been tested, and 
produced negligible changes in terms of macro effects on fleet fuel burn and cost 
considerations. As such, this approach appears to be adequate.  
4.7.2 Replacements 
As vehicles are retired from the fleet they must be replaced in order to account for 
the existing operations. The replacement of aircraft is assessed throughout each year of 
the simulation as aircraft from the initial inventory list are retired. Due to the fact that an 
air carrier may decide to purchase another vehicle than the one retired, or potentially the 
vehicle retired may be out of production, a system for replacing retired aircraft must be 
established. This is accomplished by assessing the maximum payload and seating 
capacity of in production aircraft present in the inventory. An equal probability of 
selection for any aircraft with similar payload and seating capacity is given when aircraft 
are retired, and the replacement aircraft is randomly selected from the list. This process 
also requires the seeding of a random number in order to provide repeatable results. 
Additionally, as aircraft are replaced it is possible that the notional standard may be 
implemented. As such, if the standard is in place in the forecast year being assessed, the 
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selected vehicle is also identified as a technology infused vehicle. The meaning and 
assessment of these technology infused vehicles is explored more thoroughly in 4.10.1.  
4.7.3 Additions 
Finally, the growth in operations must be assessed to determine the number of 
additional vehicles needed in future years. This is accomplished by forecasting the 2012 
operations database using the growth forecast for each air carrier. The additional block 
hours necessary for each aircraft type is aggregated to determine the total additional 
operational hours each year. An assumption on utilization of 9.4 hours per day was then 
used to calculate the number of new vehicles necessary for the growth in operations [23]. 
In addition, since the block time is manipulated directly from the operations database 
there is an inherent assumption of constant load factor throughout the fleet. This can be 
updated in the future to account for growing load factors, but is not attempted here.  
With an overall assessment of the number of new vehicles needed in each aircraft 
type, the process employed for replacements is implemented to select the specific 
additional vehicles. Similar vehicles are given an equal probability of selection, which 
amounts to an assumption of equal market share among aircraft manufacturers. Further, if 
a standard is implemented in the year of assessment, the vehicle selected is identified as a 
technology infused vehicle. Ultimately, the retirements, replacements, and additions are 
tracked by maintaining an inventory database for each air carrier throughout the 
simulation. This database provides vehicle specific information, year of acquisition, and 
retirement year for performance and cost assessment.  
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4.8 Fuel Burn Forecasting 
 While the method for fuel burn estimation has already been discussed, the 
implementation of aircraft fuel burn surrogates in forecasted years can now be 
introduced. As aforementioned, all operations in the operations database used for 
forecasting have an associated aircraft type. As growth is forecasted vehicles may retire, 
and the replacements and additions are associated with the vehicle types in the operations 
database through an accounting strategy in the inventory databases. Subsequently, in 
forecasted years of the simulation an equal utilization assumption is employed for similar 
aircraft types owned by an air carrier. This means that in each forecast year the fleet mix 
is analyzed to assess the relative number of operations fulfilled by existing, replacement, 
and additional vehicles using the fuel burn surrogates associated with the vehicles in the 
inventory. Conducting fuel burn forecasting in this way provides a more accurate account 
of fleet evolution, and demonstrates the trends in improvement expected from previous 
literature.  
4.9 Baseline Cost and Performance of the U.S. NAS 
At this point, the simulation environment for the U.S. NAS can be used to predict 
performance and costs in the absence of policy. This baseline scenario is often referred to 
as a “no action” scenario, and will be used later to assess the relative costs and benefits 
due to policy implementation. As a reminder, due to the fact there is an equivalency 
between fuel burn and CO2 emissions, the performance aspects used for comparison are 
always in tons or pounds of CO2. Figure 4.18 provides the projection of CO2 performance 
forecast out to 2036 for the air carriers included in this study, as well as aggregated fleet 
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CO2. As can be seen in this figure, the projected fuel burn trends from 2012 (the year 
used for forecasting) through 2036 show growth trends exponentially increasing, which is 
expected since the projected growth is given as a percent per year that is compounded 
over the course of the simulation.   
 
 
Figure 4.18: Projected “No Action” CO2 Emissions in the U.S. NAS 
In addition to analyzing the performance of the fleet, the costs are also stored, and 
can be assessed. The total direct operating costs and the respective components are 
displayed for this “no action” scenario in Figure 4.19. As aforementioned, all reported 
costs are given in 2012 USD. As can be seen in this figure, the primary components of 
DOC are the fuel and capital costs. It may also be noted that the relative fuel cost tends to 
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increase more rapidly than the capital costs toward the end of the simulation timeframe. 
This behavior can be explained in more detailed analysis of the cost buildup. Due to the 
fact that fuel cost is proportional to fuel burn, this cost increases at the same basic rate as 
overall fuel burn described previously. Capital cost increases come about due to the need 
for additional vehicles to meet growing demand. The number of vehicles needed is 
ultimately dependent on an assumed utilization rate of 9.4 hours per day. In further 
analysis of the baseline operations dataset used to seed the forecast it is determined that 
this utilization is significantly higher than the typical aircraft utilization in the base year. 
This means that as the existing aircraft are retired, fewer vehicles are needed to replace 
and meet additional growth due to the increasing utilization rate. The combination of 
these facts is what accounts for this relative change in overall fuel and capital costs.  
 
Figure 4.19: DOC for “No Action” Scenario in the U.S. NAS 


























In addition to analyzing the overall fleet DOC, each of the respective air carrier 
costs can also be analyzed in isolation. Doing so here for all air carriers included in the 
study is not necessary, but to demonstrate this capability Figure 4.20 is provided. Here 
the DOC for Legacy Carrier 1 is reported, with all corresponding cost components. As 
can be seen, the cost trends follow those of the fleet quite closely in terms of overall 
DOC. However, there are a few notable differences, with the most obvious being the 
tradeoff in fuel and capital costs over the course of the simulation. This follows the basic 
trend of the fleet fuel and capital costs in terms of relative cost changes however, and the 
reason for this behavior can be explained in the same way.  
 
Figure 4.20: DOC for Legacy Carrier 1 for “No Action” Scenario 



























4.10 Defining CO2 Mitigation Measures and Modeling  
With a functional performance and cost simulation environment for the U.S. 
NAS, the next step in this study is providing the functionality to study policy 
implications. As discussed in Chapter  3 of this document, the two policies under 
consideration in this study are a notional CO2 standard and emission trading schemes. 
The implementation of modules and links between the existing simulation environment 
will be discussed for each of these policies in the following sections.  
4.10.1 Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard 
As identified throughout literature, the likely metric system for an aircraft CO2 
standard will be a measure of 1/SAR (specific air range) correlated against MTOW [119]. 
Subsequently, for each vehicle in the seed database SAR values are determined at 92% 
MTOW. This data is stored for all vehicles included in the inventory datasets. Given this 
data, the reciprocal of these SAR values are then plotted against the MTOW to visualize 





Figure 4.21: Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard Metric System 
As can be seen, the expected metric system is relatively linear. While it’s 
unknown what the final metric system definition will be at this point, or how the 
stringency options will be fit, it’s likely the stringency levels will follow the trends of the 
data. As such, it’s assumed here that a linear fit of the data will produce a resonable 
estimate for use in this study. The basic concept of stringency options has been explored 
more completely in 2.4.2.3.2, but as a reminder will likely result in limit lines 
distinguishing the level of technology insertion necessary to meet the standard. In order 
to describe this more concretely, a notional plot of a CO2 metric system with 
























Figure 4.22: Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard Stringency Options 
While stringency options can be defined within the module directly, in order to 
reduce computational effort when many different stringency options are considered, a 
baseline “no action” stringency option is defined. All future stringency scenarios will be 
based on percent reductions of this “no action” scenario. This “no action” baseline 
stringency option will be such that in-production aircraft are below the line, i.e., pass the 
level. However, the out of production vehicles will still be allowed to be impacted, as 
they would have to be replaced anyways by aircraft that are being produced in future 
years. In order to visualize the distinction of the in-production and out-of-production 











Figure 4.23: Aircraft CO2 Standard with Production Status 
Defining the baseline stringency option requires the determination of a stringency 
level where all in-production aircraft in the current fleet can pass a certification 
requirement. To accomplish this, the in-production aircraft metric value data is used to 
produce a linear fit using least squares regression. This initial fit is then increased to 
produce the “no action” stringency option serving as the baseline. The primary reason for 
only including in-production aircraft in the fitting of an initial stringency option is due to 
the fact that the out-of-production aircraft will need to be replaced by in-production 
aircraft regardless of the existence of standard. As such, an initial standard that does not 
impact in-production aircraft will not have an effect on the outcome of the simulation. 
Figure 4.24 is provided demonstrating the result of the initial fit of the data, as well as the 























Equation 12, for the “no action” stringency option is also provided. It should be noted 
that producing the “no action” stringency option has been accomplished by increasing the 
initial in-production fit line by 13.28%.  
 
 
Figure 4.24: “No Action” Limit Line for the Aircraft CO2 Standard 
Equation 12: Limit Line Definition for “No Action” Aircraft CO2 Standard 
Baseline  Stringency = 5.9766×10!!×𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 + 3.158048 
Given this initial stringency, stringency options can be defined. This is 
accomplished through a simple percent reduction from the “no action” baseline 
stringency option defined above. A more complete description of the ranges of stringency 


























In addition to the metric system and stringency option, a notional aircraft CO2 
standard also requires definition of the scope of applicability. For this study, all aircraft 
included in the seed database will be subject to the standard, and the date of applicability 
can be defined by the user. The combination of aircraft subject to the standard and date of 
applicability finalizes definition of the notional standard. It was assumed that an initial 
implementation date is either 2017 or 2023. While these dates are notional, the 
methodology allows for any dates to be defined by the decision maker.  
Given this definition for a notional CO2 standard, a number of stringency 
scenarios can be generated. For each stringency option tested, aircraft introduced by 
manufacturers after the date of applicability will be required to meet the outlined 
certification requirement. As such, each CO2 standard scenario will assess the specific 
aircraft meeting the requirement. Aircraft meeting the standard will be available for 
replacements in future forecasted years. However, all non-compliant aircraft will be 
required to meet the outlined standard by the date of applicability. 
Meeting this requirement will necessitate the introduction of new technologies 
and other efficiency measures into design to improve the overall efficiency of the aircraft.  
Analysis of this technology integration is ideally completed using high fidelity vehicle 
level modeling tools, such as the Environmental Design Space (EDS). This has been 
accomplished for a number of new technology vehicles in other studies [173], but the 
engineering effort required to accomplish such a task for the number of vehicles 
represented in this database and the number of stringency options to be studied, is not 
feasible in the timeframe considered for this research.  
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As such, an approximation method has been developed in order to expedite 
creation of new technology replacements for aircraft represented in the seed database. 
This approximation will by nature be a normative forecasting technique, and future work 
will be necessary to determine the feasibility of producing vehicles meeting necessary 
metric value improvements. Despite this shortfall, the approximation will enable the high 
level policy tradeoff experiments planned in this research. The approximation technique 
for vehicle improvements is based on the needed margin to meet any given stringency 
option. This margin is a representation of the percent reduction in 1/SAR needed to be 
compliant with a potential CO2 standard, and is based on Equation 13 presented below.  
Equation 13: Aircraft CO2 Standard Margin 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =   
𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡  𝑀𝑉 − 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑀𝑉
𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡  𝑀𝑉  
In this equation, the aircraft metric values are those of the baseline aicraft, while 
the stringency metric value is calculated based on the given MTOW and reduction from 
the “no action” baseline stringency option defined in Equation 12. It is assumed that 
vehicles will be able to meet needed metric value improvements without specifically 
identifying individual technology packages or their impacts. Further, it is assumed that 
the fuel burn performance that will feed into the block fuel calculations will be impacted 
by the same extent as the impact in metric value improvement. This means that a 10% 
impact improvement will correspond to a 10% improvement in fuel burn characteristics. 
Implementing this in the fuel burn calculations of the main performance module is 
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accomplished by simply reducing the block fuel surrogates for a particular aircraft by the 
impact calculated.  
While this method provides the performance for new vehicles as a result of 
certification requirements, the cost to produce these vehicles will also have to be 
established. This has been discussed previously in the non-recurring cost to 
manufacturers’ module and capital cost calculations, where cost is also a function of 
metric value improvement and MTOW. As such, the impacts resulting from this module 
are also linked to the NRC and capital cost calculations. The formulation in this manner 
allows for generalization of metric value improvements, but can be modified if specific 
information or relationships are established. 
Subsequently, for the notional CO2 standard implementation module, the primary 
inputs are the percent reduction over a “no action” stringency scenario and the 
implementation date, and the output from the module is the impact to in production 
vehicles in the future. These impacts feed into the performance calculations, as well as 
the NRC and capital cost calculations. As a simple test to show how this method 
performs, Figure 4.25 provides a representation of the resulting CO2 production given a 
reduction in the “no action” stringency of 30% with a date of applicability of 2017. As 
can clearly be seen, the trend in overall growth is fairly similar as there is no change in 
the demand forecast, however, due to technology insertion on new vehicles introduced to 
the fleet after 2017 there are measureable reductions in CO2 emissions throughout the 





Figure 4.25: Example Aircraft CO2 Standard Emissions Reduction 
4.10.2 Emissions Trading Scheme 
As discussed previously, emission trading schemes have two major components, 
the cap setting process, and allocation of allowances. The impact of these trading 
schemes is to ultimately produce a real cost for CO2 emissions, which are expected to be 
passed through to consumers, ultimately reducing demand. The following section will 
detail the method employed for cap setting and allocation of allowances. Additionally, 
the method by which demand is updated will also be discussed. It should be noted here 
that effort has been made to replicate many of the qualities of the EU ETS.  
As with the EU ETS, the cap setting process typically involves defining a 
reference year for emissions. For the EU ETS, this reference emission level is the average 
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for years 2004 through 2006 [95]. In order to replicate this basic process, the user can 
specify the year on which the cap is based. In the existing ETS module this is set to 2005 
by default in order to match the assumptions used for the EU ETS. The ETS module itself 
then assesses fleet fuel burn in the reference year and converts this fuel burn to CO2 using 
the conversion of 3.15 lbCO2/lb Fuel. Additionally, the user can define the cap based on a 
fixed percent of the reference CO2 output. For the EU ETS, this cap would be in the 
range of 97% to 95% depending on the year analyzed. As this study is meant to be more 
exploratory in nature, the level of the cap will be one of the main parameters to be varied.  
 Given determination of the cap set for the ETS, the allocation process must be 
defined. To begin this process, the user can define the date of applicability for the ETS. 
This date provides a starting point determining when allowances will be allocated. 
Following this, the method for allocation can begin. For aviation under the EU ETS, the 
allocation of allowances is based on the relative market share of air carriers, measured 
through revenue-tonne-kilometers [95]. To provide a similar methodology, the revenue-
ton-miles (RTM) for each air carrier included in the study is tracked throughout the 
simulation, giving relative market share. This relative market share determines the level 
of allocated allowances to each air carrier. Further, the user can define the percentage of 
allowances allocated freely, and the percentage auctioned through the state. In a given 
year, the number of allowances needed over the cap for each air carrier is assessed, and it 
is assumed that these will be purchased through the ETS market linked with the EU ETS.  
 With the number of freely allocated, auctioned, and purchased allowances 
determined for each air carrier in a given year, the cost associated with the ETS can be 
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assessed. Due to the high volatility in allowance price observed in the EU ETS, this is 
kept as an input to the module to be varied for this study. As such, the market price of 
allowances is input, and an assumption for the auction price of allowances is provided. 
While it’s not clear through literature what the auction price of allowances may be, it’s 
assumed this price will be nominally lower than the market price of allowances. As such, 
the module assumes an auction price of half the input market price for allowances. The 
range of market prices studied is taken from numerous literature discussed previously, 
and will be introduced more completely again in the implementation section of this 
document. Further, due to the fact that it was observed that the lost opportunity costs 
associated with freely allocated allowances are typically passed through to consumers, an 
input is provided to the user to either pass through or not pass through these lost 
opportunity costs. The lost opportunity cost itself is calculated based on the level of 
allowances allocated freely and the market price input. Additionally, the cost associated 
with auctioned and purchased allowances are stored throughout the simulation to be 
added to overall recurring costs (RC) for aircraft owners and operators discussed 
previously.  
 The outcome of this method is an associated cost of the ETS to each air carrier in 
a given year. This cost must then be passed through to consumers in order to impact 
demand. The first step in accomplishing this is determining the cost pass through rate, 
which is a measure of the costs passed through to consumers over those absorbed by the 
air carriers. This cost pass through rate is provided as an input to the user, but is generally 
believed to be about 1 based on most existing literature, which implies all costs are 
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passed on to consumers. The cost that is determined to be passed through in a given year 
is reflected in the ticket prices in the following year, and it’s assumed that the consumer 
behavior reacts immediately to increases in price. Updating demand in this way amounts 
to the creation of a partial equilibrium model of demand for the simulation. Since the 
impact to demand is not propagated to other sectors of the economy it does not classify as 
a general equilibrium model.  
The demand updates are based on the price elasticities of demand (PED). The 
price elasticity of demand is a basic measure of how demand changes in response to a 
change price, and can be stated mathematically as in Equation 14. Here Q denotes the 
quantity of a good or service, while P denotes the price of that good or service. The 
principle provides a relationship for the change in quantity as price changes. Typically 
the PED is negative, barring Veblen and Giffen goods, demonstrating one of the key 
principles of economics, as price increases the quantity demanded will decrease.  
Equation 14: Price Elasticity of Demand 






Estimates for the PED in aviation have been provided by a number of different 
studies, with IATA giving a good overview of those studies [137]. Due to the fact that it 
is identified earlier that there may be disproportionate impacts on low cost carriers over 
legacy carriers, estimates for PED are desired that differentiated between these basic 
carrier types. PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides just such an estimate based on a 2005 
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report [138]. For full service carriers it is -1.23, while for low cost carriers it is -1.38. 
These values demonstrate that there tends to be greater changes in demand due to price 
fluctuations for low cost carriers.  
In order to calculate the relative change in quantity demanded, a base price for air 
travel must first be established. This is accomplished for the air carriers considered here 
through detailed analysis of the BTS Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) 
Ticket database, which provides reported air fares and coupons [150]. This database has 
been collected for each quarter of 2012 (the base year for forecasting), and analyzed 
using the statistical analysis software JMP®. The goal is to provide the average fare per 
revenue passenger mile (RPM) as a normalized measure of the price of air travel. This 
measure of price will allow for direct calculation of the change in price due to an ETS 
policy, without having to provide special consideration for changes in stage length and 
different routes. The fare per mile is reported directly in the DB1B database. All available 
data is used for each air carrier in the study, however, air fares identified as not credible 
were initially removed from the dataset. For this study, only the average ticket prices per 
RPM will be used in the determination of demand updates, however, it should be noted 
that there is a great deal of variability in this measure. While not considered explicitly in 
this study, the variability will be explored and documented to provide information for 
future work. The average fare per mile is presented below in Table 4.14, while Appendix 
F provides greater detail regarding the variability in fare per mile for each air carrier 
considered here. As can be seen in the standard deviation of fare per RPM and from the 
histograms in Appendix F, the variability can be greater than the average price. Despite 
188 
 
this fact, the average fare per RPM is determined to provide a good representation of air 
fares in this study. 
Table 4.14: Average Fare Per Revenue-Passenger-Mile 
Carrier Average Fare Per RPM ($) Standard Deviation 
Legacy Carrier 1 0.2288 0.2041 
Legacy Carrier 2 0.2537 0.2872 
Legacy Carrier 3 0.2263 0.1882 
LCC 1 0.2280 0.1407 
LCC 2 0.2513 0.2151 
LCC 3 0.2140 0.2021 
 
With this average fare per RPM the price of air travel is set. Additionally, the 
operations database and expected growth can be used to calculate the RPM for each year 
and air carrier throughout the simulation. This RPM for each air carrier is used along with 
the calculated ETS costs passed through to consumers in applicable years to determine a 
relative increase in fare per RPM. This increase in the fare occurs in the year following 
the costs on air carriers as previously stated, but impacts demand in that year. As such the 
percent change in air fare from the previous year is equated to a percent change in 
demand through the PED estimates. This percent change in demand is applied to the 
growth forecast to determine the new demand under an ETS for all years of the 
simulation. These calculations occur on a year by year basis throughout the simulation, 
and the resulting increases in fare and demand are tracked.  
To demonstrate the impact of the ETS on the forecast, Figure 4.26 is provided. 
Shown here is the input demand forecast, and the resulting growth per year for each air 
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carrier included in the study. It should be noted that the steps occurring at 2016 and 2026 
are due to the input demand forecast, which changes at those dates. In order to generate 
these results, a cap year of 2005 with a cap of 95% is chosen, replicating the cap setting 
process of the EU ETS. Further, an assumed market price of $20 per ton CO2 is input, 
which is within the bounds of most studies on the EU ETS surveyed, and full cost pass 
through is assumed. Finally, the ETS implementation date selected is 2014. As can be 
seen, there is a reduction in demand over the forecast of approximately 1% to 2% 
depending on the air carrier analyzed. This reduction is in line with a number of other 
studies on aviation’s impact in the EU ETS [102, 106, 115]. The fact that these reductions 
are in line with other studies is a good indication that the model is behaving 
appropriately. Further, it’s interesting to note that for the most part, the low cost carriers 
do show greater reductions in demand than the legacy carriers, barring the behavior of 
Legacy Carrier 1. This is also a good indication, that the hypothesis that there are 
disproportionate impacts on airlines based on carrier type is validated. The last piece of 
information to note is that the model tends to reach equilibrium demand within a few 
years. Due to the fact that PED estimates were greater in magnitude than -1 it is expected 
that demand corrections will overshoot the equilibrium value before resettling. This is 





Figure 4.26: Example Yearly Demand Growth for an ETS 
 The final check to ensure the ETS implementation is working appropriately is to 
analyze the impact to overall CO2 production for the fleet. As demand has been shown to 
be reduced in accordance with estimates from literature, it’s expected that the overall CO2 
emitted will also be reduced. Figure 4.27 provides the resulting CO2 estimates for the 
example ETS corresponding to the demand growth rates seen above. As can be seen, 
there is an overall reduction in CO2 emitted under the ETS scenario over the “no action” 
scenario described previously. This serves as a good indication that the modeling and 




































Figure 4.27: Example Emissions Reductions for an ETS 
4.10.3 Summary of U.S. NAS Policy Cost-Effectiveness Modeling  
As has been demonstrated, a cost-effectiveness model of the U.S. NAS has been 
created based on a framework and assumptions representative of other comparable 
models. This model has been validated against actual fuel sales, and has been shown to 
be a good predictor of overall fleet behaviors.  
Further, modules representing the implementation of a notional CO2 standard and 
emission trading schemes have also been developed and tested. The impact of these 
policies within the modeling framework has been shown to behave in accordance with 
previous literature, as well as expected outcomes. In order to provide a more complete 
mapping of information flow throughout U.S. PoInT, Figure 4.28 is provided. 





















Figure 4.28: U.S. PoInT Information Flow Diagram 
193 
 
CHAPTER  5 
IMPLEMENTING THE QUANTITATIVE POLICY SUPPORT 
PROCESS 
5.1 Application of the Policy Analysis Process 
In order to demonstrate the full capabilities of the proposed policy analysis 
process, it will be implemented to study the impacts of potential CO2 certification 
standards and emission trading schemes on the U.S. NAS. Ultimately, the purpose of 
applying this process is to address the aforementioned research objectives: 
1. Quantitatively assessing regulatory policy in the context of an 
acknowledged system-of-systems (SoS).  
2. Demonstrating the ability to assess the concurrent implementation of 
multiple policies throughout a SoS. 
3. Objective identification of effective policy space.  
4. Reducing the regulatory uncertainty, and quantifying other forms of 
aleatory uncertainty in the presence of multiple regulatory policies.  
The following sections will demonstrate the implementation of the policy analysis 
process outlined in Figure 3.6. As such, the utilization of the lexicon for systems-of-
policy-systems will be employed, and the developed cost-effectiveness simulation 
environment of the U.S. NAS will provide quantifiable measures of costs and benefits. It 
should be noted here that all goals used in this process are purely notional, and are simply 
meant to discuss the resulting trends regarding effective policy space. Further, it is 
recognized that any policy implementation before 2017 is highly unlikely in the real 
world, however, policy implementation at earlier dates will be tested for the sole purpose 
of understanding longer term trends throughout the simulation. As such, no policy 
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recommendations are made in this work, and it serves as merely a demonstration of 
novel policy assessment capabilities. 
5.2 Establish the Need 
As has been established, the mitigation of CO2 emissions is a growing concern for 
policymakers throughout the world. The growing GHG emissions from commercial 
aviation are contributing approximately 2% [5] to anthropogenic climate impacts at much 
greater rates than has been seen in past decades, and the expected increases in demand 
will only exacerbate these problems. Ultimately, the fouling of our atmosphere in this 
way represents a classic tragedy of the commons, and the behaviors contributing to this 
must be addressed to reduce and help prevent catastrophic climate impacts.  
In order to address this tragedy of the commons, regulatory bodies throughout the 
world are pursuing a number of policy options aimed at the mitigation of CO2. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) under the direction of the United 
Nations is leading this charge in commercial aviation, and through the GIACC is asking 
member states throughout the world to select “baskets of measures” to meet CO2 
mitigation goals established under the Kyoto Protocol. These baskets of measures 
ultimately represent a number of policy options directed at the mitigation of CO2, and are 
specified on a country by country basis through National Allocation Plans (NAPs). 
Despite such efforts, there has been little direction given to member states regarding the 
process by which baskets of measures ought to be selected. Further, the 
interdependencies of various policy options are rarely explored, even when interaction 
can be expected to be present. Two such policies that are widely cited throughout 
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submitted NAPs where interaction is expected to exist are a CO2 certification standard 
and emission trading schemes, such as the EU ETS. These policies are both currently 
being studied widely throughout the world, yet there is no research directly studying both 
concurrently.  
In order to fully understand how these policies will impact aviation and its 
associated GHG emissions, there is a need for a policy analysis framework to 
quantitatively assess concurrent policy making in air transportation systems. This 
framework must be able to account for how these policies impact aviation, how they may 
impact one another, how they can be pursued to work well together, and how uncertainty 
regarding their implementation can be quantified. By establishing this framework it will 
be possible to demonstrate the capability of concurrently considering baskets of measures 
in commercial aviation in the context of an acknowledged SoS. 
In addition to this need for a policy analysis framework on which to concurrently 
study multiple policies, there are also specific issues with the policies themselves. For the 
certification standard this is largely due to the fact that a final agreement on a standard 
has not yet been reached. Further, even though a metric system framework has been 
established [118], it has yet to be publically disclosed regarding the specific functional 
form. As such, understanding the impacts of this CO2 standard will require the ability to 
test a number of different potential standards in terms of costs and benefits. 
Alternatively, emission trading schemes, especially the EU ETS, have been 
studied somewhat extensively in literature, and have also been applied directly to aviation 
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activities. Despite this relative wealth of information, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding the implementation of emission trading schemes in the U.S. There has been 
strong opposition to inclusion in trading schemes such as the EU ETS [98, 99], while at 
the same time the Obama administration has indicated interest in cap and trade policy 
[188]. In large part this hesitance is likely a result of a lack of understanding of how 
emission trading schemes will impact aviation activities in the U.S. It’s known that the 
primary impact of cap and trade policy in transportation markets is to reduce overall 
demand, however, due to a lack of studies regarding cap and trade policy in the U.S. 
NAS, the extent of these impacts domestically is not well understood. Subsequently, the 
study of potential emission trading schemes for U.S. aviation with linkage to other 
established ETS markets, such as the EU ETS, has yet to be studied.  
5.3 Define the Problem 
In order to address this need, it’s first necessary to fully understand the problem it 
represents. As aforementioned, from a conceptual level the mitigation of anthropogenic 
CO2 from aviation activities represents a tragedy of the commons, where corrective 
behaviors are being sought through regulatory policy actions. As such, there are multiple 
pieces to this problem that must be understood. First, the policies being studied should be 
defined in order to establish the policy alternative space that exists to address CO2 
mitigation.  Further, the structure of commercial aviation in the U.S. NAS must be 
understood in order to provide context to the inherent system-of-systems structure. 
Additionally, the structure of the system-of-policy-systems and its interaction with the 
physical SoS must also be established to provide the capability to analyze this potential 
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basket of measures as an integrated whole. The following sections will provide more 
detail regarding the policies considered, the physical SoS represented by the U.S. NAS, 
as well as the interaction of the SoPS with the physical SoS.  
5.3.1 Regulatory Policies Considered 
Previously, a more formal lexicon was developed in order to help discuss 
systems-of-policy-systems (SoPS). The following sections will introduce definitions of 
the notional CO2 standard and emission trading schemes utilizing the lexicon regarding 
metric systems, stringency levels, and compliance mechanisms. This lexicon will be 
discussed in reference to the cost-effectiveness simulation environment of the U.S. NAS 
created for the policy studies considered herein. It is implicitly assumed that the policy 
stakeholders will be regulatory bodies, such as the U.S. FAA and ICAO for both policies. 
Further, the notional CO2 standard will also include aircraft manufacturers as 
stakeholders, and emission trading schemes will include air carriers.  
5.3.1.1 Aircraft CO2 Standard 
The notional CO2 certification standard considered herein is intended to be a 
command and control policy to push aircraft manufacturers to invest and infuse 
technology into new vehicle designs in order to improve the efficiency of the global fleet. 
It is unique in the sense that it will be the first internationally established fuel efficiency 
standard in the world, yet this standard is currently still under consideration and olnly 
considered as notional herein. There has only been limited information regarding the 
metric systems and potential stringency levels, and no formal agreements have been 
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reached. As such, the following discussion will highlight a potential form of this standard 
based on publically available information.  
5.3.1.1.1 Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard Metric System 
While ICAO CAEP has yet to publically identify the specific form of the metric 
system that will be employed in the final sstandard, there has been some indication as to 
what it may be through literature. Despite this fact, literature on the specific Aircraft CO2 
Standard is relatively limited, including just a few news releases from ICAO [116, 118], 
as well as a report from the U.S. FAA’s PARTNER Project 30 and a conference paper 
from researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology [117, 119]. What is clear from 
this literature is that the metrics considered are simple and will directly reflect the 
physical properties of interest for the given standard.  
Instantaneous point performance measures of fuel efficiency have ultimately 
shown great promise for this purpose. The metric considered is known as specific air 
range (SAR), or nautical air mileage (NAMS), and is the air distance flown per unit fuel 
in steady-state flight [117]. In many ways this is analogous to miles per gallon (MPG) 
reported for automobiles. The advantage of such a measure is that it has been used 
historically in the aviation industry among operators and government agencies to classify 
aircraft fuel efficiency. SAR is often reported to airlines by manufacturers as a guarantee 
of product effectiveness. This measure is typically calculated as shown in Equation 1 and 
Equation 2 [117].  
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A recent news release from ICAO in 2012 indicates that the selected metric 
system is based on cruise point fuel burn performance, aircraft size, and aircraft weight 
[118]. While not explicitly stating this is the case, it seems quite apparent that the metric 
system chosen is based on a measure of 1/SAR, which would be consistent with the 
findings of Lim et. al. It should also be noted that the general observations of both types 
of metric systems indicated very similar characteristics between 1/SAR metrics and FB/R 
[117].  
In addition to the actual metric, it has been shown that metric systems should also 
adopt a correlating parameter in order to normalize the differences in size or capability, 
allowing for uniform application [117]. These metric systems, including a metric and 
correlating parameter, are tested against the EC aforementioned in 2.4.2.3. As has been 
shown previously, 1/SAR correlated against MTOW is one of the most promising metric 
systems for the final standard. In the end, it’s likely the metric system decided on by 
ICAO CAEP is some form of 1/SAR correlated against MTOW, as ICAO has stated that 
the overall design of the aircraft is represented in the CO2 metric system by the certified 
maximum takeoff weight [118]. 
In order to provide a mapping for this metric system, the inventory databases of 
each air carrier considered are queried to produce a list of unique aircraft types. Estimates 
of SAR values are then determined at an evaluation condition of 92% MTOW, and the 
aircraft can be visualized in this metric system based on production status. The particular 
aircraft included in this study, and their corresponding metric system values are presented 
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in. Additionally, Figure 5.1 is reproduced below showing the metric system for the 
current study.  
 
Figure 5.1: Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard Metric System under Consideration 
5.3.1.1.2 Notional Stringency Options 
In addition to a metric system on which to evaluate fuel efficiency, some level of 
stringency must be placed on manufacturers in order to push technology development and 
integration. For the notional standard considered herein, insight into these stringency 
options is provided by the work of the FAA’s PARTNER Project 30, where in a findings 
report a number of notional limit lines (NLL) serve as the basis for analysis of a potential 
CO2 certification framework [119]. In order to establish these NLL, a database of 192 























applicable parameters to various metric systems under consideration are also collected.  
Additionally, a number of fitting procedures for the initial stringency lines has been 
considered, and due to the fact that the 1/SAR based metric systems showed very simple 
trends, these fits tended to include linear and second order approximations of in-
production vehicles [119]. Figure 5.1 showing the metric system under consideration 
follows these findings, and appears to have a very linear trend. 
In order to provide a simple measure of stringency, an initial “no action” line can 
be defined and fixed percentage reductions can be analyzed from there. A more complete 
discussion of the initial limit line, known as a “no action” scenario, has been provided in 
4.10.1. This initial limit line defines a standard that would not impact aircraft 
manufacturers, however, even small deviations from this line could create instances 
where manufacturers would have to respond through technology infusion. In order to 
provide a more visual representation of the metric system and stringency options, Figure 
5.2 is provided. Here, the “no action” line is shown, as well as fixed percent reductions 
from there. These limit lines represent notional standards that could be applied, however, 
it should be noted that a wide range of stringencies will be studied here, with all 




Figure 5.2: Aircraft CO2 Standard Stringencies 
5.3.1.1.3 Aircraft CO2 Standard Compliance Mechanism 
The last major component of the notional standard that has yet to be fully 
discussed is the compliance mechanism. The compliance mechanism is the application of 
intent meant to direct the activity of the entities involved under the CO2 standard. In a 
sense, the compliance mechanism is the regulatory control authority’s means of enforcing 
the standard. In order to fully define the compliance mechanism, the scope of 
applicability, including the entities covered under the standard and implementation 
timeframe, as well as the means of enforcement must be addressed. Here, the means of 
enforcement will most generally regard the type of standard, such as command and 




























As has been noted, the primary industry affected by a standard will be aircraft 
manufacturers. As such, the PARTNER Project 30 findings report serves as a good 
starting point in defining the entities covered under the standard, with all manufacturers 
and vehicles represented in this study included. 
As with any policy, timing can be very difficult to predict. However, it has been 
noted that the initial CO2 NLL studied assumed an adoption of the standard in 2017 with 
introduction in 2018 [119] and an additional option for an adoption date of 2023 with 
introduction in the following year [52, 119]. As such, the likely implementation 
timeframe will be sometime between 2017 and 2023. That being said, due to the 
exploratory nature of this study, earlier implementation will also be studied to provide a 
best case scenario for overall CO2 mitigation potential. A more complete discussion of 
the implementation dates considered will be provided when the ranges on the 
experiments run are discussed.  
Finally, the general type of mechanism must also be discussed. As has been 
indicated in the PARTNER Project 30 findings report all covered aircraft manufacturers 
and vehicles would be subject to the standard, and failure to comply could result in the 
inability to bring an aircraft to the market [119]. This type of mechanism is generally 
considered a command and control approach to regulation, where the control authority, 
the U.S. FAA in the case of the NAS, would enforce the standard. As such, it is assumed 
here that if a standard is in place, aircraft manufacturers would be required to meet the 
limit line in order to comply. 
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5.3.1.2 Emission Trading Schemes 
Emission trading schemes (ETS), often referred to as cap and trade policy in the 
U.S., are market based regulatory policy mechanisms that attempt to create a real price 
for emissions. The purpose of creating a price for CO2 is to internalize the cost of 
emitting anthropogenic GHGs, which are typically externalized by most industries. 
Typically, the effect of such schemes is to increase the price for a good created by the 
covered entities, thus reducing demand based on fundamental economic principles. As 
such, these ETS differ fundamentally from policy such as an aircraft CO2 standard in the 
sense that they are generally focused on reducing demand as opposed to increasing 
efficiency. ETS are quite common throughout the world, and have been widely discussed 
in recent years, especially in the EU. With that said, they have been implemented in the 
U.S. as well through the Acid Rain Program, as aforementioned, and the Obama 
administration has indicated an interest in other cap and trade policy aimed at mitigating 
climate change. The following discussion will introduce ETS in the context of the SoPS 
lexicon developed. It should be noted here that the form of the ETS chosen for study is 
based on the structure of the EU ETS. The goal in doing this is to provide linkage 
corelation with a potential U.S. ETS and EU ETS, in order to provide a market of 
allowances for U.S. aviation activities. Without linkage, such a market would not exist, 
and it’s unclear how air carriers would meet any cap, as they are expected to be net 
purchasers of allowances.  
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5.3.1.2.1 Emission Trading Scheme Metric System 
The metric system for emission trading schemes is quite different than for an 
aircraft CO2 standard. It should be noted however, that these ETS interact with entities at 
a different hierarchical level of the air transportation SoS. Ultimately, the measurable 
parameters used for the ETS are the reported fuel sales, measured in this case through 
fuel burn to each air carrier. The fuel burn can be equated directly to CO2 emissions as 
aforementioned, and will induce an associated cost that is likely to be passed on to 
consumers. The stringency setting process for these ETS provides the link between fuel 
burn and actual ETS costs, however, both the fuel burn and ETS cost represent the 
measurable parameters of the policy, and thus constitutes the metric system.  
5.3.1.2.2 Emission Trading Scheme Stringency Options 
In order to provide intent to the ETS, stringency options can be defined utilizing 
the cap setting and allocation of allowances. As with the EU ETS, the cap setting process 
typically involves defining a reference year for emissions. For the EU ETS this reference 
emission level is the average for years 2004 through 2006 [95]. In order to replicate this 
basic process, the user can specify the year on which the cap is based. As stated in the 
modeling section of this document, in the existing ETS module this is set to 2005 by 
default in order to match the assumptions used for the EU ETS. Given this reference year 
for the CO2 cap, the user can define the cap based on a fixed percent of the reference CO2 
output. As aforementioned, for the EU ETS, this cap would be in the range of 97% to 
95% depending on the year analyzed. As this study is meant to be more exploratory in 
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nature, the level of the cap will be one of the main parameters to be varied, and the ranges 
analyzed will be introduced more completely in upcoming sections of this document.  
 With a cap in place, the allocation process must be defined in order to finalize 
stringency to each covered air carrier. For aviation under the EU ETS, the allocation of 
allowances is based on the relative market share of air carriers, measured through 
revenue-tonne-kilometers [95], and to provide a similar methodology, the revenue-ton-
miles (RTM) for each air carrier included in this study is tracked throughout the 
simulation, giving relative market share. This relative market share determines the level 
of allocated allowances to each air carrier. Further, the user can define the percentage of 
allowances allocated freely, and the percentage auctioned through the state. In a given 
year, the number of allowances needed over the cap for each air carrier is assessed, and it 
is assumed that these would be purchased through the ETS market linked with the EU 
ETS.  
5.3.1.2.3 Emission Trading Scheme Compliance Mechanism 
Finally, the compliance mechanism for the EU ETS can also be defined, which 
necessitates discussion of the scope of applicability, as well as the type and function of 
the policy. The scope of applicability includes the covered entities and implementation 
time frame. For the ETS under consideration in the U.S. NAS, the covered entities 
include all air carriers operating in the region. Due to the fact that only the top passenger 
air carriers have been included in the cost-effectiveness simulation environment however, 
only a subset of the air carriers operating throughout the NAS will be included. Despite 
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this limited set of covered entities, it’s expected that the main effects of an ETS will be 
captured due to the large market share of the air carriers included.  
The implementation date of the ETS is an input to the cost-effectiveness 
simulation environment for the U.S. NAS. Due to the fact that the EU ETS has been in 
effect for aviation since 2012, it’s currently possible to consider an ETS policy in the 
U.S. As such, implementation will be considered in the near future, however, due to the 
typically long timeframe for policy making, future implementation will also be 
considered. A more complete discussion on the actual dates of implementation will be 
discussed when feasible policy alternatives are generated.  
Finally, as aforementioned, emission trading schemes represent market based 
policy mechanisms. As such, control authorities assess charges imposed to covered 
entities, and the market is allowed to respond to those charges. The mechanism through 
which these charges are passed on to consumers and consumer demand is updated has 
been discussed previously in 4.10.2. As a reminder though, with all allowances 
determined for each air carrier in a given year, the costs associated with the ETS are 
assessed, based on an input market and auction price of allowances.  The user then 
defines the cost pass through rate, and whether the lost opportunity cost is also passed 
through, and the imposed charges are reflected in ticket prices the following year. 
Consumer demand responds immediately based on anticipated price elasticities of 




5.3.2 Civil Aviation as a Transportation SoS 
In addition to defining the policies studied, the physical environment in which 
they operate must also be fully defined. The scope of this study is focused on the 
interaction of these CO2 policies in the U.S. NAS. As such, the aviation transportation 
SoS represented by the U.S. NAS serves as the physical system of study. As has been 
previously defined, these transportation systems represent acknowledged systems-of-
systems. The independently operating systems are each modeled separately, as discussed 
previously, and interact to perform a function that is greater than each system 
individually. Based on the current structure of this study, and the simulation of the U.S. 
NAS developed, this SoS can be illustrated as in Figure 5.3. This figure provides the 
basic structure of SoS presented by DeLaurentis, where the individual systems are 
grouped based on hierarchical level, and their interactions are traced. As can be seen, at 
the vehicle level, the aircraft included in the operations and inventory databases are 
modeled. These aircraft models, are ultimately utilized through the operations, inventory, 
and forecasting to produce estimates of the fleet fuel burn and costs. Finally, these fleet 
fuel burn and costs are aggregated to provide estimates of global CO2 emissions and costs 




Figure 5.3: U.S. NAS System-of-Systems Representation 
5.3.3 Regulatory Policies Constitute a SoPS 
The case has also been made previously, that like the physical system itself, the 
policies themselves constitute an integral piece of the SoS and interact as a system-of-
policy-systems (SoPS). For the policies being considered here, the metric system can be 
analyzed in this SoPS structure in much the same way the U.S. NAS has been. This basic 
representation of the SoPS utilizing a similar framework as previously established is 
presented below in Figure 5.4. It should be noted here, that typically, the metric systems 
do not directly interact as in the physical SoS, but interact indirectly through interaction 
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with the physical SoS. As such, interaction among the policies will exist, but it is 
ultimately a secondary effect dependent on the impact to the physical SoS.  
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the notional aircraft CO2 standard is at the vehicle 
level of the SoPS architecture, impacting the individual aircraft models in the physical 
SoS. These impacts are then aggregated through the modeling environment, as previously 
discussed, to produce fuel burn estimates for the air carriers in the NAS. This in turn, 
feeds into the ETS policy at the fleet level of the SoPS hierarchy, where charges can be 
assessed, modifying the behavior of consumers in the physical SoS. In this way, these 
individual policy metric systems induce behaviors at their respective levels of the SoPS 
hierarchy, and the impact to the global system can be tracked.  
 
Figure 5.4: U.S. NAS System-of-Policy-Systems Representation 
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5.3.4 Interaction of the Physical SoS and SoPS 
Ultimately, both the SoPS and physical SoS interact in order to produce emergent 
behaviors for the entire U.S. NAS. As such, it’s also important to understand the linkage 
between the SoPS and SoS representations. Figure 5.5 provides an illustrative 
representation of this linkage. As can be seen, the notional aircraft CO2 standard interacts 
directly with the vehicle models at the base hierarchical level of the physical SoS. 
Additionally, this standard also impacts the non-recurring costs to aircraft manufacturers 
as previously discussed. As this information is propagated to higher levels throughout the 
SoS, the fleet fuel burn is ultimately input into the ETS and costs are fed back into the 
physical SoS. These costs are included in the recurring costs to the aircraft owners and 
operators, and also serve to update the input demand forecast. Ultimately, this interaction 
of the SoPS and SoS provides a complete representation of the system of study. Further, 
it should be noted that this representation also fits quite well into the GenPAF policy 
analysis framework developed to study these policies. The SoPS represent the “policies”, 
while the physical SoS represents the system boundary. At the global level of the U.S. 





Figure 5.5: U.S. NAS SoPS and SoS Interaction 
5.4 Establish Value 
As aforementioned, establishing value for the impact of policy is solely in the 
policymakers domain. To remain objective thorugout the policy development process the 
scientist simply provides the ability to apply value systems to the problem of study. As 
such, the role of the policy maker will be addressed here, however, the distinction of roles 
should be kept in mind.  
In this step, the overall objectives of the problem are established. While the final 
setting of objective values does not need to occur here, at least the identification of 
parameters to be tracked for eventual down selection of alternatives should be the goal. 
This step will have a direct impact on the “Goals” used in the GenPAF policy analysis 
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framework. The measures of effectiveness established will serve as the basis on which 
effective policy space can be identified in the systems of policies studied throughout the 
process. As such, this step serves to establish the link between the measured outcomes of 
interest and policies under consideration, as seen in Figure 5.6. For the primary problem 
being discussed here, the measures of effectiveness used for eventual downselection of 
effective policy mixes will be total CO2 emissions, and the costs incurred on aircraft 
manufacturers and air carriers. The idea is that these measures establish value in both the 
mitigation of harmful anthropogenic GHG, as well as the economic sustainability of the 
industry.  
 
Figure 5.6: Application of Value Systems to Policy in the U.S. NAS 
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Ultimately, the desired level of CO2 mitigation potential and acceptable costs 
incurred to the market actors involved is left to the policy maker. The subjectivity of their 
applied value systems can be made transparent through the visualization of the policy 
tradeoff selections. The process outlined here provides specifc steps where a clear 
dilineation of these roles can be applied. As such, the objectivity of the scientist can be 
maintained while including the subjectivity of policy makers. The following sections will 
overview the environmental and economic measures of effectiveness anticipated to be 
used for eventual downselection of effective policy space. 
5.4.1 Determining the Environmental Benefit 
Both policies under consideration here are aimed at the mitigation of 
anthropogenic CO2. As such, the overall level of mitigated CO2 is the most direct 
measure of effectiveness regarding environmental benefit. Determining the level of 
mitigated CO2 due to policy implementation necessitates an understanding of the overall 
CO2 emitted in the absence of policy. This baseline emissions forecast serves as the 
benchmark on which to assess all other policy scenarios regarding environmental benefit.  
The baseline emissions forecast is ultimately determined through the utilization of 
the simulation environment of the U.S. NAS, and air carrier and fleet level aggregate CO2 
effects have been introduced previously in Figure 4.18. As a reminder, these CO2 
emissions are based directly on fuel burn predictions using a conversion of 3.15 lb CO2 
per lb fuel consumed [119]. The simulation environment provides these estimates directly 
on a year by year basis out to 2036, however, they can also be aggregated throughout the 
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years to provide an overall level of CO2 emissions that would occur in the absence of 
policy.  
Given this benchmark for CO2 emissions, the mitigation potential of implemented 
policy can also be assessed. This is accomplished by directly comparing the emissions 
estimates from policy experiments conducted in the cost-effectiveness simulation 
environment of the U.S. NAS to the benchmark emissions limits. Due to the fact that this 
simulation environment provides year by year estimates for each air carrier, this 
comparison can be done at the air carrier level on a year by year basis, or at the fleet level 
for cumulative emissions for any year out to 2036. Policy makers are responsible for 
determining the overall level of mitigation that is necessary, however, it should be noted 
that insight can also be gained from scientists as well regarding mitigation needed to 
avoid catastrophic climate events. 
5.4.2 Establishing the Economic Costs 
As aforementioned, costs are determined for both aircraft manufacturers and 
aircraft owners and operators. The notional aircraft CO2 standard will impose non-
recurring costs on aircraft manufacturers through requirements for technology investment 
and infusion, and ETS policy will produce CO2 related charges to air carriers. The 
interaction of the policies with the SoS will also alter the recurring costs (RC) to aircraft 
owners and operators. Due to the fact that these costs are inherently unique and 
independent, they are treated separately. The following sections will provide a brief 
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overview of these economic costs, and will mention how policymakers may apply value 
systems using them.  
5.4.2.1 Non-Recurring Costs to Aircraft Manufacturers 
As aforementioned, the only non-recurring costs (NRC) considered in this study 
are those imposed on manufacturers in order to meet the notional aircraft CO2 standard. 
The technique used to model this cost is based on both airframe and engine development 
costs for aircraft families, and utilizes the parameters included in the metric system 
assumed herein. This produces a cost estimating relationship for NRC to manufacturers 
that is part of the cost calculation module of the simulation environment developed. It 
should be noted that this method of NRC estimation is inherently a normative forecasting 
technique, and does not consider any specific technologies to meet a specific metric 
value. A more complete description of this estimating relationship and its validation can 
be found in 4.5.2, and the final form of the relationship can be viewed in Figure 4.15. 
Ultimately though, the resulting change in NRC to aircraft manufacturers is the result of 
an input reduction percent over the “no action” scenario. Thus, NRC can be mapped 
against the input reduction percent (which is the also referred to as the improvement in 
margin in this document as well), as shown in Figure 5.7. As can be seen, the NRC to 
manufacturers tends to increase gradually up to a reduction percent of approximately 25, 
at which point costs tend to exponentially increase. This can be an indication of a 
potential technological limit for certain vehicles, but it’s ultimately a result of the specific 




Figure 5.7: Non-Recurring Cost (NRC) Variation with Reduction Percent 
Typically, the value system of the policy maker would desire a reduction in the 
economic burden of any established policy. As such, the value system of policy makers 
can be applied using this cost in two ways. NRC limits can be placed to filter 
economically viable policy options for aircraft manufacturers, or alternatively, a limit on 
the reduction percent over a “no action” stringency can be placed to filter technologically 
viable policy options for aircraft manufacturers. Due to the direct relationship seen 
between NRC and reduction percent, both approaches are equivalent, albeit from 
different value perspectives, the first being an economic viability perspective and the 
later being a technical feasibility perspective. With that said, it should be noted that the 
values of NRC shown in Figure 5.7 are purely notional, and do not reflect only feasible 
technology alternatives. It is fully recognized that reductions greater than approximately 




NRC are considered in this notional problem in order to provide trends for discussion of 
the outlined methodology. 
5.4.2.2 Recurring Costs to Aircraft Owners and Operators 
The recurring costs to aircraft owners and operators include both the direct 
operating costs (DOC), as well as policy induced costs due to emission trading schemes. 
The reason for inclusion of ETS related costs is the fact they would be assessed on a year 
by year basis, and are directly tied to fuel burn, thus operation of the vehicle. In this 
study, the specific costs included in these recurring costs are the fuel costs, capital costs, 
crew and maintenance costs, route and landing fees, and ETS related expenses.  
As with estimating the environmental benefit of policy, the economic costs to 
aircraft owners and operators can be evaluated through benchmarking of the simulation 
environment in the absence of policy. In the absence of an emission trading scheme or an 
aircraft CO2 standard, direct operating costs are provided on a year by year basis for each 
air carrier in 2012 USD. These costs can also be aggregated for the entire fleet. Examples 
of these benchmark direct operating costs are provided in Figure 4.20 for a single air 
carrier and Figure 4.19 for the entire fleet. It should be noted that there are no ETS 
related costs there due to the absence of policy.  
Given this cost benchmark, the change in costs incurred under all policy scenarios 
can be determined. This can be accomplished for all recurring cost elements 
cumulatively, or specific elements, such as the ETS related costs, individually. 
Additionally, these costs can also be analyzed on a year by year or cumulative basis as 
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with CO2 mitigation potential. The determination of which cost elements and level of 
aggregation to use for eventual down selection of effective policy space is solely in the 
domain of the policy maker. With that said, it will be shown that the fuel cost savings due 
to policy implementation tend to outweigh any increases in capital costs, thus DOC 
always tends to be reduced when policy is implemented. As such, the economic burdens 
associated with the increases in fees due to emission trading schemes may serve as a 
better measure of economic viability for the industry.  
5.4.3 Providing the Ability to Tradeoff the Costs and Benefits 
Typically, cost-effectiveness analysis is accomplished by directly relating the 
costs and benefits as a ratio. This method provides a singular measure of cost-
effectiveness for environmental policy such that the optimal policy can be identified 
numerically. While this form of cost-effectiveness analysis has precedent throughout 
regulatory policy analysis, directly relating the costs and benefits is difficult for policies 
impacting different actors throughout a SoS. Due to the fact that the non-recurring costs 
to manufactures and the recurring costs to aircraft owners and operators are accounted for 
independently and not directly related, they cannot be easily added to produce a singular 
measure of cost. This may be possible through the use of weighting functions, similar to 
concepts used for overall evaluation criteria, however, the most direct method of dealing 
with these distinct costs is to treat them independently. It’s anticipated that the 
policymaker will be able to apply value systems directly through both costs and benefits 
independently utilizing filtering. As such, filtering of exploratory experimentation can 
occur on the NRC to manufacturers, RC to aircraft owners and operators, and 
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environmental benefits simultaneously. In this way, cost-effectiveness analysis can be 
completed, albeit in the absence of a singular measure of overall cost-effectiveness.  
5.5 Generate Feasible Alternatives 
With potential values for policymakers identified, the policy alternative space 
must be fully explored in order to provide insight into the implications of competing 
value systems. This necessitates the generation of policy alternatives for the notional 
aircraft CO2 standard and emission trading schemes. The generation of feasible policy 
alternatives will be used to address the research objectives in question, which will be 
reintroduced as they are addressed. Due to the fact that policy cannot be tested in the real 
world, computer simulations representing the SoS and SoPS must be used to predict 
overall behavior. For this study, the cost-effectiveness simulation environment developed 
for the U.S. NAS will be employed for the study of both policies. The following sections 
will detail the specific assumptions used in generating policy alternatives, and provide 
estimates of the environmental benefits and economic costs of the policies being studied.  
This will be accomplished by first identifying the emissions and economic trends 
of the U.S. NAS in the absence of policy in order to benchmark policy implementation. 
Following this, the impact of each policy will be explored in isolation in order to 
demonstrate the primary effects of efficiency standards and trading schemes, and 
ultimately the interaction of these policies will be investigated through exploration of the 
concurrent implementation of both. Finally, the impact of aleatory uncertainty, in the 
form of changing fuel price, will be analyzed regarding the impact to the policy 
alternative space.  
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5.5.1 Predicting Costs and Benefits in the Absence of Policy 
In order to provide a benchmark on which policies can be assessed, an 
understanding of the costs and benefits in the absence of policy is necessary. This “no 
action” scenario assumes a fixed technology fleet of vehicles, in which replacements and 
additions are chosen from existing in-production vehicles available in the cost-
effectiveness model for the demand forecast assumed.  
As aforementioned, the primary benefits being tracked in this policy study are 
CO2 emissions, while the costs include the recurring costs to aircraft owners and 
operators, as well as the non-recurring costs to aircraft manufacturers. In the absence of a 
standard however, there will be no additional non-recurring costs to aircraft 
manufacturers. This is due to the fact that this benchmarking scenario only considers fleet 
evolution with current in-production vehicles. As such, there is no consideration of new 
vehicles entering the fleet, which is often referred to as a fixed technology fleet. 
Additionally, it should be noted that in the absence of emission trading schemes, the 
recurring costs tracked will be only the direct operating costs to air carriers, as there will 
be no emission trading scheme related costs.  
The following sections will provide the results of this fixed technology fleet 
scenario in the absence of policy implementation. Growth of the industry will be 
examined through the revenue-ton-miles, emissions will be tracked through CO2, and the 
applicable recurring costs will also be presented.  
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5.5.1.1 Demand Growth in the Absence of Policy 
For this study, a notional forecast is implemented, and provides an expected 
percent increase in revenue-ton-miles per year out to 2036. In the absence of a policy, 
namely emission trading schemes, this input growth is not modified throughout the 
simulation. As such, this forecast is applied directly to the measures of RTM for the fleet 
considered to provide estimates out to year 2036. The results of this forecast are provided 
in Figure 5.8. As can be seen, the forecasted growth tends to be exponential, as expected, 
and is consistent for all air carriers considered.  
 
Figure 5.8: Forecasted RTM in the Absence of Policy 





































5.5.1.2 CO2 Emissions in the Absence of Policy 
Due to the fact that the benefits of policy implementation will be measured 
through direct comparison of predicted CO2 emissions, an understanding of the emissions 
from the fleet considered in the absence of policy is necessary. As aforementioned, this is 
measured through predicted fuel burn and converted using an established multiplier from 
literature. The resulting CO2 in the absence of policy is presented in Figure 5.9, where the 
total CO2 for the fleet is presented in addition to the contributions from each air carrier 
considered.  
While the trends observed in this figure follow those observed in RTM growth 
generally, there are some noticeable differences. The most prominent difference can be 
seen in the total CO2 for the fleet between the years of 2013 and 2017, where CO2 
emissions grow much more slowly than the predicted growth in RTM. This delayed 
growth is due to the fact that as air carriers renew their fleet in the presence of increased 
demand, the overall efficiency of the fleet is improved. Ultimately this improvement in 
fleet efficiency produces a slower growth rate in emissions than RTM. With that said, the 
cumulative emissions over the course of the simulation for the fleet considered are 




Figure 5.9: Forecasted CO2 in the Absence of Policy 
5.5.1.3 Recurring Costs in the Absence of Policy 
The other primary consideration in cost-effectiveness analysis is the associated 
cost of policy. Due to the fact that policy implementation will produce changes in the 
direct operating costs (DOC) for air carriers, these costs should be understood. The 
recurring costs considered in the absence of policy include the fuel costs, capital costs, 
crew costs, maintenance costs, route charges, and landing fees. The aggregate costs for 
each air carrier, as well as the fleet considered, are presented in Figure 5.10. As is 
expected, the total recurring costs increase throughout the course of the simulation as 
demand continues to grow. Additionally, it’s interesting to note in this figure the relative 



































change in costs for specific air carriers, namely Legacy Carrier 1 and Legacy Carrier 2. 
As can be seen, the recurring costs for Legacy Carrier 2 tends to be higher than for 
Legacy Carrier 1 until about 2022, at which point the operating expenses for Legacy 
Carrier 1 outpace Legacy Carrier 2. This is a result of the fleet evolution for the two 
respective air carriers, and demonstrates that this simulation environment for the U.S. 
NAS predicts Legacy Carrier 2 will be operating a relatively more efficient fleet than 
Legacy Carrier 1 in the future. This prediction is based on the assumptions provided 
previously for the developed modeling environment.  
 
Figure 5.10: Total Recurring Costs for All Air Carriers in the Absence of Policy 
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 In addition to understanding the relative effect of each air carrier to the total 
recurring costs, the level of aggregation in this modeling environment of the U.S. NAS 
also allows for more detailed analysis of the DOC build-up for specific air carriers. In 
order to demonstrate this capability, Figure 5.11 is provided. Here the total operating 
costs for Legacy Carrier 2 are presented, along with the cost components comprising the 
DOC. As can be observed, the key contributions to overall DOC for Legacy Carrier 2 are 
the fuel and capital costs, with all other cost categories representing a much smaller 
fraction of overall DOC. This trend can be observed for all other air carriers considered, 
however, is not done here in the interest of succinctness.  
 
Figure 5.11: Recurring Cost Build-up for Legacy Carrier 2 in the Absence of Policy 
















































Ultimately, it is the relative change in costs and benefits due to policy 
implementation that will be used as a framework for effective policy identification. The 
preceding discussion of the costs and emissions in the absence of policy serve as the 
benchmark on which all policies will be evaluated for cost-effectiveness analysis.  
5.5.2 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Individual Policies 
Given this understanding of the associated costs and emissions in the absence of 
policy, the relative cost-effectiveness of policy implementation can be assessed. While 
the ultimate goal of this research is to identify effective policy space in the presence of 
multiple concurrent policies, it’s first necessary to understand the effects of the individual 
policies being studied. The following sections will address the effect of the 
implementation of the two policies in isolation in order to better understand their relative 
impacts. Ultimately, this analysis will be used to address research question 1, which is 
reproduced below.   
RQ1: What are the impacts to the U.S. NAS of a new certification standard or a 
trading scheme in isolation? 
5.5.2.1 The Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard 
The purpose of an aircraft CO2 standard is to push technology infusion on new 
vehicles developed by aircraft manufacturers. The result of creating new technology 
infused vehicles for the NAS will likely be a more efficient fleet for all air carriers. As a 
result, it has been predicted that implementing this standard will lead to a reduction in 
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fuel burn, thus CO2 emissions, for air carriers. While emissions are expected to be 
reduced, this standard will primarily impact aircraft manufacturers, thus the expected 
growth in demand will not be impacted since the NRC incurred by the manufacturer to 
comply was not transferred to the operator. As a result, it’s expected that the reduction in 
fuel burn will not be great enough to stabilize emissions. Further, due to technological 
limitations and economic considerations for aircraft manufacturers, the overall impact of 
such a standard will be limited. The overall benefit of the standard will be measured 
through a relative change in cumulative CO2 from the “no action” scenario discussed 
previously.  
While the notional aircraft CO2 standard is expected to reduce emissions, this 
reduction will come at a cost to aircraft manufacturers. This NRC to aircraft 
manufacturers is a function of the necessary improvements needed for each aircraft 
included to meet the standard, as well as the size of the aircraft. A more complete 
discussion of the estimating relationship implemented to predict this NRC has been 
provided previously in 4.5.2. What is important to note however, is that there is expected 
to be an exponential increase in NRC with increasing stringency of the standard. The 
overall level of the NRC to aircraft manufacturers can ultimately be used to limit the 
ranges of viable stringency options. Additionally, as a reminder to the reader, the costs in 
this study are all purely notional, and the level of NRC considered is often economically 
unviable simply to discuss the resulting trends. 
Finally, the standard is also expected to reduce operating costs for air carriers due 
to the fuel cost savings that are expected to occur through the implementation of more 
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efficient fleets. It’s expected that these fuel cost savings will be greater than the relative 
increases in capital costs for the new technology vehicles under the fuel price scenario 
considered. This will be measured by considering the change in cumulative recurring 
costs between implemented standards and the “no action” scenario discussed previously. 
Ultimately, it’s expected that it will be shown that there is a tradeoff in the costs imposed 
to aircraft manufacturers and the cost savings provided to air carriers.   
5.5.2.1.1 Experiment Definition for a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standards 
Populating the policy alternative space necessitates defining ranges on applicable 
inputs to the policy. For this policy, this is accomplished by defining the stringency of the 
standard, as well as the scope of applicability. The stringency level is based on percent 
reductions from a “no action” limit line defined previously. As such, defining the 
stringency level can be accomplished through a singular measure of reduction percent 
over the “no action” stringency limit. Ultimately, the maximum level of stringency will 
be dependent on the technical feasibility of meeting the standard for individual aircraft, as 
well as the economic viability to aircraft manufacturers. Due to the fact that the 
technology forecasting method implemented is normative, no specific technologies are 
identified to meet the standard, thus determining the maximum reduction from the “no 
action” limit line is not possible a priori.  
Despite this limitation, the economic viability of these standards can be assessed 
through determination of the non-recurring costs to aircraft manufacturers through the 
estimating relationship established earlier. In testing a number of potential stringency 
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limits it has been determined that the NRC begins rapid exponential growth at a reduction 
of 25% to 30% below the “no action” limit line, and outpaces all other cost elements at 
40% below this limit line. As such, the reductions to be tested are varied between 0% and 
40% of the “no action” limit line defined previously on Figure 4.24. While the higher end 
of this range is likely well outside the realm of realistic policy alternatives, exploration 
beyond technical feasibility is expected to produce trends to be discussed in this notional 
implementation of policy. 
The scope of applicability for this standard requires definition of the entities 
covered under the standard, as well as the date of implementation. As aforementioned, all 
manufacturers represented in the simulation environment created for the U.S. NAS would 
be subject to the standard based on current literature [119]. Thus, fully defining the scope 
of applicability for this study only requires definition of the date of implementation. As 
such, the assumed dates of implementation would occur in 2017 or 2023.  Due to the 
ability to rapidly assess policy options however, implementation dates are varied from 
2014 to 2023 on a yearly basis. While it is recognized that any implementation dates 
before 2017 are in reality extremely unlikely, earlier dates are tested to discuss the 
notional long term effects of these policies within the simulation. The ranges of the 
parameters varied for this policy option are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard DoE Ranges 
 
Minimum Maximum Type 
Reduction % 0% 40% Continuous 




Given ranges on the inputs to this policy option, the actual experiments to be run 
must be defined. This is typically accomplished through definition of design of 
experiments (DoE) [189]. The goal of this study is to explore the entirety of the policy 
alternative space through Monte Carlo Simulation, in order to fully populate all feasible 
alternatives. Due to the fact that the only parameter that can be continuously varied is the 
reduction percent defining the stringency, it has been determined that a randomized 
design on this variable with a full factorial of implementation date will adequately 
populate the space.  
5.5.2.1.2 CO2 Mitigation Potential of a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard 
For each experiment performed using the cost-effectiveness simulation 
environment of the U.S. NAS, fuel burn totals for each air carrier are collected. These 
fuel burn totals are converted to CO2 emissions, and aggregated to estimate overall CO2 
emissions from the fleet. This provides a measure of emissions for the fleet on a year by 
year basis out to 2036. While the mitigation potential of these standards can be assessed 
yearly, the cumulative mitigation potential serves as a more illustrative measure of the 
effect of the policy. As such, the cumulative CO2 emissions resulting from each policy 
experiment are compared to the cumulative emissions of the benchmarking scenario 
discussed previously. The resulting mitigation potential of the alternatives can then be 
viewed as a function of stringency level and year of implementation, as seen in Figure 
5.12. This figure provides a visual representation of the policy alternative space explored 




Figure 5.12: CO2 Mitigation Potential of the Aircraft CO2 Standard 
As can be observed, the overall mitigation potential of the policy option in 
isolation is highly dependent on the overall stringency applied to the standard. While the 
impact of these standards can be quite significant, approaching 0.2 Gt-CO2 at moderate 
stringency limits of approximately 30% below the “no action” limit line, the mitigation 
potential of stringencies at less than 10% produce negligible effects. As such, this figure 
serves to highlight the fact that a notional aircraft CO2 standard under the definition 
provided in this study will only produce noticeable effects at stringencies above 10% 
reduction over the defined “no action” limit line.  
Additionally, it can also be observed in Figure 5.12 that the overall mitigation 















sooner standards are implemented, the more mitigation potential exists. Further, at higher 
stringency levels, the range of mitigation potential becomes greater based on 
implementation date. This indicates that for moderate to strict levels, the ultimate date of 
implementation becomes more important for overall CO2 mitigation potential. It should 
be noted that for all experiments run, none produce changes to the demand forecast. 
Ultimately, this confirms the hypothesis for research question 1 that these standards to 
aircraft manufacturers will produce reductions in CO2 without impacting expected 
demand.   
It was also predicted that these standards would not be able to stabilize emissions 
due to the fact that there is no impact to consumer demand. This prediction can be tested 
through direct observation of the CO2 output for each policy experiment on a yearly 
basis, which is provided in Figure 5.13. The range of CO2 emissions scenarios is 
presented in this figure, where CO2 emissions are bounded by the scenario in the absence 
of policy and a 40% reduction over a “no action” limit line. It is clear from this figure 
that even under the most stringent option tested emissions will continue to grow in the 




Figure 5.13: Yearly Emissions for a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standards 
5.5.2.1.3 Variation of Non-Recurring Costs and Reduction Potential 
In addition to tracking the mitigation potential of the notional aircraft CO2 
standard alternative space, the non-recurring costs to aircraft manufacturers is also 
assessed. This is accomplished through the utilization of the NRC estimating relationship 
defined previously. Due to the fact that this is assumed to be a one-time cost, it is not 
affected by the date of implementation, but only the overall stringency limit of the 
standard. As such, policy makers should consider the date of implementation as well as 
the economic impact of these standards on aircraft manufacturers when determining 
economically viable policy alternatives.  
It has been hypothesized that the effect of a notional aircraft CO2 standard to 
aircraft manufacturers will be increasing NRCs associated with investments and infusion 
of technologies on new vehicle concepts. This increasing NRC is predicted to behave 






















costs for moderate policy, and economically unviable costs for very stringent policy. The 
variation in NRC to aircraft manufacturers with increasing stringency limits is repeated in 
Figure 5.14.   
 
Figure 5.14: Non-Recurring Cost Variation for the Aircraft CO2 Standard 
As shown here, less stringent standards in the range of 0% to 10% reduction over 
a “no action” limit line incur negligible costs to all aircraft manufacturers on the order of 
tens of millions of dollars. Typically this level of cost would be within the level of 
investment uncertainty for any new development program. More moderate stringency 
limits, in the range of 10% to 30% below the “no action” limit line, have the potential to 
incur significant, but likely acceptable costs, to aircraft manufacturers, reaching a level of 
approximately $20 billion. While this cost may seem high, it should be noted that the cost 




policy alternatives above 30% reduction over the “no action” limit line, the NRC to 
aircraft manufacturers exponentially increases, reaching levels well over $200 billion. 
While it would be in the policy makers’ purview as to whether this level of cost would be 
acceptable for the industry to incur, due to the fact that it’s at a level above the valuation 
of the companies producing aircraft, it’s unlikely to be deemed economically viable. 
5.5.2.1.4 Recurring Cost Savings 
In addition to impacting the costs incurred to aircraft manufacturers, the notional 
aircraft CO2 standard is also predicted to reduce the recurring costs to aircraft owners and 
operators over the benchmarking scenario. This is due to the fact that anticipated 
reductions in fuel burn, and thus fuel cost, at the current fuel price are expected to 
outpace increases in capital cost due to premiums for more efficient aircraft. The 
recurring costs to aircraft owners and operators are tracked on a yearly basis for the U.S. 
NAS, and have been aggregated for all air carriers considered. As with actual emissions, 
these costs can be analyzed on a yearly basis, however, assessing the cumulative impacts 
of the standards to recurring costs provides a more illustrative understanding of the tested 
standards to potential recurring cost savings. As such, the cumulative recurring costs for 
each experiment are compared against the benchmarking scenario to provide an overview 




Figure 5.15: Recurring Cost Savings Due to Aircraft CO2 Standards 
As can be seen, at less stringent policy alternatives in the range of 0% to 10% 
produce negligible cost savings. This is likely due to the fact that both the increases in 
capital costs and decreases in fuel costs are minimal in this region of the policy 
alternative space. However, for more moderate stringency limits, the recurring cost 
savings increase dramatically. While not shown here, further analysis reveals that this 
effect is due to the savings in fuel costs outpacing increases in capital costs. Ultimately, 
the cost savings continue to increase for more stringent policy alternatives. The reason for 
these decreasing costs is the fuel savings. It may be assumed that at very stringent policy 
options the high cost of investment to aircraft manufacturers would be passed on to 
aircraft owners and operators, ultimately accounting for the fuel cost savings. However, 
in the implementation of the pricing module for new aircraft it has been assumed that the 















vehicles will not necessarily match the increases in costs incurred to aircraft 
manufacturers. It is this assumption that ultimately leads to the continual decrease in 
recurring costs for the policy alternative space explored here.  
Additionally, it’s also interesting to note that there are discrete jumps in the 
recurring cost savings for moderate policy options. These occur due to the nature of the 
CO2 metric system assumed herein. Since this metric system produces a space that is not 
fully continuous, the standard tends to impact different vehicles at specific stringency 
levels. As such, there tends to be jumps in the recurring cost savings as highly utilized 
vehicles begin to be affected by the standard. 
5.5.2.1.5 Manufacturer and Air Carrier Cost Tradeoffs 
Ultimately, what is demonstrated by the increasing costs to aircraft manufacturers 
and reduced costs to aircraft owners and operators over the benchmarking scenario in this 
policy alternative space is that there is a cost tradeoff inherent with this policy option. 
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 5.16, where the recurring costs to aircraft owners and 
operators is plotted against the non-recurring costs incurred by aircraft manufacturers. As 
can be seen, lower recurring costs to air carriers typically coincide with greater NRC to 
aircraft manufacturers. While this is generally true, it’s also quite apparent that the 
implementation date has the potential to greatly impact the overall cost tradeoff between 




Figure 5.16: RC and NRC Tradeoff Due to the Aircraft CO2 Standard 
5.5.2.1.6 Summary of Impacts of a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard in Isolation 
The hypothesis provided regarding the impact of a notional aircraft CO2 standard 
has been shown to be reasonable in the preceding discussion. As a reminder, it was 
predicted that these standards in isolation would lead to: 
1. A quantifiable decrease in CO2 emissions.  
2. No change in demand over the input forecast. 
3. An inability to stabilize emissions. 
4. Increases in non-recurring costs (NRC) to aircraft manufacturers. 
5. Decreases in recurring costs (RC) to aircraft owners and operators. 
5.5.2.2 Emissions Trading Schemes 
Emission trading schemes (ETS) are regulatory policies aimed at creating a real 














climate impacts. As such, these ETS impact aviation through a different mechanism than 
an aircraft CO2 standard previously discussed. The primary effect of an ETS is to reduce 
demand by passing additional costs on to consumers in the presence of the policy. This is 
primarily based on the anticipation that demand growth in civil aviation will outpace 
efficiency improvements, leading to a performance gap in emissions. This performance 
gap will have an associated cost based on the definition of the ETS, which is likely to be 
passed through to consumer ticket price. Any increase in price will necessarily alter the 
expected demand through established demand elasticities. As such, it has been predicted 
that the presence of an ETS will lead to CO2 mitigation through decreased demand over 
the input demand forecast. Further, it’s anticipated that demand reductions will reach 
equilibrium values on the order of 1% to 2% below predicted estimates for moderate ETS 
definitions, such as those established in the EU ETS.  Further, the relative impact to 
different carrier types, namely low cost carriers and legacy carriers, is expected to be 
disproportionate, with low cost carriers reaching lower equilibrium demand values in 
general than the legacy carriers included in the fleet.  
The following sections will detail the assumptions implemented in defining the 
cap setting and allocation process for ETS policy alternative space, and provide the 
impacts to the U.S. NAS based on computational experimentation. As was done for the 
prior policy option analysis, all applicable research objectives and hypotheses tested in 
conducting these experiments will be given specific mention.  
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5.5.2.2.1 Cap Setting and Allocation of Allowances for an ETS 
In order to define the metric system for an ETS, the cap setting and allowance 
allocation processes must be established. Due to the desire for linkage of the ETS studied 
here to the established allowance markets in the EU, the structure of the EU ETS is used 
to benchmark these processes.  
Ultimately, the cap determines the level of allowable emissions under an ETS. 
Typically this is determined based on a percent of some reference year emissions, which 
for the EU ETS is on the order of 95% of the average emissions between 2004 and 2006. 
In order to replicate this cap setting process in the modeling environment developed for 
the U.S. NAS, the reference year is defaulted to 2005, and the cap is allowed to be varied 
by the user. While much of the forthcoming discussion considers a cap representative of 
the EU ETS, in order to fully populate the ETS policy alternative space, a range of caps is 
defined for experimentation from 50% to 100% of the 2005 fleet emissions.  
With an established cap for the ETS, the allocation of allowances to the entities 
covered can be addressed. For the EU ETS this is accomplished through determination of 
the relative market share of air carriers based on the revenue-tonne-kilometers (RTK) 
flown. In order to replicate this process the revenue-ton-miles (RTM) are tracked for all 
air carriers included in this study, and allowances are allocated based on the relative 
market share from the measured RTM. While this ultimately establishes the total allowed 
emissions for each air carrier under an ETS, the number of allowances auctioned and 
those allocated freely must be defined. For the EU ETS, 15% of allowances can be 
242 
 
auctioned, with the remainder provided freely to covered entities. This assumption can be 
implemented directly in the framework of the developed modeling environment, 
however, due to unexpected observed behaviors in output CO2 emissions when only a 
fraction of allocated allowances are auctioned, it is proposed that all allowances under the 
established cap be auctioned. As such, it’s assumed that all allowances allocated under a 
given cap will be auctioned, and the performance gap in emissions will be covered 
through purchased allowances on the EU ETS allowance market.  
5.5.2.2.2 Determining Allowance Prices  
While the cap setting and allocation processes outlined above provides the ability 
to determine the number of purchased and auctioned allowances under a given ETS, the 
associated cost is dependent on the price of the allowances allocated and purchased. 
Subsequently, the definition of allowance purchase and auction price is necessary for the 
determination of total ETS cost to be passed through to consumers.  
A number of assumed purchase prices of allowances have been studied in aviation 
for the EU ETS throughout literature, and a review of these assumptions has been 
provided in Table 2.4. From these reviewed studies, the purchase price of allowances has 
been assumed to vary between €5 and €60 per tonne. Due to the fact that the modeling 
environment and all costs are in English units and USD, this allowance price range must 
be converted. Using the current exchange rate of $1.35 per Euro [190] and 1.10231 short 
tons per metric ton, the allowances prices can be converted into commensurable units 
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with the developed modeling environment. This results in a range of allowance prices for 
purchased allowances between $6.12 and $73.48 per short ton of CO2.  
While the existing literature provides a good estimate of the range of possible 
market prices for purchased allowances, there is generally no mention of the price for 
auctioned allowances. As such, it’s unclear if auctioned allowances are assumed to have 
the same price, or be nominally lower. Due to the fact that assuming the prices are the 
same between purchased and auctioned allowances would negate the effect of a cap, it 
has been assumed that the price of auctioned allowances is nominally lower than the 
purchase price of allowances from the EU ETS market. In order to provide a first 
estimate of this price, an assumption is made that the auction price of allowances 
allocated under the cap will be 50% of the price of purchased allowances.  
 The next issue to address is that of the pass through of lost opportunity costs. As 
has been identified in literature, one potential solution to alleviate this problem is to 
define a set price for allowances under the cap that are passed through to consumers. This 
can either be accomplished by assuming that no lost opportunity costs are passed through 
to consumers, or that all allowances under the cap are auctioned. Due to the established 
belief that air carriers will likely pass on lost opportunity costs to consumers, a strong 
argument can be made that all allowances under a cap ought to be auctioned. For this 
study, all allowances allocated under a cap will be auctioned based on this reasoning.  
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5.5.2.2.3 Experiment Definition for Potential Emission Trading Schemes 
Up to this point, the cap setting and allocation processes have been established, 
the allowance prices have been determined, and a case has been made for the auctioning 
of all allowances under a specified cap. This information provides the full definition of 
potential ETS policy, which can be implemented in any future year. In order to fully 
define the policy alternative space, ranges on all input parameters will be established, and 
a discussion of the design of experiments to be run will be discussed.  
 For this study, it has been determined that the cap will be set based on a 2005 
reference, and will vary from 100% to 50% of those emissions. The market price of 
emission allowances will be varied based on estimates from literature between $6.12 and 
$73.48 per ton. Both the cap and market price can be continuously varied between the 
minimum and maximum values established here. As with the notional aircraft CO2 
standard, the implementation date is a discrete input to the simulation environment. In 
order to provide some consistency between the two policy options discussed here, the 
implementation date will be varied between 2014 and 2022. Table 5.2 provides a 
summary of the input parameters for this ETS policy alternative space study.  
Table 5.2: Emission Trading Scheme DoE Ranges  
 
Minimum Maximum Type 
Cap 50% 100% Continuous 
Market Price (per ton) $6.12  $73.48  Continuous 




 As with the notional aircraft CO2 standard analyzed previously, the purpose of 
defining ranges on these input parameters for an ETS is to fully populate the policy 
alternative space. Due to the fact that there are two continuous and one discrete variable, 
a different approach for the design of experiments (DoE) is taken here than for the 
previous study. In order to capture the extremes of the policy alternative space, a central 
composite design on the continuous variables is employed, and the internal policy 
alternative space is populated by supplementing this DoE with a large number (hundreds) 
of Latin Hypercube and randomized experiments [189]. This DoE is then repeated for a 
number of implementation dates in the range studied. Specifically, the continuous 
variables are tested for potential implementation in 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022.  
5.5.2.2.4 The Impact of an ETS to Demand 
Before discussing the results of the outlined experiments, the impact of emission 
trading schemes to consumer demand will be analyzed. This can be done for any of the 
planned experiments; however, the general trends in demand impact remain the same. 
Further, analyzing all experiments simultaneously in respect to demand equilibrium 
proves very difficult to visualize. As such, an ETS policy is defined that is comparable to 
the EU ETS in order to address RQ1.1, which is concerned with the general impacts to 
demand for passenger transport, and RQ1.2, which explores the relative impacts to 
different air carrier types. The ETS that is defined to address these objectives is based on 
a 2005 reference year with a cap of 95%. An allowance price of $20/ton is assumed, and 
all costs are passed through to consumers. Further, it’s assumed that the date of 




Figure 5.17: Emission Trading Scheme Impact to Consumer Demand 
Given this definition for the ETS, the yearly demand growth as a percent of 
revenue-ton-miles (RTM) can be extracted from the results. It should be noted that the 
steps in demand growth are a result of the input forecast, which anticipates yearly 
demand growth changes in 2016 and 2026. The resulting yearly demand growth for each 
air carrier can then be compared to the input business as usual (BAU) forecast, as in 
Figure 5.17. As can be seen, the resulting demand growth under an ETS comparable to 
the EU ETS in the U.S. NAS produces demand that is 1% to 2% lower than the input 
forecast. This result is within the same range as previous studies regarding the impact to 
air carriers in the EU [102]. Further, it is noted that the resulting demand for all air 
carriers reaches a new equilibrium value within 3 to 5 years. Subsequently, the 
hypothesis proposed for RQ1.1 is confirmed, as it was expected that equilibrium demand 


































In addition to understanding the general impact to demand under an ETS, this 
figure also demonstrates the relative impact to specific air carriers. It has been predicted 
that low cost carriers would be impacted more greatly than the legacy carriers due to their 
relatively lower ticket prices and higher demand elasticities. As can be observed, this is 
generally the case, barring Legacy Carrier 1 whose equilibrium demand closely matches 
that of LCC 1 and LCC 2. Subsequently, it can be stated that the hypothesis for RQ1.2 
was partially confirmed. Generally, the relative impacts to low cost carrier demand under 
an ETS will be greater than for legacy carriers, however, a full understanding of the 
impacts to demand equilibrium will ultimately occur on a case by case basis.  
5.5.2.2.5 The Relative Influence of Market Price and Cap Definition to CO2 
Mitigation Potential 
With this understanding of the impacts of emission trading schemes to consumer 
demand, the experiments defined previously can be analyzed more thoroughly. Due to the 
fact that the market price and cap are varied in this experimentation, it’s important to 
identify the relative influence of each variable to overall CO2 mitigation potential. In 
order to accomplish this, the cumulative CO2 emissions from each experimental run are 
compared against the benchmarking scenario to provide a measure of mitigation 
potential. The specific experiments can be visualized based on market price and cap with 
overlaid colors showing CO2 mitigation potential, as seen in Figure 5.18. This is 
accomplished for each potential implementation date, and was determined to demonstrate 
similar trends regardless of date of implementation. It can be observed in this figure that 
the coloration is relatively constant across the defined cap, but changes drastically across 
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the input market price. This indicates that the market price of emissions allowances is 
more influential than the defined cap in terms of overall CO2 mitigation potential. It 
should be noted that this result is likely dependent on the assumed definition of the cap 
setting process, which was made consistent with that of the EU ETS. Due to the fact that 
the reference year was chosen as 2005 and caps up to 50% below this limit were tested, 
the actual range of the caps tested is somewhat limited. Future studies of such standards 
not linked to the EU ETS may explore a wider definition of the emissions cap, resulting 
in trends different than those seen below. 
 
Figure 5.18: Relative Influence of Market Price and Cap to CO2 Mitigation 
Potential 
In addition to looking at the cap and market price simultaneously, the impact of 
changing market price to overall CO2 mitigation demonstrates the results shown 




experiments performed to populate the ETS policy alternative space are provided based 
on CO2 mitigation potential and market price. Here, the implementation date is colored in 
a similar fashion to the analysis performed for the notional aircraft CO2 standard. As can 
be observed, the market price and date of implementation have the greatest impact on 
cumulative CO2 mitigation potential in the time frame considered for this simulation. The 
effect of the cap controls where in each colored band the CO2 mitigation potential will 
fall. Ultimately, the cap produces much smaller changes in emissions mitigation than 
either the market price or date of implementation, although, this is not to say the impact 
of the cap is negligible. As was the case for the prior policy option, the overall CO2 
mitigation potential of these ETS are highly dependent on the year of implementation. 
The sooner the ETS is implemented, the greater the mitigation potential. Ultimately, for 
very high market prices the difference between implementing an ETS immediately and 
waiting until 2022 can mean an additional 1Gt-CO2 mitigated by 2036; however, the 
effect is less pronounced at low market prices. Finally, it’s also important to note here 
that the CO2 mitigation potential of these tested ETS is typically much higher than for the 





Figure 5.19: CO2 Mitigation Potential of ETS with Varying Market Price 
5.5.2.2.6 Effect of Cap Setting to ETS Related Costs and CO2 Mitigation 
While the effect of the cap is less pronounced in these experiments than either the 
market price or implementation date, the impacts to overall CO2 mitigation potential and 
emission trading scheme related costs can still be substantial. In order to demonstrate the 
isolated effect of the cap set, a reference scenario is selected among the policy 
alternatives previously identified. A range of cap definitions is run through the developed 
modeling environment for an allowance market price of $20/ton with an implementation 
date of 2014. The resulting mitigation potential and ETS related costs are visualized in 










Figure 5.20: Effect of Cap on ETS Cost and CO2 Mitigation 
 As can be observed in the above figure, as the cap is reduced, and the policy is 
made more stringent, the overall level of CO2 mitigation potential increases. 
Additionally, the costs associated with the ETS also tend to increase with more stringent 
ETS policy. It’s interesting to note in the figure that the CO2 mitigation potential seems to 
have a second order polynomial relationship with the cap level. This may indicate that the 
mitigation potential of further reductions in the cap may increase more rapidly than at 
moderate definitions of the policy. Additionally, it should be noted that although the cap 
does have a less pronounced effect on mitigation potential than market price or 
implementation date, the demonstrated policies shown at this market price represent a 




5.5.2.2.7 Summary of Impacts of an ETS in Isolation 
As with the analysis of the notional aircraft CO2 standard, the study of ETS in 
isolation is aimed at addressing RQ1, which concerns the impact of these policies to the 
U.S. NAS. It has been predicted that emission trading schemes will impact demand, 
reaching new equilibrium values that can be quantified. These demand changes are 
expected to be different depending on air carrier type. In order to address these needs, 
ETS policy alternative space is populated for a number of cap definitions, potential 
market prices of allowances, and implementation dates. In analyzing the results of these 
experiments with the given assumptions it has been determined that an ETS tends to:  
1. Reduce demand over the input demand forecast. 
2. Produce new equilibrium demand values.  
3. Impact low cost carrier demand more than legacy carrier demand, 
typically.  
4. Incur policy induced costs to aircraft owners and operators. 
5. Produce greater CO2 mitigation potential than Aircraft CO2 Standards. 
5.5.3 Concurrent Policy Implementation 
With an understanding of the individual impacts of the two policy options, the 
exploration of feasible policy alternative space can be continued concerning the 
concurrent implementation of these policies. It has been shown that previous policy 
analysis studies typically pursue regulatory policy analysis for one policy at a time. 
Despite this fact ICAO’s GIACC has tasked EU member states with the determination of 
“baskets of measures” aimed at the mitigation of emissions. The concurrent 
implementation of the policies pursued in this study represents a potential “basket of 
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measures”. It has been predicted that the effects of this basket of measures cannot be 
predicted solely based on the individual assessment of the policies included due to their 
complex interactions within an established SoS. This realization has prompted the 
definition of systems-of-policy-systems, where policy tradeoffs are likely to occur.   
The following sections will explore the determination of policy tradeoffs between 
the two options considered herein. In order to accomplish this, a benchmarking research 
objective has previously been established (RQ2.1) where it is posited that the XPIROV 
policy analysis framework implemented previously can be expanded for the study of 
multiple policies implemented concurrently. This expansion of the established policy 
analysis framework has been termed the GenPAF framework, and a representation of the 
policies considered in this framework is presented in Figure 5.21. As can be seen, the 
individual policies constituting the SoPS can be mapped to the specific systems within 
the physical SoS at their respective hierarchical levels, and ultimately the interaction of 
these policies to overall outcomes of interest can be tracked. As such, the GenPAF policy 
analysis framework ought to adequately represent and track the interactions of these 




Figure 5.21: Concurrent Policy Analysis in the GenPAF Framework 
Ultimately, the purpose of conducting policy alternative exploration for multiple 
policies in this SoPS context is to understand how the combined effects of the policies 
differ from their impacts in isolation. Due to the fact that the notional aircraft CO2 
standard will improve the overall efficiency of the fleet, the impact to demand of 
emission trading schemes are expected to be lessened. Further, it has been predicted that 
meeting an established environmental goal can be accomplished through a mix of these 
policies, and there will be an inherent tradeoff among them in doing so. Finally, by 
exploring a policy tradeoff instead of a single policy to address environmental goals, it’s 
expected that the associated policy induced costs will be lessened over any policy in 
isolation. Studying these effects will address RQ2, which is reproduced below.  
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RQ2: How will the combined effect of these policies differ from their 
implementation in isolation? 
5.5.3.1 Cost-Effectiveness of Policy in Isolation 
In order to explore the inherent policy tradeoffs and potential reduction in costs of 
concurrent policy implementation, it is first necessary to understand the cost-
effectiveness of meeting established environmental goals with either policy in isolation. 
This will provide a benchmark against which policy mixes can be compared in order to 
address the research objective aforementioned. Understanding the cost-effectiveness of 
meeting an environmental mitigation goal with either policy option studied here can be 
accomplished by utilizing the results of the individual policy results previously discussed. 
In order to illustrate this process, a notional value system from a policy maker will be 
applied on desired CO2 mitigation, and the cost-effectiveness of each policy in isolation 
will be explored. For this example, consider the notional goal in question to be the 
mitigation of approximately 0.18 Gt-CO2 by the year 2036.  
Based on the results previously presented, this mitigation potential can be 
achieved with either policy option. For the notional aircraft CO2 standard, meeting this 
environmental goal can be achieved with an implementation in 2016 and a reduction of 
approximately 30% over the “no action” limit line. In order to illustrate this assessment, a 
subset of the results presented in Figure 5.12 have been extracted and are presented in 
Figure 5.22. The needed reduction over the “no action” limit line is quite apparent in this 
figure, and this reduction can be used to predict the non-recurring costs (NRC) incurred 
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by aircraft manufacturers to meet the standard through the relationship shown in Figure 
5.14. Doing so provides an estimate for NRC in the range of approximately $20 billion 
for technology investment needed to meet this goal.  
 
Figure 5.22: Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard Stringency to Meet Notional Goal 
 Similarly, emission trading schemes can also be implemented to meet this 
established goal. In order to remove the effect of allowance market price from this 
analysis, a market price of $8/ton is considered here. Based on closer examination of the 
results presented in Figure 5.19, it is determined that meeting this mitigation goal at the 
market price considered can be accomplished with an implementation of the ETS in 
2018. Given the establishment of the market price of allowances and implementation 




the mitigation potential outlined here. To provide a more visual representation of this cap 
determination process Figure 5.23 is presented. As can be seen here meeting the goal of 
approximately 0.18 Gt-CO2 by 2036 can be accomplished with a cap in the range of 
approximately 65% of 2005 emissions. The costs associated with the implementation of 
this ETS can then be assessed using the cost-effectiveness simulation of the U.S. NAS. 
Doing so demonstrates a cumulative cost associated with this ETS of approximately 
$23billion.  
 
Figure 5.23: Emission Trading Scheme Stringency to Meet Notional Goal 
As is shown here, meeting a notional emissions mitigation goal may be possible 
with either policy option, but doing so may produce large costs on the order of $20 
billion. Further, it should be noted that pursuing either of these policies in isolation will 




notional aircraft CO2 standard is implemented, the burden will be primarily placed on 
aircraft manufacturers, while the implementation of emission trading scheme will burden 
aircraft owners and operators. Producing a more fair and balanced approach to the market 
actors included in the U.S. NAS will likely require a tradeoff of the two policies 
considered here.  
5.5.3.2 Discovering a Policy Tradeoff 
Understanding this policy tradeoff is accomplished through concurrent policy 
implementation using the framework presented in Figure 5.21. Due to the fact that it’s not 
possible to know the exact definitions of the notional aircraft CO2 standard and emission 
trading schemes that will meet the policy goal of 0.18 Gt-CO2 a priori, the alternative 
space of these concurrently implemented policies must be explored. Filtering can then be 
used to illustrate the effective policy mixes that meet this goal.  
Accomplishing this necessitates definition of the ranges of each policy to be run 
in conjunction. The implementation of each policy has already been established, with the 
notional aircraft CO2 standard occurring in 2016 and an ETS in 2018. Further, the market 
price of allowances under an ETS have been assumed to be $8/ton. Subsequently, 
studying the combined effect of this policy tradeoff at this stage will be accomplished 
through the variation of stringencies for both policy options. For the notional aircraft CO2 
standard, the reduction percent over a “no action” limit line is varied, and for the ETS the 
cap definition is the parameter to be changed. Table 5.3 provides the ranges of the 
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stringency parameters varied in this study. These ranges are based on those established 
previously for each of the policies in isolation.  
Table 5.3: Policy Tradeoff Parameter Definition 
 
Minimum Maximum Relevant Policy 
Reduction % 0% 30% Aircraft CO2 Standard 
Cap 50% 100% Emission Trading Scheme 
 
These ranges on the individual policies are varied through a randomized DoE to 
populate the policy alternative space, which is ultimately filtered for a notional mitigation 
goal of 0.18 Gt-CO2 by 2036. The stringency parameters of each policy can then be 
viewed simultaneously, and effective policy mixes can be identified, as seen in Figure 
5.24. It is readily apparent in this figure that a tradeoff among the policies exists. If a less 
stringent notional aircraft CO2 standard policy is desired, the ETS must be made more 




Figure 5.24: Policy Tradeoff of the Aircraft CO2 Standard and ETS 
Ultimately, it is in the policymaker’s purview as to what specific mix of these 
policies is optimal, but it would likely be an intermediate policy along the policy tradeoff 
curve identified. While the scientist is not able to predict what specific policy mix will be 
selected, the costs for all policy alternatives are stored from the results of the 
experimentation and can be analyzed dynamically. To demonstrate this capability, 
consider the policy mix circled in Figure 5.24 and it is assumed to be a desired policy mix 
to be implemented. This SoPS alternative consists of a notional aircraft CO2 standard 
with a reduction of approximately 7% over the “no action” limit line and an ETS with a 
cap of 75% of the emissions from 2005. Analyzing the costs of this policy mix reveals an 
associated NRC to manufacturers of approximately $60 million and a cumulative cost of 
the ETS on the order of $20 billion to aircraft owners and operators. While this cost is 
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still substantial, it represents a savings of billions of dollars to both of these market actors 
over either policy in isolation. In this way, the inherent tradeoff in this concurrent policy 
alternative space demonstrates the potential for sharing the economic burden of meeting 
environmental goals at a reduced cost to both aircraft manufacturers and 
owners/operators.  
5.5.3.3 The Influence of a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard to Demand Under an 
ETS 
In addition to analyzing the effects of this policy tradeoff in reducing the 
associated costs to market actors included in the U.S. NAS, the interaction of these 
concurrent policies should also be explored. As aforementioned, it has been hypothesized 
that the inclusion of a notional aircraft CO2 standard in the presence of an ETS will lessen 
the effect of demand reduction. In order to test this hypothesis, the emission trading 
scheme studied earlier that is comparable to the EU ETS is implemented in addition to a 
relatively stringent notional aircraft CO2 standard. The specific definitions of parameters 
for each policy are presented below in Table 5.4. It should be noted that the 
implementation dates selected are in a time frame that would be politically and 
technically infeasible; however, the purpose is to understand the combined effects to 
demand of these policies. As such, earlier implementation allows for longer durations of 






Table 5.4: Policy Interaction Definition 
Emission Trading Scheme 
Cap Year 2005 
Cap 95% 
Allowance Price (per ton) $20  
Implementation Date 2014 
Notional Aircraft CO2 Standard 
Reduction % 30% 
Implementation Date 2014 
 
The results on demand growth for this policy mix are compared against those for 
the ETS in isolation. As a reminder, the impacts to demand for this particular ETS have 
been presented previously in Figure 5.17. As expected, in the presence of a notional 
aircraft CO2 standard, the impact to demand of the emission trading scheme is lessened. 
This occurs for all air carriers considered, and to illustrate this effect Figure 5.25 is 
provided. Here, the impact to LCC 3’s demand is presented under an ETS in isolation, 
and with a policy mix. As can be seen, the presence of the notional aircraft CO2 standard 
leads to higher equilibrium demand than under an ETS in isolation. While a similar result 
can be viewed for all air carriers, it is not necessary for the illustration of this effect. 
Subsequently, this hypothesis on the impact to demand under a policy mix has been 




Figure 5.25: Impact to Equilibrium Demand Under Policy Mix 
5.5.3.4 Summary of Concurrent Policy Implementation 
It has been shown here that for an established environmental goal, effective policy 
mixes can be identified at a reduced cost to either policy in isolation. In pursuing these 
effective policy mixes there is an inherent tradeoff among the notional aircraft CO2 
standard and emission trading schemes, and the identification of an optimal policy mix 
would be based on a policy maker’s assessment of the relative burden to be placed on 
aircraft manufacturers and air carriers. While these policy mixes have the ability to more 
fairly distribute the associated costs of meeting environmental objectives, the interaction 
of the two policy options produces effects to equilibrium demand growth. Subsequently, 
understanding the inherent tradeoffs and implications of concurrent policy 
implementation necessitates studying these policies as a SoPS.  
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5.5.4 Quantifying the Effects of Aleatory Uncertainty 
In addition to understanding the potential tradeoffs among multiple concurrently 
implemented policies, the ability to quantify aleatory uncertainty in this framework is 
also desired. This is due to the fact that many uncertainties in the physical SoS cannot be 
reduced through policy implementation, and may have an impact on the policies 
themselves. As such, quantifying the impact of these uncertainties can provide valuable 
insight to policymakers. One example where this is likely the case is in the potential 
volatility of fuel price. While an underlying assumption of $3/gallon has been applied to 
this problem, and is consistent with other analyses, future fuel prices may be substantially 
lower or higher based on factors outside the control of commercial aviation.  
To demonstrate the capability of quantifying the effects of aleatory uncertainty in 
the physical SoS, such as fuel price volatility, the GenPAF policy analysis framework 
will be employed through the mapping of exogenous factors to the specific systems of 
interest within the physical SoS. Doing so for the purpose of studying the impact of fuel 
price changes can be visualized in this framework in Figure 5.26. As can be seen here, 
the fuel price is treated as an exogenous factor, which will impact the recurring cost 
calculations. It’s anticipated that the impact of fuel price volatility will be most 
pronounced in the study of the notional aircraft CO2 standard, where there is a tradeoff in 
the increases in capital costs and reductions in fuel costs. As the fuel price assumption 
changes the relative influence in fuel cost to capital costs will change, and may lead to 
instances where the increases in capital costs outweigh the reductions in fuel costs. It has 
been hypothesized that this will occur at low fuel prices and more stringent notional 
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aircraft CO2 standards, will will be to address the research objectives outlined by RQ4.2, 
which is reproduced below.  
RQ4.2: How can specific forms of aleatory uncertainty be quantified in the 
presence of regulatory policy for commercial aviation? 
 
Figure 5.26: Exploring Aleatory Uncertainty in the GenPAF Framework 
5.5.4.1 The Impact of Fuel Price Volatility  
The main effect of changing the assumed fuel price will be to alter the relative 
influence of fuel costs to the calculation of the recurring direct operating costs outlined in 
4.5.1. As a reminder, at the assumed fuel price of $3/gallon, which is based on previous 
regulatory analyses and estimates from the Energy Information Administration, the 
recurring capital costs and fuel costs accounted for the majority of all DOC, and were of 
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approximately the same magnitude. Changing the fuel price assumption to account for 
fuel price volatility will ultimately change the relative level of the fuel cost. As the fuel 
price is reduced, the relative influence in fuel costs to DOC will also be reduced.  
 While studying the effect of varying fuel price to the benchmarking scenario is 
possible, the main purpose here is to illustrate implications to potential regulatory policy. 
As such, the impact of varying fuel price will be studied here in the presence of  notional 
aircraft CO2 standards. This provides a more interesting case for analysis, as one of the 
main effects of the policy is to increase capital costs, and reduce fuel consumption, thus 
fuel costs. As such, there is an inherent cost tradeoff occurring in the DOC due to this 
standard. While it has been shown that under the current fuel price scenario all potential 
standards lead to a reduction in DOC due to decreases in fuel costs, this result may 
change as the fuel price is varied. In fact, it’s expected that a cost tradeoff will become 
more apparent as the fuel price is reduced, ultimately, reaching a level where increases in 
capital costs outweigh fuel cost savings.  
 In order to demonstrate this, the notional aircraft CO2 standard is considered for 
an implementation in 2014, and a large number of reduction percentages over the “no 
action” limit line are tested based on previously established ranges. This is accomplished 
for four fuel price scenarios of $0.50/gallon, $1/gallon, $3/gallon (default assumption), 
and $4/gallon. The cumulative recurring costs over the course of the simulation are then 
aggregated and compared to the benchmarking scenario aforementioned. This produces a 
measure of cumulative change in recurring costs due to a notional aircraft CO2 standard 
under different fuel price scenarios. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 
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5.27. As previously established, the default fuel price of $3/gallon results in continual 
decreases in recurring costs as the standard becomes more stringent. This is due to the 
fact that at this level of relative fuel costs, the fuel burn savings outweigh the marginal 
increases in capital costs due to the premiums air carriers pay for more efficient vehicles. 
This trend is further exaggerated at higher fuel price scenarios, where the fuel costs 
become more influential. While this is true for the higher fuel prices tested, as the relative 
influence of fuel costs is reduced the trend in recurring cost savings can become quite 
different. As can be seen in the lower fuel price scenarios tested, there tends to be a 
reduction in recurring costs only as the increases in efficiency outweigh the marginal 
increases in capital costs. As the notional aircraft CO2 standard becomes more stringent 
under these scenarios though, the increases in capital costs can become more influential 
than the reductions in fuel cost. While this doesn’t lead to actual recurring cost increases 
for the $1/gallon scenario, under the $0.50/gallon fuel price scenario, a notional aircraft 
CO2 standard with a reduction of 35% or more over the “no action” limit line is shown to 
produce higher recurring costs than the benchmarking scenario. This increase in the 
recurring costs is due to the greater capital costs, and their relative influence in overall 
DOC. Additionally, it should be noted that as with recurring cost savings observed 
earlier, there are discrete jumps in this data. These occur due to the nature of the metric 




Figure 5.27: Change in Recurring Costs Under Different Fuel Price Scenarios 
While the main focus of this research is in the identification of effective policy 
space when multiple policies are implemented concurrently, many of the underlying 
assumptions to this analysis may alter the results of this analysis, as shown here. 
Subsequently, it’s deemed important to demonstrate that the established policy analysis 
framework is capable of quantifying the impacts of aleatory uncertainty within the 
physical SoS. This has been accomplished here through the analysis of the effects of fuel 
price volatility to the overall change in recurring costs to aircraft owners and operators. 
As has been shown, the effect of a substantially lower fuel price may lead to instances 


































where the notional aircraft CO2 standard produces greater recurring costs over the 
benchmarking scenario despite fuel burn savings.  
5.6 Make Decision  
With the ability to concurrently implement both a notional aircraft CO2 standard 
and emission trading schemes, greater insight into the potential implications of effective 
policy mixes can be provided to policy makers in the decision making process. As has 
been explicitly stated, the final decision of an effective policy mix is solely based on the 
applied value systems from policy makers. With that said, the scientist can provide the 
ability to identify a quantitative policy space through inverse design principles. It has 
been predicted that this can be accomplished through Monte Carlo Simulation and 
filtering based on value heuristics established previously.  
In order to address CO2 mitigation policy in commercial aviation, it’s expected 
that likely measures of effectiveness will include CO2 mitigation potential, and the 
economic costs associated with policy implementation. In the case of the notional aircraft 
CO2 standard, the economic viability of policy is measured through the non-recurring 
cost (NRC) incurred to aircraft manufacturers, and for emission trading schemes, the 
associated recurring ETS costs can be used. Further, it is anticipated that the 
identification of effective policy space is also highly influenced by the value systems 
applied using these measures of effectiveness. As such, the assessment of effective policy 
mixes will be dependent on the desires of each individual policymaker to mitigate CO2 or 
reduce economic burdens to aircraft manufacturers and air carriers.  
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While this method will allow policymakers to apply their value systems to 
identify an effective policy space, in the same vein, it will also provide traceable insights 
into the value systems themselves. This is due to the fact that such an approach is 
expected to reveal Pareto frontiers of effective policy space, and the selection of policy 
mixes will highlight the tradeoff among the feasible policy alternatives studied.  As such, 
this approach of applying value systems through filtered Monte Carlo Simulation is 
expected to provide traceability to policymakers’ decisions.  
Ultimately, it’s expected that implementing filtering using the heuristics selected 
will reveal reductions in effective policy space as either greater CO2 mitigation potential 
is desired, or through reduced economic burdens to aircraft manufacturers and air 
carriers. This will be accomplished by demonstrating the use of filtering to identify 
effective policy space, which can be used to uncover policy tipping points. Additionally, 
the use of visualization to communicate the impacts of policy identification will also be 
discussed, as well as the usefulness of this method in the reduction of regulatory state 
uncertainty. Demonstrating these capabilities is expected to address the objectives 
outlined in RQ3, which is reproduced below.  
RQ3: How can this knowledge of a policy tradeoff be used to help meet goals, 
such as those established under the Kyoto Protocol? 
5.6.1 Utilizing Filtering to Show Effective Policy 
As previously stated, the identification of effective policy space can be achieved 
by applying value systems to the policy alternative space being studied. While this would 
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be accomplished by the policymaker, the capability to identify an effective policy space 
will be demonstrated here through the consideration of notional CO2 mitigation goals and 
levels of economic viability. This will be accomplished using the results presented 
previously for the two policy options. Following this demonstration, a more thorough mix 
of these policies will be analyzed by generating an expansion of the policy alternative 
space using concurrent policy implementation in the GenPAF framework. Filtering 
principles will then be used on the policy alternative space to demonstrate the ability to 
identify effective policy mixes that can be considered feasible candidates for “baskets of 
measures” to address CO2 mitigation in the U.S. NAS.  
5.6.1.1 The Aircraft CO2 Standard 
A number of potential notional aircraft CO2 standards have been run in isolation 
based on the inputs provided in Table 5.1, and the resulting CO2 mitigation potential has 
been presented in Figure 5.12. Further analysis of the policy alternative space for this 
policy option can be accomplished by considering the application of value systems 
through filtering. To demonstrate this capability, consider a notional scenario in which a 
policymaker desires an overall CO2 mitigation potential of 0.15 Gt-CO2 by the year 2036. 
This value system can be reflected in the provided results by filtering the policy 
alternative space to an effective policy space where only policies resulting in at least 0.15 
Gt-CO2 or greater are observed, as is the case in Figure 5.28.  As evident, this particular 
value system results in the requirement of a notional aircraft CO2 standard with a 
minimum reduction of 25% below the “no action” limit line. Additionally, the impact to 
272 
 
implementation date can also be observed, and it becomes apparent that the later the 
standard is put in place the more stringent it will have to be to meet this goal.  
 
Figure 5.28: Assessment of a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standards to Achieve 0.15 Gt-
CO2 Mitigation 
 In addition to applying values on the environmental aspects of the problem, the 
policymaker may also choose to express their value system through economic 
considerations, such as the non-recurring cost (NRC) incurred to aircraft manufacturers. 
If it is determined by the policymaker that a NRC greater than $60 billion may over-
burden aircraft manufacturers, this consideration can also be included as a part of the 
applied value system. Doing so for the notional aircraft CO2 standard studied here results 
in a maximum reduction over the “no action” stringency limit line of approximately 35%, 
as seen in Figure 5.29. Given this applied value system to both the environmental and 
economic considerations of the problem, the effective policy space is greatly reduced 
from the policy alternative space presented earlier. Further, it can be seen that this value 
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system requires the implementation of a notional aircraft CO2 standard before 2023, with 
very few policy options available the later the standard is implemented. If this notional 
value system is reflective of the actual value system of policymakers, it becomes quite 
clear that waiting until 2023 to pass a standard will not produce the desired results. The 
power of this approach is that any policy maker value system can be implemented and the 
options to achieve that value are readily obtained. 
 
Figure 5.29: Assessment of a Notional Aircraft CO2 Standards to Achieve 0.15 Gt-
CO2 at an NRC Less Than $60 billion 
As a result of this applied value system to the experiments performed for the 
notional aircraft CO2 standard in isolation, it can be seen that effective policies will likely 
have an aggressive stringency level and be implemented prior to 2023. Further, the more 
rapidly the standard can be implemented, the less stringent it needs to be to meet the 
environmental goals established herein. Subsequently, this analysis points out the need 
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for a response in the coming years in order for the standard to be effective based on the 
applied value system.  
5.6.1.2 Emission Trading Schemes 
As with the notional aircraft CO2 standard in isolation, the results presented 
previously for emission trading schemes can also be used to study the effects of applied 
value systems. This is done for the experiments performed based on the ranges presented 
in Table 5.2. The results of these experiments to the overall mitigation of CO2 have also 
been presented previously in Figure 5.19. It should be noted here that for this 
demonstration of the application of value systems to the policy in question, the market 
price of allowances is varied within the ranges provided by literature. Due to the fact that 
this market price was the dominant factor in overall CO2 mitigation potential, it’s 
expected that applying value systems on the environmental goals will primarily impact 
the necessary market price of allowances. Additionally, as has been noted previously, the 
CO2 mitigation potential of the emission trading schemes studied tended to be much 
greater than for the notional aircraft CO2 standard, thus, it’s expected that policymakers 
would likely desire greater reductions in CO2 given the implementation of an ETS.  
To demonstrate the impact to the ETS studied in isolation, consider the notional 
desire of a policymaker to be the mitigation of 1 Gt-CO2 by the year 2036. Application of 
this value system can be accomplished through filtering as was done previously, and the 
resulting effective ETS policy alternatives can be visualized in Figure 5.30. As can be 
seen, achieving the value system of the policymaker with an ETS would necessitate a 
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market price of allowances of at least $40 per ton-CO2. Further, this goal can only be 
achieved if an ETS is implemented by 2020, and the later the implementation date the 
higher the necessary allowance price would need to be.   
 
Figure 5.30: Effective Emission Trading Schemes to Achieve 1 Gt-CO2 Mitigation 
In analyzing the impact of these applied value systems to the two policy options 
previously studied, some general trends are readily apparent. For a desired reduction in 
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overall CO2 emissions, policies implemented sooner can be less stringent, while those 
planned for implementation further into the future will have to be more stringent to 
achieve the same desired mitigation values in the forecasted period. Further, it’s quite 
apparent that the impact of applying both environmental and economic desires is the 
reduction in effective policy space, as hypothesized. Finally, it has also been shown that 
by applying the value systems in this way, many dates of implementation can be seen to 
be infeasible, which is an important consideration for policymakers.  
5.6.1.3 Identifying Effective Policy Space Under Concurrent Policy 
Implementation 
In addition to analyzing the implications of applied value systems to the policies 
considered in isolation, the two policy options implemented concurrently can be analyzed 
for effective policy mixes. The ability to implement these policies concurrently in the 
GenPAF policy analysis framework has been previously demonstrated, and will be used 
here to populate the policy alternative space. Doing so requires definition of the ranges 
used, as well as the DoE to populate the policy alternative space.  
In order to remove the effect of allowance market price from the ETS, a singular 
market price is selected within the ranges identified from literature. For this study, it’s 
assumed that allowances can be purchased on the market for $20 per ton-CO2, and would 
be auctioned at $10 per ton-CO2 under the cap. Further, due to the combinatorial nature 
of including multiple implementation dates on multiple policies, only a subset of dates 
are applied. For this study, the likely dates of implementation of the notional aircraft CO2 
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standard are included, 2017 and 2023, as well as 2014 to demonstrate the mitigation 
potential given immediate implementation of the standards. Due to the fact that the 
implementation date is a discrete input to the problem, a full factorial of these dates is run 
for the two policies. Given these assumptions, the cap for the ETS, and reduction over the 
“no action” limit line for the Aircraft CO2 standard can also be varied. The ranges for 
these continuous parameters are provided in Table 5.5, and a central composite design 
supplemented with Latin Hypercube and randomized points are generated to populate the 
space. It should be noted that the ranges selected to populate this policy alternative space 
have been selected based on the previous studies of the two policy options in isolation.  
Table 5.5: DoE Ranges for Concurrent Policy Implementation 
 
Minimum Maximum Relevant Policy 
Reduction % 0% 40% Aircraft CO2 Standard 
Cap 50% 100% Emission Trading Scheme 
 
The resulting policy alternative space can be visualized in Figure 5.31. As can be 
seen, the alternative space is well covered for all applicable years for both policies. 
Subsequently, it is assumed that these experiments will provide the necessary information 




Figure 5.31: Concurrent Policy Alternative Space 
With the policy alternative space fully populated through Monte Carlo 
Simulation, the application of value systems can be considered. As was the case for the 
policies in isolation, this is achieved through filtering of the policy alternative space. For 
this notional example, consider a scenario where the policymaker desires an overall 
reduction in CO2 of at least 0.7 Gt by the year 2036. Filtering all infeasible policies from 
the alternative space shown above, results in an effective policy alternative space 
provided in Figure 5.32. As can be observed, this environmental goal produces little 
impact on the implementation date or overall stringency of the notional aircraft CO2 
standard, however, it demonstrates that an emission trading scheme would need to be 
implemented by 2017. The fact that greater mitigation potential can be achieved by an 





Figure 5.32: Effective Policy Mixes to Achieve 0.7 Gt-CO2 Mitigation 
One of the main benefits to this approach is that the value systems can be 
dynamically changed, and the resulting effective policy space can be visualized in real 
time. As such, if the policymaker were to decide based on the previous results that greater 
mitigation potential is possible, they may increase their desired reduction. In this case, 
consider the desired mitigation potential is increased to 1.1 Gt-CO2 by 2036. The 
resulting effective policy space is further reduced as presented in Figure 5.33. As can be 
seen, as the desire for greater reductions in emissions is placed on the policy alternative 
space, the need for ETS implemented immediately becomes clear, and more stringent 




Figure 5.33: Effective Policy Mixes to Achieve 1.1 Gt-CO2 Mitigation 
The reduced effective policy space can also be visualized as a tradeoff between 
the two policy options, as discussed in 5.5.3.2. For the effective policy space based on the 
value system applied here, this can be accomplished as in Figure 5.34. Here, in addition 
to filtering based on the environmental goals established by the policymakers, the costs 
associated with the policy mix can also be analyzed. This is accomplished for the NRC to 
aircraft manufacturers through the size of the dots, and for the ETS related cost through 
the color scheme described. In order to pick the most cost-effective policy to achieve the 
stated CO2 mitigation goals, it’s desired that the policy mix selected be represented by a 
small blue dot. In this way, the tradeoff in costs to aircraft manufacturers and air carriers 
can be made readily apparent to the policymaker.  


























Figure 5.34: Effective Policy Mix Tradeoff 
5.6.2 Demonstrating Policy Tipping Points 
One of the most valuable insights that can be gathered from this filtering approach 
as the absolute measure of a heuristic is varied, is the identification of policy tipping 
points. Policy tipping points can be classified as the applied value systems that eliminate 
effective policy space that may be desired by policymakers. This situation is quite 
apparent considering the desired implementation dates of effective policy, both in 
isolation and as a policy mix.  
As an example, consider the value system applied to the notional aircraft CO2 
standard in 5.6.1.1. It has been expressed in literature regarding these efficiency standards 
that potential dates of implementation may occur in 2017 or 2023 [119]. As such, it is 


























However, if the notional value system applied to the problem previously is reflective of 
the actual value systems of the policymakers, there would be no feasible policy 
alternatives available for implementation in 2023. In this way, the desires expressed by 
the notional policymaker in terms of CO2 mitigation potential and viable non-recurring 
costs (NRC) imposed to manufacturers creates a policy tipping point that excludes 
implementation in 2023. As such, this analysis can illustrate the need for more immediate 
action in the 2017 timeframe.  
Ultimately, the heuristics used as the measurable parameters for the applied value 
systems can be varied to more fully understand the tipping points of the regulatory 
policies in question. The advantage of this approach, filtered Monte Carlo Simulation, is 
that this analysis of policy tipping points can be completed dynamically and shown in 
real time with policymakers present. In this way, this proposed method for policy 
analysis represents a contribution to concurrent policy analysis that has not yet been 
demonstrated in the literature.   
5.6.3 Utilizing Results to Discuss Regulatory State Uncertainty 
As discussed previously in Chapter 2.5.1, regulatory state uncertainty is the 
uncertainty associated with the level and extent of regulatory policy implementation in 
the future. The case has been made that reducing the regulatory state uncertainty of 
policy mixes will inherently mitigate the impacts of regulatory effect and response 
uncertainty, as it is a precursor to both of these forms of uncertainty. As such, the 
regulatory state uncertainty of the systems of policies in question can be treated as a form 
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of epistemic uncertainty due to the potential for reduction in the existence of greater 
knowledge. Further, it has been posited that this form of epistemic uncertainty can be 
quantified through the relative size of effective policy space. As effective policy space is 
reduced, this form of uncertainty will also be reduced. This will be demonstrated 
considering the identification of effective policy space for the Aircraft CO2 Standard. The 
purpose of doing so will be to address RQ4.1, which is reproduced below.  
RQ4.1: How can regulatory state uncertainty be reduced in the context of policy 
implementation? 
5.6.3.1 Regulatory State Uncertainty in the Context of Current Policy Analysis 
As has been discussed throughout this document, the final state of policy is often 
unclear to regulated entities until the passing of the final standard. This is largely due to 
the political nature of policymaking, and the lack of a standardized framework on which 
to illustrate potential effective policy space with multiple policies implemented. As 
shown utilizing literature for the notional aircraft CO2 standard, there is an indication of 
how the standard will be measured, but there is limited information regarding the final 
state of the standard. Subsequently, there is a great deal of uncertainty for aircraft 
manufacturers in the coming years regarding fuel efficiency regulations. This may 
produce instances of waiting to release new technologies until after the standard is 
established, in order to ensure their products will be available for purchase. Such delays, 
may create increased expenses for manufacturers, and will certainly result in delays in the 
release of more efficient vehicles.  
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5.6.3.2 Assessing Regulatory State Uncertainty in the Integrated Policy Analysis 
Process 
Despite this limitation in current policy analyses, the methodology for the 
integrated policy assessment techniques developed here allows for the determination of 
effective future policy states given applied value systems from policymakers. As an 
example of this capability, consider the notional aircraft CO2 standards examined in 
5.6.1.1, where the initial applied value system was based on a desired mitigation potential 
of 0.15 Gt-CO2 by 2036. The application of this value system under the policy analysis 
framework established can be accomplished very early in the policy design process, and 
produces a more limited set of future policy states illustrated in Figure 5.28. This 
effective policy space can be easily conveyed to aircraft manufacturers, providing them 
with information regarding the full definition of feasible standards. Ultimately, this 
would allow manufacturers to bound the needed improvements in their products as more 
information and greater definition becomes available throughout the policy analysis 
process.  
Further, as other values are added to the applied value system, such as a 
determination of maximum economic burden to aircraft manufacturers, the effective 
policy space is reduced, as seen in Figure 5.29. Subsequently, as the applied value system 
becomes more defined, so does the effective policy space. As such, the addition of 
alternative criteria, as well as increases in policy makers desires, has been shown to lead 
to reductions in the effective policy space. These reductions in effective policy space 
equate to a more limited set of future policy states, which provides useful information to 
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the regulated entities. Ultimately, this information, which is not typically produced under 
current cost-effectiveness approaches, produces greater information on the feasible 
regulatory states being considered. As such, it can allow entities, such as the aircraft 
manufacturers for the notional aircraft CO2 standard, to plan accordingly for the expected 
standards in terms of both stringency and implementation timeframe. Subsequently, it 
stands to reason that the policy support process developed here inherently provides for 
the ability to identify and reduce the regulatory state uncertainty of the policies in 
question. This has been demonstrated implicitly through the analysis provided here, and 
is now explicitly stated.  
5.6.4 Summary of Contributions to the Identification of Effective 
Policy Space 
Ultimately, the purpose of developing this integrated policy support process is for 
the systematic and quantitative identification of effective policy space considering 
multiple interacting policies earlier in the policy analysis and design process. It has been 
demonstrated that the policy analysis framework implemented for the study of these 
policies adequately captures the main effects in the U.S. NAS, as well as their interaction 
as a system-of-policy-systems (SoPS). Further, the ability to quantitatively capture the 
effects of aleatory uncertainty in the physical SoS has been demonstrated, and the 
potential for reducing regulatory state uncertainty has also been discussed.  
The primary advantage of the methodology employed here is that it formalizes a 
process for the study of multiple policies impacting a SoS concurrently, which provides 
286 
 
more information to policymakers earlier in the policy design process. Further, due to the 
systematic nature of this process, it provides traceability to the policy decisions made by 
policymakers, and ensures objectivity of the scientist providing policy analysis.  
In the most general sense, it allows the scientist to fully populate the policy 
alternative space in an objective manner, so that the policymaker can subjectively apply 
value systems, going from policy alternative space (Figure 5.35) to effective policy space 
(Figure 5.36).  
 









CHAPTER  6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As concern over the release of anthropogenic greenhouse gases continues to grow 
throughout the world, so too will our reliance on regulatory policy to induce behavioral 
and technological changes that can ensure the sustainability of our activities. This fact is 
well recognized in the global aviation community, and has led organizations such as 
ICAO to call on world member states to begin to address the climate change concerns 
associated with aviation through the identification and selections of baskets of policy 
measures. While this proactive approach to create binding policy agreements throughout 
the world is a promising sign of a strong commitment to create sustainable behaviors in 
aviation, there has been little guidance on how each member state should determine their 
respective baskets of measures. Further, there has been no established framework on 
which to evaluate and bring transparency to the submitted National Allocation Plans, and 
as a result, it is unclear whether the submitted regulatory policy measures will meet the 
goals for each region. This has ultimately created an atmosphere of ad-hoc policy 
decision making in the context of a highly complex system-of-systems (SoS), where 
policy is typically pursued one at a time even if there are known policy interactions.  
In order to address the inevitable shortcomings associated with this web of 
policymaking in a complex SoS, a top down integrated policy support process has been 
formalized based on research in the product and process design fields. This integrated 
policy support process provides the ability to systematically analyze multiple 
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concurrently implemented policies in a holistic manner. It has been shown that 
concurrent policy analysis must be done in the context of the air transportation SoS 
holistically, as the policy implications are not additive and may have secondary effects on 
one another. Further, this formalized process brings traceability to the policy decisions 
and assumptions used to reach those decisions. Finally, the primary contribution of this 
research is the ability to identify and visualize areas of effective policy space. This policy 
support process can be visualized as shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1: Integrated Policy Support Process 
As can be seen in the representation of the integrated policy support process, this 
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established systems engineering methods with developed policy analysis methods. These 
policy analysis methods are ultimately based on existing literature within the regulatory 
policy field, however, significant modification has been necessary to enable their use in 
the context of complex SoS problems, such as that posed by commercial aviation. The 
main contributions in the policy analysis field established by this research are the 
development of a lexicon that can be used to describe policy in the context of SoS, or as 
has been termed here, system-of-policy-systems (SoPS). Additionally, applicable policy 
analysis frameworks have been researched and modified for their inclusion in the study 
of multiple regulatory policies that are planned to be concurrently implemented in a 
physical SoS. This expanded policy analysis framework is largely based on prior research 
and has evolved herein as the GenPAF policy analysis framework. It has been shown to 
be sufficient in regards to concurrent policy implementation, and has been tested using a 
notional aircraft CO2 standard and potential emission trading schemes in the U.S. NAS as 
a test case. The full implementation of these policies in the established policy analysis 
framework can be viewed in Figure 6.2. Based on the work presented in this document, 
it’s expected that this policy analysis framework will be useful for expanded policy 
studies including other relevant GHG mitigation measures and also noise. Further, it’s 
also expected that this framework can be applied to other industries throughout the world, 




Figure 6.2: Visualization of the GenPAF Policy Analysis Framework 
Ultimately, what has been demonstrated by the work presented in this dissertation 
is that areas of effective policy space can be identified through the application of value 
systems on policy alternative space. By providing a systematic method for populating and 
down selecting the policy alternative space the objectivity of the scientist can be 
maintained. Further, insights regarding the value systems of policymakers can be made 
readily apparent through the visualization of the policy mix selected in the context of the 
effective policy space. It is anticipated that this methodology, or something similar, can 
help formalize policymaking for organizations like ICAO, as well as other regulatory 
bodies throughout the world.   
6.1 Summary of Contributions 
In addition to providing the ability to identify effective policy space, the research 
conducted for this dissertation also provided a number of contributions to policymaking 
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for commercial aviation and beyond. These contributions to the regulatory policy and 
civil aviation fields are a result of the research objectives outlined in this document. As a 
reminder, there were four main research objectives, which include:  
1. Quantitatively assessing regulatory policy in the context of an 
acknowledged system-of-systems (SoS).  
2. Demonstrating the ability to assess the concurrent implementation of 
multiple policies throughout a SoS. 
3. Objective identification of effective policy space.  
4. Reducing the regulatory uncertainty, and quantifying other forms of 
aleatory uncertainty in the presence of multiple regulatory policies.  
For each of these research objectives, associated research questions and 
hypotheses have been provided. Further, the results of attempting to answer these 
research questions have been identified through experimentation of a notional aircraft 
CO2 standard and emissions trading schemes in the U.S. NAS. To provide a summary for 
the reader, the research questions and corresponding findings will be reintroduced here.  
In order to provide an understanding of the main effects of the two policy options 
considered, the ability to quantitatively assess these policies in the context of the U.S. 
NAS was ultimately desired. This has been accomplished through the implementation of 
a cost-effectiveness model of the U.S. NAS, and specific policy implications have been 
mapped using the XPIROV policy analysis framework. The details regarding the 
implementation of these policies can be found in Chapter  4 and Chapter  5 of this 
document. These research efforts are aimed at addressing the first research objective, and 
as such the following research question was originally posed.  
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 RQ1: What are the impacts to the U.S. NAS of a new certification standard or a 
trading scheme in isolation? 
Through detailed analysis of the implementation of these policies in isolation, the 
primary effects of each have been identified. It has been shown that the notional aircraft 
CO2 standard primarily affects the efficiency of individual aircraft available to air 
carriers, and thus the fleet efficiency can be improved. As a result, these standards 
produce quantifiable reductions in CO2 emissions without impacting demand. Despite the 
mitigation potential of such measures, they have been shown to be unable to stabilize 
emissions, and can ultimately result in large non-recurring costs to aircraft manufacturers 
that may not be economically viable.  The implementation of emission trading schemes 
have also been shown to induce reductions in CO2 emissions, although from a different 
mechanism than the notional aircraft CO2 standard. The ETS tends to create a real price 
for CO2, which is passed onto consumers, thereby reducing demand. It has been shown 
that the ETS produces new equilibrium demand values, and that there may be 
disproportionate effects based on air carrier types (ie. low cost carriers or legacy carriers). 
Additionally, it has been shown that these ETS create induced costs to air carriers that 
can be in the billions of dollars depending on the market price of emissions allowances, 
however, they have no measurable impact on aircraft manufacturers when implemented 
in isolation. Finally, the exploration of these policies in isolation also revealed that ETS 
have greater CO2 mitigation potential than a notional aircraft CO2 standard depending on 
the level of costs incurred.  
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With an understanding of the main effects of each of these policies in isolation, it 
was then desired to understand the impact of concurrent implementation of these policies 
as a notional basket of measures. This has been deemed necessary due to the fact these 
baskets of measures are meant to be a whole that is greater than each policy in isolation. 
As such, policy mixes consisting of the notional aircraft CO2 standard and emission 
trading schemes have been tested concurrently in the U.S. NAS in order to address the 
second research objective. More detailed considerations regarding the concurrent 
implementation of multiple policies in the U.S. NAS is provided in Chapter  5 of this 
document. Conducting this research was ultimately aimed at addressing RQ2, which is 
reproduced below.  
RQ2: How will the combined effect of these policies differ from their 
implementation in isolation? 
It has been shown that the implementation of multiple policies concurrently in the 
U.S. NAS can be accomplished through the utilization of the expanded GenPAF policy 
analysis framework. The results of this implementation show that there are secondary 
effects that produce interaction between the two policy options that would not be evident 
if the policies were to be considered in isolation. The primary interaction of these policies 
stems from the ability of the notional aircraft CO2 standard to improve the efficiency of 
fleets operating in the U.S. NAS, which lessens the impact to consumer demand 
reduction impact of potential emission trading schemes. It was shown that this impact to 
demand in the presence of multiple policies can be quantified and compared against 
emission trading scheme policies in isolation. Further, it has been shown that through the 
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concurrent implementation of these policies it is possible to achieve CO2 mitigation in a 
more fair and balanced way economically than through either policy in isolation. This is 
due to the fact that these policies impact different market actors in the U.S. NAS, and the 
concurrent implementation of them produces more distributed policy induced costs than 
considering either in isolation. 
Given the ability to implement these policies concurrently, and an understanding 
of the inherent tradeoffs in doing so, the ability to use this analysis for the objective 
identification of effective policy space was ultimately desired. This third research 
objective is the primary contribution of this dissertation, and is viewed as a unique 
contribution to policy analysis and design.  In order to address this research objective, 
systems engineering methods are employed to fully populate the policy alternative space, 
and the expanded GenPAF policy analysis framework is employed for experimentation. 
The results of these experiments are then filtered to produce estimates of effective policy 
space, which is shown to be a novel approach to cost-effectiveness analysis. For a more 
detailed discussion regarding the implementation and identification of effective policy 
space, the reader is referred to Chapter  5 of this document. Ultimately, the purpose of 
conducting this research was meant to address RQ3, which is reproduced below.  
RQ3: How can this knowledge of a policy tradeoff be used to help meet goals, 
such as those established under the Kyoto Protocol? 
The results of populating the policy alternative space through Monte Carlo 
Simulation and filtering to identify areas of effective policy space reveals the inherent 
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tradeoffs that occur due to desires for environmental and economic sustainability. It has 
been shown that identifying areas of effective policy space in this manner provides policy 
makers with the ability to dynamically change their desires to see the impacts to effective 
policy mixes in real time. This provides greater insights into policy tipping points, and 
the inherent tradeoffs of the policies themselves. Further, the final policy mix selected by 
policy makers can be visualized in the context of all other effective policies to provide 
greater insights regarding the applied value systems of the policy makers. This level of 
traceability for policy analysis and design is entirely unique to this policy support 
process, and is anticipated to be the greatest contribution of this work.  
Finally, due to the fact that we live in an uncertain world, and there are deep 
uncertainties associated with the policies themselves, it was desired to be able to quantify 
and potentially reduce the forms of uncertainty present in this problem. As identified in 
Chapter  2 of this document, the primary forms of uncertainty inherent to this type of 
problem are the regulatory uncertainties associated with the policies, as well as the 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties associated with the physical SoS. It has been argued 
that the regulatory uncertainty associated with these policy mixes can be reduced through 
quantification and reduction of the regulatory state uncertainty, which is measured 
through identification of effective policy space. Further, it has also been shown that 
quantifying the effects of aleatory uncertainty can be accomplished through the expanded 
GenPAF policy analysis, and is demonstrated through considerations of fuel price 
volatility in the context of potential notional aircraft CO2 standards. A more complete 
discussion regarding the assessment of these forms of uncertainty is provided in Chapter  
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5 of this document. Due to the fact that the regulatory uncertainties associated with 
policy, and aleatory uncertainties inherent in the physical SoS are unique, two separate 
research questions were posed, and are reproduced below.  
RQ4.1: How can regulatory state uncertainty be reduced in the context of 
concurrent policy implementation? 
RQ4.2: How can specific forms of aleatory uncertainty be quantified in the 
presence of regulatory policy for commercial aviation? 
In conducting this research, it has been shown that the regulatory state uncertainty 
of these policy mixes can be quantified and bounded through the identification of 
effective policy space. The area of effective policy space provides a good indication of 
likely policies to be implemented and, as such, gives a good representation of the possible 
future regulatory state. Further, it has also been demonstrated that the regulatory state 
uncertainty can be reduced as effective policy space is reduced. This is typically 
accomplished through the application of value systems to the problem, and further 
reductions can occur in the presence of greater desires for CO2 reduction or reduced 
economic impacts to aircraft manufacturers and air carriers.  
In addition to addressing the regulatory uncertainties of the policies themselves, 
the GenPAF policy analysis framework has been demonstrated to be capable of 
quantifying the effects of aleatory uncertainty inherent in the physical SoS. This is 
accomplished in this research through analysis of fuel price volatility in the presence of 
notional aircraft CO2 standards. It has been shown that the impact of changing fuel price 
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has the potential to alter the relative contribution of fuel cost to overall direct operating 
costs for air carriers. In the presence of notional aircraft CO2 standards, this effect can 
alter the overall direct operating costs due to the relative change in increasing capital 
costs and reduced fuel costs. As has been shown, at the assumed fuel price of $3/gallon, 
all potential sttringency options tested result in a reduction of the recurring costs for air 
carriers as fuel cost savings outpace increases in capital costs. However, this result is 
dependent on the assumed fuel price, and much lower fuel prices reveal the potential for 
increased capital costs to outpace reductions in fuel costs. Quantifying this variability is 
deemed important for a complete understanding of the policy implications, and has been 
successfully demonstrated in this document.   
Ultimately, the integrated policy support process pictured in Figure 6.1 has 
provided the ability to address each of these research objectives and associated research 
questions. As such, it is anticipated that this formalized process for policy alternative 
space generation and effective policy space identification can play a crucial role in the 
systematic identification of effective baskets of measures for CO2 mitigation policy in 
civil aviation throughout the world.  
6.2 Future Work 
As with any problem of this magnitude, there are a number of avenues upon 
which this research can be expanded and improved. Discussing all possible areas of 
improvement and expansion is obviously prohibitive, however, there are a number of 
improvements and additional studies possible in the framework developed that will likely 
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lead to greater insights regarding concurrent policy implementation. The most influential 
areas of future work, as anticipated by the author, will be discussed briefly here.  
6.2.1 Expansion of the Cost-Effectiveness Environment of the U.S. 
NAS 
The most obvious, and potentially relevant, area of improvement for this type of 
policy analysis is in the expansion of the simulation environment developed for the U.S. 
NAS. As has been stated in Chapter  4, only a subset of the air carriers operating in the 
U.S. are represented in the developed simulation environment. As such, it is currently not 
possible to assess the impacts to smaller air carriers that may implement much different 
organizational strategies than the large carriers considered. Including smaller air carriers 
can be accomplished through a similar methodology employed for the large air carriers 
considered.  
Further, only aircraft specific to the air carriers included are represented in the 
current modeling environment. This reduced set of aircraft provided ease of 
implementation, but is not representative of the entire aircraft fleet that exists. As such, 
the aircraft included in the simulation environment can be expanded through estimates 
provided by other aircraft level simulation environments. This expansion of available 
aircraft would likely provide greater insights into more specific implications of the 
notional aircraft CO2 standard. Additionally, a consideration should be given to the 




Finally, it should be noted that the only emissions species included in this study is 
the CO2 resulting from aircraft fuel consumption. Due to the fact that the baskets of 
measures identified through the process are meant to holistically address the 
environmental concerns of civil aviation, it seems relevant to include considerations of 
other emissions, such as NOx, and also noise. This can be accomplished by establishing 
surrogate models for other emissions species and noise and then utilizing them directly in 
the modeling environment to produce estimates of fleet emissions and population 
exposure to different noise levels. The process by which the vehicle level surrogates can 
be mapped to fleet and global effects would likely be similar to that employed for fuel 
burn estimation. Whereas the noise assessment would require a different approach, for 
which other research has been conducted to reduce computational time for assessments 
similar to those conducted herein. 
6.2.2 Improved Technology and Cost Forecasting at the Aircraft 
Level 
In addition to expanding the considerations of the simulation environment, there 
are also a number of improvements that can be made to the existing modules discussed 
throughout Chapter  4. The most influential improvements would likely come from 
further research regarding technology and cost forecasting. As aforementioned, all 
aircraft technology forecasting was inherently normative, and no specific technologies 
have been considered. As such, the application of the value systems are based on gross 
estimates of technical feasibility and economic viability in the absence of bottom up 
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technology forecasting. This can be improved through the consideration of specific 
technologies in the future to bound the technical feasibility of a future aircraft CO2 
standard. There is a great deal of research regarding technologies and their impacts at a 
vehicle level from organizations, such as IATA, that can be used for this purpose.  
Further, both the non-recurring cost incurred by aircraft manufacturers and 
vehicle price are estimated based on normative forecasting through the notional aircraft 
CO2 standard. While research has provided estimates for these costs used in the 
development of cost estimating relationships, there is a lack of realism inherent in these 
estimating techniques for a number of reasons. For the non-recurring cost estimates, this 
is largely due to the fact that no specific technologies are considered. As such, these 
estimates can likely be improved through greater understanding of future technology 
packages. Estimates for vehicle price can be improved through additional considerations 
not included in the developed simulation environment. While price is market driven, 
factors such as production quantity and schedule should also be considered in 
determining price, as well as the associated cost to aircraft manufacturers, which is 
currently not linked.  
6.2.3 Inclusion of Other Relevant CO2 Mitigation Policies 
While the policy support process has been demonstrated using the notional 
aircraft CO2 standard and emission trading schemes in the U.S. NAS, there are a number 
of other policies relevant to CO2 mitigation that could also be included. These have been 
discussed at a high level in Chapter  2 of this document. Typically, they would fall into 
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other command and control or market based approaches to CO2 mitigation. The most 
relevant policies however, would likely be environmental levies in the form of fuel taxes. 
While not explored here, these fuel taxes would likely induce behavioral changes similar 
to emission trading schemes. Further, their implementation would be quite similar to 
emission trading schemes in terms of consumer demand considerations, and as such, 
implementation of such modules could occur with less development than other policies. 
Finally, considering environmental levies may also provide insights regarding the 
robustness of different policy mechanisms aimed at reducing consumer demand. While 
no research is provided to support this claim, it is believed that the variability of 
environmental levies would be less than for ETS due to a more strict control of fees, 
whereas emission trading scheme impacts have been shown to be highly dependent on 
the market price of emissions allowances, which can be quite volatile.  
6.2.4 Implementation of Policy Phasing 
Finally, due to the fact that the purpose of this dissertation was to demonstrate the 
ability to identify effective policy space in the presence of multiple policies for a complex 
SoS, only static policies have been considered. This means that for all of the experiments 
analyzed a single policy is implemented, and no updates are considered throughout the 
simulation. While this method of employment was effective at addressing the motivation 
of this dissertation, it is quite divergent from the reality of policy making. As has been 
stated, CAEP works on alternating 3 year cycles, and policies in place are continually 
updated. As such, an interesting consideration that is not accounted for in this dissertation 
is the implications of policy phasing. Here policy phasing is taken to mean the 
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implementation and updating of policy throughout time. It’s unclear what the effects of 
effective phasing of policy may look like, but such approaches may produce behaviors 
that do stabilize emissions, which were not seen in this work. In a sense, the study of 
effective phasing strategies for policies such as the notional aircraft CO2 standard and 
emission trading schemes may serve as the basis for other dissertations in the future.  
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APPENDIX A  
CAFE STANDARDS 
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles and 
light trucks in the U.S. have provided a real world experiment exuding the benefits and 
challenges of this type of policy mechanism. Some basic insights from the results of these 
standards will be briefly discussed here, in order to provide context for discussions on 
command and control policy for commercial aviation. 
Impacts of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards 
Eight years after the CAFE standards went into effect, fuel consumption per 
vehicle had dropped by 20%; a stunning and rapid energy policy and climate change 
success [191].  U.S. national gasoline consumption dropped overall, despite an increasing 
number of total vehicles on the road.  Only after 1992, as the average length of a 
vehicular drive went up, and while more cars were added to the road, did overall fuel 
efficiency decline [191]. In large part, this is due to an overall trend throughout the life of 
CAFE standards through which they have become less binding on new vehicle attributes 
[192]. From 1975 to 1980 the effect of CAFE standards and efficiency technologies was 
to increase fuel economy by 4.2 mpg (55% of total fuel economy change), with weight 
reductions contributing another 3.5 mpg (45% of total fuel economy change) to the 
increase in fuel economy [192]. However, during the period from 1980 to 1987, 
efficiency technologies for cars were almost entirely responsible for fleet fuel economy 
increases. This period coincides with the widespread deployment of the automatic 
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transmission, torque converter lock-up, port fuel injection, and front-wheel drive 
technologies [192]. These advances that led to an “all-efficiency” approach toward fuel 
economy signify that either automobile manufacturers and suppliers had the research and 
lead time to ramp up production of new drive train technologies, or that consumers’ 
appetite for smaller vehicles had diminished with lower fuel prices and therefore 
manufacturers had no choice other than to meet CAFE standards via efficiency 
technologies [192]. Despite this early trend of increasing fuel economy, since 1985 the 
fuel economy of light-duty vehicles has not increased, and in recent years has actually 
been on the decline as consumers are overwhelmingly favoring greater performance and 
increased weight over fuel savings [193]. The more recent period in CAFE standards 
history represents a period with comparatively little movement in the standards and fuel 
economy, as can be readily observed in Figure A.1 below [192].  
At the time of its passage, the CAFE regulations faced criticism for causing 
economic harm to domestic automobile manufacturers, but a 2002 National Research 
Council report found little evidence of such [30].  However, the rising tide of miles 
traveled per drive ultimately overwhelmed the benefits of an improved standard; as total 
vehicular miles traveled in the United States “increased by almost 700 million miles, or 
25 percent, during the 1990s [194].” Additionally, the standards were never kept updated 
to match technical advances in vehicle performance – advances that allowed for quicker 
acceleration, and higher maximum vehicle speeds, and as a result, efficiency gains were 
used to satisfy customer desires over enhanced fuel economy. It has only been in recent 
years that the EPA has been challenged by President Barak Obama to update the 
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standards and once again enforce more binding regulations on automobile manufacturers 
[195].  
 
Figure A.1: Fuel Economy and Other Attributes for Light-Duty Vehicles, 1975-
2004: (a and c) passenger cars and (b and d) light trucks [192] 
Despite the relative stagnation of vehicle fuel economy in both passenger cars and 
light-duty trucks, vehicle fuel efficiency has been continually rising since the 
implementation of CAFE standards, as is observed in Figure A.1 above. As such, it is 
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important to keep in mind the distinction between fuel efficiency and fuel economy. To 
illustrate this distinction Figure A.2 is provided below, where it is shown that fuel 
efficiency can be applied to a number of vehicle performance attributes including fuel 
economy. However, as consumers of automobiles exert their desire for increased 
performance and safety, and as CAFE standards become less binding, manufacturers 
have become more likely to apply fuel efficiency gains to meet customer demand over 
improved fuel economy. Subsequently, it has become quite apparent in our most recent 
history that technological innovation in vehicles is not lagging, but is certainly not being 
used to improve vehicle fuel economy [192]. These recent trends are the result of a 
number of policy and market failures that ought to be addressed in the context of future 
CO2 policy, especially in light of the upcoming regulation of civil aviation. 
 
Figure A.2: Fuel Efficiency Areas of Application [196] 
Policy Failures of CAFE Standards 
The CAFE regulations themselves set minimum miles-per-gallon requirements for 
automobiles and light truck manufacturers based on the weighted total vehicle sales.  
Thus, total output must be at or over the minimum standard, at whatever configuration of 
automobiles a certain manufacturer may choose [197].  Furthermore, an individual 
manufacturer can be fined for shortcomings in their corporate average fuel economy, or, 
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conversely, can present a plan to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation for 
future mpg-deficit-fulfilling reductions “within the next three model years [197].”  
Unfortunately, this framework has been undermined by the fact that these standards, 
divided for two vehicle types, critically allowed light trucks to fall under less stringent 
fuel economy standards and heavy duty vehicles to avoid any regulation at all.  Indeed, 
the original CAFE standards were written when the personal use of vehicles like the 
Hummer was literally “inconceivable” to the regulators [191]. Thus, as usage patterns 
shifted towards greater personal use of the light truck class, the overall average fuel 
economy of the US domestic vehicle fleet declined [198]. This problem has been further 
expounded by the fact that the distinction between passenger cars and light trucks has 
become increasingly fuzzy [199], representing one of the most significant policy failures 
of CAFE standards. It can reasonably be argued that this failure has led to adverse 
environmental consequences through a shift in fleet mix that may persist for many years 
after the more stringent CAFE standards for light and heavy duty trucks take effect in the 
2012 to 2016 timeframe [195]. 
A number of additional features of CAFE standards have also contributed to the 
policy failures and subsequent market disruptions endemic in the automotive industry. 
One notable example of a failure of CAFE standards comes about through the treatment 
of vehicle fuel economy calculations for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles and dual-fuel 
vehicles. The fuel economy of these vehicles is greatly inflated to account for the lower 
carbon content of alternative fuels that could be used. While these alternative fuel and 
dual fuel vehicles would lead to lower CO2 emissions if they were used as intended, in 
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reality dual fuel vehicles are often run on only gasoline instead of an alternative fuel mix. 
Thus the fuel economy rating of the vehicle is artificially inflated without leading to 
lower emissions [199].  
Adding to this problem of greater emissions than predicted through the standard is 
the fact that U.S. EPA methods of measuring and quantifying vehicle fuel economy do 
not capture patterns of actual usage, and their figures accordingly exaggerate the 
efficiency ratings of vehicles across the board [191]. The test cycle with which new cars 
are required to comply is unrealistic of real driving and too predictable, allowing car 
manufacturers to design cars to pass tests yet produce higher levels of pollution when 
driven on the road [200]. This is largely due to the slow speeds and low acceleration that 
the test cycle requires, which is not reflected by typical driving habits. This cycle beating 
can result in high emissions of carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), and ammonia 
(NH3) [200]. 
Finally, through no fault of CAFE standards, there is another serious market 
failure at work that must be considered in this discussion. This failure is due entirely to 
consumer behavior, where there is a lack of rational decision making occurring during car 
purchases. For automobiles, the National Research Council’s evaluation of CAFE 
standards suggests that consumers may only consider the first 3 years of fuel savings 
when considering the value of higher fuel economy, which understates the true economic 
value over the life of a vehicle by about 60% [201]. This undervaluing of fuel economy is 
likely a result of bounded rational behavior [201], in which a decision maker will accept 
an adequate solution over an optimal solution due to incomplete knowledge or competing 
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desires. Automobile consumers may not think it is worth the effort to fully investigate the 
true costs and benefits of higher fuel economy [201], and in addition may be persuaded 
through manufacturers’ marketing that is unrelated to fuel economy concepts. This 
represents a serious problem that ought to be addressed for the future of CAFE standards, 
although will likely be less prevalent in the context of civil aviation. 
Lessons for Civil Aviation 
Many of the lessons CAFE standards offer for civil aviation are quite clear. The 
certification framework should directly address the objectives of the regulatory policy, 
especially with a regulation that is structured to be in force for a decade or more in a 
technologically dynamic industry.  The interdependent impact of additional features of a 
regulation, such as the dual fuel credits under CAFE standards, should be understood in 
the context of the standard itself. The setting of a CO2 regulation must have flexibility for 
revision or amendment built-in; for instance, ICAO should consider a mandatory trigger 
in any regulation that would require an assessment and re-authorization of the regulation 
on a frequent basis. Additionally, such revisions should remain squarely in the public eye, 
as CAFE standards have shown that when regulations are set with little public attention 
afforded them, regulators are more liable to succumb to political pressure from 
government and industry alike to create less binding rules.   
Moreover, metric parameters must fit not just the technical capacity of an aircraft 
(or vehicle), but should follow patterns of actual use – an even more important criterion 
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for civil aviation, given the heavy usage and long life of each individual aircraft which is 
on the order of 25 to 30 years.  
Finally, the market failure occurring due to bounded rationality on the part of 
consumers’ needs to be addressed. Despite the fact that this phenomenon is readily 
observed in the automotive industry, it’s well known that the entire civil aviation industry 
operates with the intent of generating profit, and subsequently business practices are 
much more likely to follow the neoclassical economic assumptions of rational decision 
making. As such, compliance mechanisms for this regulatory policy can be designed with 
greater certainty than has been seen in CAFE standards, and the market flaws resulting 
from bounded rationality in the automotive industry will likely be avoided in civil 
aviation even under stringent CO2 emissions regulations. 
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APPENDIX B  
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
The idea of the tragedy of the commons was first introduced by the social scientist 
Garrett Hardin in his 1968 article in Science aptly titled “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
[72]. In this article the problem posed by population growth is introduced. Recognizing 
that population tends to grow exponentially while the world’s resources are finite, the 
ultimate end to our population growth will occur as a result of a lack of resources to 
support the world’s population [72]. In this way we can view the earth’s resources as the 
commons, and the tragedy occurs as the philosopher Whitehead poses in the 
“…inevitableness of destiny [that] can only be illustrated in terms of human life by 
incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that the futility of 
escape can be made evident in the drama [202].” While it may be argued that tragedy for 
the world’s people is not inevitable, and many such as Adam Smith believe that an 
individual who works towards his own gain is led by an “invisible hand to promote the 
public interest [203]”, there is a wealth of evidence that disproves this claim.  
For Hardin, this evidence came in the form of an 1833 pamphlet produced by the 
English mathematician William Forster Lloyd, who described the ruin of herdsmen acting 
as rational beings in their own self-interest throughout small villages [204]. In this 
example, the tragedy of the commons unfolds by considering a pasture open to all, where 
each herdsman can keep his cattle. In assuming social stability of the community utilizing 
this common, the inherent logic of the commons becomes each herdsman acting as a 
rational being seeking to maximize his own gain. In doing so, the herdsman considers the 
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utility associated with adding another head of cattle to his own flock, which will have an 
associated positive and negative utility. The positive component of the utility is the 
increment of adding an animal, and since the herdsman will receive all the profits from 
that animal it can be said to be nearly +1. The negative component of the utility will be 
associated with overgrazing created by the addition of that animal; however, since the 
effects of this overgrazing are shared by all herdsmen utilizing the commons it is only a 
fraction of -1 [72]. In this way, the rational herdsman will always add another animal, at 
least until the commons becomes so overgrazed that it cannot support any animals. This 
specific case of the tragedy of the commons as a “food basket” has been well 
documented, and is ultimately what led Hardin to originally argue that, “ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all 
[72].”  
CO2 Pollution as a Tragedy of the Commons 
While the emission of CO2 into our atmosphere is different than taking a resource 
out of the commons as previously discussed, it is viewed in Hardin’s essay as a reverse 
tragedy of the commons. That is, the tragedy results not from taking something out of the 
commons, but by putting something in that will ultimately “foul our own nest” [72]. Our 
atmosphere represents a pristine environment that can be viewed as the commons, which 
will be brought to ruin as we reach CO2 concentrations that trigger catastrophic climate 
change events. This appears to be the recognition among policymakers in civil aviation in 
recent years, as there has been a strong push to stabilize CO2 emissions from the aviation 
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industry. This recognition is a result of evidence within the aviation industry that the 
individual actors, airlines and manufacturers, acting rationally will lead to growing CO2 
emissions as the industry grows. While progress is measured in economic terms, the 
potential to bring ruin to our environment is a potential cost of that progress that does not 
enter the utility maximizing behaviors of the actors involved in the civil aviation industry.  
This behavior in civil aviation, and realistically in most sectors of our 
industrialized world, is a result of similar utility calculations as those described 
previously for the herdsman. The rational man will find that his share of the cost of the 
pollutants discharged into the atmosphere is less than the cost of purifying or offsetting 
those pollutants [72]. Subsequently, as long as each actor behaves as an independent, 
rational, free enterpriser the result will be continually growing pollution, leading toward 
ruin for the environment. Due to the global nature of these problems, which will require 
governance at all levels of society, these types of problems represent some of the most 
important contemporary environmental challenges that have yet to be solved [29, 205, 
206].  
Addressing Tragedy of the Commons 
Given these tragedy of the commons problems, such as CO2 mitigation, represent 
the most important current environmental challenges, a means of addressing these 
problems must be established. The original literature by Hardin outlines three paths 
forward, which can be summarized as the “do-nothing”, private ownership, and 
regulation approaches. Each of these approaches will be outlined briefly here for 
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completeness; however, it should be recognized that the approach being pursued in 
commercial aviation is that of regulation.  
Do-Nothing Approach 
In this case, the system of interest is allowed to continue on a business as usual 
basis. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is relied upon to bring controls to the system before 
ruin is inevitable [203]. While this view may be a popular one among free market 
capitalists, it has been well established that when costs are allowed to be externalized in a 
commons the end result will inevitably be ruin. As such, this approach is not advisable 
for problems such as CO2 mitigation, as they’ve already been shown to fail.   
Private Ownership 
Here, if resources are taken from the commons and put into the hands of private 
citizens it is reasonable to assume that their worth will be evaluated differently, and 
ultimately the resource will be better cared for. This is called out directly by Hardin when 
he states, “the tragedy of the commons as the food basket is averted by private property, 
or something formally like it [72].” These ideas regarding private ownership extend back 
to classic philosophers such as Aristotle who wrote in 350 B.C. in Politics that “what is 
common to many is least taken care of, for all men have greater regard for what is their 
own than what they possess in common with others [207].” Unfortunately, this answer to 
the tragedy of the commons is only feasible when the commons can be divided among 
specific individuals. As has been well established in this document, one of the greatest 
problems with CO2 emissions is the global nature of the problem. Due to the fact that 
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GHG emissions mix throughout the atmosphere and cannot be traced to a single point 
source, our CO2 problem cannot be addressed through this private ownership approach. 
This point is also identified by Hardin in his essay, as he identifies resources such as air 
and water, which cannot be “fenced”, as commons where private ownership will fail to 
prevent ruin [72].  
Regulation (Coercion) 
In some of the earliest literature on tragedy of the commons, Hardin and Crowe, 
point to “forced coercion” as the only course of action to prevent ruin for global 
resources such as air and water [72, 143]. For resources that cannot be fenced, 
sustainability of the commons can only be achieved through coercive laws or 
environmental levies that make the cost of polluting more expensive than treating the 
pollutants [72]. This is certainly the case in civil aviation, as highlighted by a 2009 report 
by ICAO, which showed that emissions from international aviation are global in nature 
and cannot be associated to any national boundaries, thus assigning responsibility for 
CO2 emissions is difficult to implement or enforce [10]. In these instances, the goal of 
regulation is not to prohibit specific sources of pollution, but to internalize the costs 
associated with polluting the atmosphere. In this way, there is not a need to forbid entities 
in civil aviation from conducting their business, there is only a need to make it 
increasingly expensive to do so, such that the environmental concern is an equitable 
portion of their utility calculations. Hardin quite playfully states this as, “a Madison 
Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the greater candor of the word coercion 
[72].” While it’s quite clear that coercive action must be taken in order to mitigate the 
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impact of anthropogenic CO2 emissions from civil aviation, in this document all 
discussions on regulation will continue to be framed as regulatory policy as opposed to 
forced coercion.  
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APPENDIX C  
OVERVIEW OF EU ETS 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme was initially implemented in 
2005 through Directive 2003/87/EC, and is now touted as a reference point for most 
GHG emission trading schemes throughout the world [103, 208]. However, this 
important legislation was not created entirely originally, and it should be noted that it 
would not exist if it were not for the Kyoto Protocol, which is the “flagship measure” by 
which all member states of the EU will attempt to meet environmental obligations during 
the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 [105, 209]. Despite this fact, the EU ETS 
is entirely independent of the Kyoto Protocol, and is just one measure aimed at helping 
meet the GHG reductions established there.  
In many ways the EU ETS is a classic cap and trade system, however, there are a 
few important differences. First, the EU ETS implements an emissions cap that is 
decentralized in nature, meaning the cap is set for the EU as a whole, but each member 
state maintains its own trading system. Additionally, the cap that is outlined in the EU 
directive is actually a cap within a cap from 2008 on, in which each year there is a 
progressively more stringent cap set [105]. With that said, the EU ETS currently only 
includes emissions of CO2, and covers only a subset of the economy, the power sector for 
the first phases of trading and recently aviation [105]. Emissions allowances are issued 
within the EU annually, but are only valid to cover emissions in any year within the 
trading period. The only other credits allowed to count toward emissions are those 
created through the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, specifically relating to the Clean 
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Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI). These credits are known 
respectively as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs) [105]. The flexible mechanisms of the EU ETS are outlined in the Linking 
Directive 2004/101/EC [115, 210].	  Ultimately, the function of the EU ETS can be seen as 
27 primarily independent trading systems that are in agreement to make their allowances 
commonly tradable, and they all adhere to agreed upon procedures to make the system 
functional [105]. In this way, the EU ETS operates very much like an “Acknowledged 
System-of-Systems” discussed previously.   
For the EU ETS, there are two major components that must be understood, which 
are the cap setting and allocation of allowances, both of which are decentralized 
negotiation processes that reflect the political structure of the EU. These processes are 
outlined for each member state within the National Allocation Plans (NAPs), and are 
meant to address the goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol [103]. In the cap setting 
process member states use differentiated criteria to produce caps between “lesser than 
business as usual” and  a “path consistent with the Kyoto Protocol” [103]. For most 
NAPs, modest caps were initially set with a high dependence on projections into the 
future; however, it has been noted in literature that most if not all of the projections were 
largely inflated, which is an observed phenomenon in government forecasting [103, 211]. 
Subsequently, due to the modest cuts and inflated projections there tended to be a surplus 
of allowances, reaching levels of approximately 5% of total allowances, in the initial 
trading period [212]. This issue of over allocation due to modest cap setting will be 
analyzed more closely later in this section.  
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Allocation of allowances under a specified cap is typically based on a measure of 
overall productivity within an industry covered by the EU ETS [103, 105]. The allocation 
process itself though has been quite divergent throughout the member states in the EU, 
and since the start of trading has been shown to create allowance prices that can have an 
impact on investment decisions. Further, literature has noted that significant competition 
distortions may occur if they remain unchanged [103, 213]. Despite this fact, it has been 
proposed that these allocation issues may be avoided if member states base allocation on 
benchmarking, which is a process of determining the best industry practices and how all 
other practices score relative to this standard [103]. This benchmarking process has been 
used by some member states in phase 1 NAPs, namely in Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, Netherlands, and Italy, where it was used to benchmark allocation either to new 
entrants or for fixed energy efficiency rates for energy production entities [103]. Still, the 
main issue that exists is due to the decentralized nature of the EU, in which 
benchmarking is occurring through the use of different metrics.  
While the initial phases of the EU ETS include CO2 emissions only from energy 
intensive industries in the European Union, in December of 2006 the European 
Commission released an initial proposal to include the airline industry in the EU ETS 
[102, 214]. Finally, on July 9, 2008 the European Parliament cast a final vote on the 
inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS, ultimately creating Directive 2008/101/EC where 
aviation activities within the EU ETS are specifically outlined [95, 102]. One of the main 
differences with aviation’s inclusion in the EU ETS and other industries is the limited 
tradability of aviation allowances and liquidity of the EU ETS markets as a whole [115]. 
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Despite this fact, under the directive agreed upon in 2008, the costs of inclusion will 
differ between airlines as a function of how fuel consumption per flight by route changes 
according to the fuel efficiency of the aircraft used, operational practices, and the overall 
quantity of passengers and freight carried [102, 111]. As such, it is hoped that this policy 
will result in more efficient airlines facing lower costs than their less efficient 
counterparts. 
Since aviation activities are the focus of this dissertation, the specific 
requirements on the aviation activity will be briefly outlined here. Based on Directive 
2008/101/EC, CO2 emissions for air transport are capped at 97% and 95% of the average 
level from years 2004 through 2006 for the first and second trading years respectively. 
Thereafter, the cap will diminish to 21% below this level within the trading period from 
2014 to 2020 [95, 102]. The other major design elements from this directive are outlined 
here [95, 102]:  
1. Airlines operating within the EU will be included in the EU ETS as 
trading entities starting in 2012, including stopover airlines landing and 
departing from EU airports. 
2. An emission cap for aviation in the EU will be implemented based on 
historical CO2 emissions using the grandfathering approach based on 
average GHG emissions from 2004 to 2006. In 2012, carbon allowances 
will be fixed at 97% of those averages, and will increase to 95% in 2013.  
3. Allowances will be distributed among airlines in proportion to ton-
kilometers flown in the reference year, where the first benchmark period 
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will be 2010. After the first year, the benchmark period will be the 
calendar year ending two years before the start of the subsequent trading 
period.  
4. The allocation methodology must be the same across all Member States. 
Additionally, a certain percentage of allowances will be granted for free, 
and up to 15% will be auctioned.  
5. Certified emissions reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units 
(ERUs) from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint 
Implementation (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol may be used up to 15% of an 
airline’s EU ETS allocation in 2012. However, the use of credits tied to 
the Kyoto Protocol after this time is unclear.  
6. The trading system will be open, allowing the airline sector to trade with 
all other sectors covered by the EU ETS.  
7. A reserve will be established consisting of 3% of allowances in order to 
account for new entrants and fast growing airlines.  
Purpose of EU ETS 
Given such a broad overview of the EU ETS and its directives, it’s important to 
state explicitly the purpose of such a standard. Ultimately the purpose of the EU ETS is 
to set a price for carbon, thus internalizing the cost to output harmful GHG into our 
environment [103]. Further, it has been shown in both practice and literature that an 
emissions trading scheme, assuming there are significant allowance prices, can induce 
behavioral changes in the short and medium term and technological investments in the 
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long term, all while minimizing the competitiveness for affected companies, countries, 
and regions [106]. So, while the impact of the EU ETS on airlines and the global 
economy depends on the design of the scheme, if implemented properly, it is expected to 
constrain carbon emissions equitably throughout the aviation industry without significant 
market disruptions.  
EU ETS Trial Period 
While it’s unclear how the EU ETS will impact aviation activities since they are 
only now being included, the EU ETS has gone through two trial periods in the energy 
producing sectors of the European Union. Phase 1 of the EU ETS occurred from 2005 to 
2007, while phase 2 was implemented from 2008 to 2012. The results of these trial 
periods have been documented in literature, and will be reviewed here.  
Phase 1 
Before delving into the specifics of phase 1 of the EU ETS which occurred from 
2005 to 2007, it should be noted that a number of “teething problems” were encountered 
which may have reduced the effectiveness of this policy during this time period [103]. 
The first issue was that a number of significant delays occurred regarding member state 
registries and National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which were late by more than a year in 
some cases [103]. In large part these delays were spurred by a need to adapt national laws 
to be consistent with definitions outlined in the Kyoto Protocol and EC directives. These 
teething problems were further aggravated due to a number of inconsistencies of energy 
installation definitions, as well as regional issues related to monitoring, reporting, and 
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verifying emissions [103]. Finally, it has been noted as well that insufficient operation of 
the CDM and JI programs also created unexpected problems for phase 1 of the EU ETS 
[103, 215].  
With that said, the trial period implemented from 2005 to 2007 was ultimately 
motivated by the perception of a “performance gap” in the EU’s ability to meet 
commitments outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, as well as a recognition that experience 
would be necessary to successfully implement an EU-wide cap [105]. This recognition 
stems from the fact that while a cap and trade approach could guarantee a limit on EU 
emissions, the decentralized cap setting and allocation process was very different than 
any other cap and trade mechanism previously attempted throughout the world [216]. The 
most obvious counterpart to the EU ETS was the U.S. SO2 cap and trade system, as 
aforementioned; however, under this system the cap and allocations were determined 
centrally through Congressional legislation, the registry was maintained nationally, and 
impacted entities reported directly to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. 
EPA) [105]. The NOx Budget Program ultimately came closer to replicating the structure 
of the EU ETS, however even there noted differences occur [217]. In the end, the 
decentralized nature of the EU ETS has been pointed to throughout literature as its most 
defining aspect to other cap and trade systems, as well as its most problematic [105, 218].  
As noted previously, one potential benefit of a cap and trade system is that 
placing a single price on GHG emissions leads to the most cost effective attainment of 
emissions goals. Unfortunately this fact only holds true if the price of emissions 
allowances is high enough to drive favorable behavioral changes and technological 
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investment. In the EU, the European Union Allowance (EUA) prices showed in the first 
year of trading that this may not always be possible. One noted feature of the evolution of 
EUA prices is the drastic decline that occurred in April of 2006, where in less than a 
week prices fell from €30 to €20 for first period EUAs and then to €15 for second period 
EUAs [105]. This observation can be seen in Figure C.1. This drastic fluctuation in 
market price was attributed to the underreporting of 2005 emissions by a number of 
member states, which was a major contributor to the teething problems due to the 
decentralized nature of the EU ETS [105].	  	  	  
 
Figure C.1: European Union Allowance (EUA) Price Observations (2005-2007) [105]	  
Despite this quite drastic price volatility observed in the initial trading periods of 
the EU ETS, the price movements were not unusual for cap and trade systems. In fact, 
similar price movements were observed in the initial trading of SO2 allowances in the 
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U.S. Acid Rain Program, where the initial price of approximately $130 was about half the 
expected value of $250. Then after the first few quarters of 1995, the price began to drop 
again to an all time low of $70 in early 1996 before rebounding in the 1999 time frame 
[105, 216]. The market prices of these allowances in the U.S. have continued to fluctuate 
throughout the early 2000s, as observed in Figure C.2 below.  
 
Figure C.2: SO2 Allowance Prices [105] 
One of the other major sources of uncertainty in this first phase of the EU ETS 
was the demand for allowances. This was expected to be particularly significant at the 
beginning of this policy implementation because in addition to the usual unpredictable 
variability of economic activity, weather, and energy prices, there was also a great deal of 
uncertainty regarding the level of abatement that would occur in response to the EU ETS 
initially [105]. Further compounding this problem was the uncertainty of where the EUA 




Figure C.3: Distribution of Long and Short Positions by Member State (2005-2006) 
[105]	  
As can be seen in Figure C.3, most member states in the EU were relatively even 
regarding overall EUA positions in the initial trading year from 2005 to 2006 [105]. As 
such, much of the trading of EUAs throughout the EU could be confined mostly to 
national boundaries. However, this figure also makes it quite obvious that a few member 
states would be net purchasers of EUAs, such as Poland, France, and Germany, while 
others would be net suppliers, such as Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom. While the EU 
ETS specifically allows trading to occur throughout the EU, the political ramifications of 
such national positions could be viewed unfavorably and create energy market distortions 
in specific regions of the EU. 
In addition to the geographic distribution of EUA positions, the positions within 
specific sectors of the economy also differed greatly. As can be seen in Figure C.4, the 
328 
 
majority of EUAs issued in the 2005 to 2006 period were for the power and heat 
industries [105]. The ability for many trading entities in this sector to reduce emissions 
led to surplus allowances that could cover most other sectors’ shortcomings. While this 
still resulted in the abatement of significant CO2 from the atmosphere, the ability of 
certain sectors to more readily reduce emissions caused some concern regarding market 
distortions. In many ways, the ability of the power sector to rapidly abate emissions at a 
lower cost than other sectors of the economy can be seen as a subsidy to this industry that 
was not provided equitably across all sectors.  
	  
Figure C.4: Distribution of Long and Short Position by Sector (2005-2006) [105]	  
Phase 2 
Despite the growing pains encountered in the initial phase of the EU ETS, a 
number of improvements were made during phase 2, which occurred from 2008 to 2012. 
The most widely discussed improvement during this time period was the European 
Commission’s use of explicit “objective” projections based on the results from 2005 
verified emissions for all member states [103]. These 2005 ETS emissions were used 
with gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate projections through 2010 based on 
validated macroeconomic models, namely PRIMES [103]. The use of these “objective” 
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models to predict future behavior has allowed more accurate predictions of EUA 
evolution in the phase 2 trading period of the EU ETS. Further, this new reliance on 
computational modeling for policy projections demonstrates a willingness within the 
European Commission to apply objective scientific methodologies across all member 
states. Such a precedent is quite important for quantitative policy studies, such as the 
work accomplished in this document.  
Controversies with the EU ETS 
While many of the unfavorable issues encountered during the trial periods of the 
EU ETS have already been addressed, much of the criticism of this policy focuses on two 
main issues that will be discussed here: windfall profits and over-allocation of allowances 
[105]. The idea of windfall profits refers to the ability of electricity producers to increase 
prices, and subsequently profit, as a result of freely allocated allowances, and over-
allocation refers to the issue of modest emissions caps that did not provide sufficient 
constraints.  
First, to understand the idea of windfall profits, it’s important to understand the 
cost considerations of the electricity generators in the EU ETS. Due to the fact that all 
EUAs have an associated market value, there is an assumed cost of using those EUAs to 
cover emissions for electricity generators. Despite this assumed cost, most allowances are 
allocated freely, thus produce no real cost to the electricity generators.  These lost 
opportunity costs have been observed to be passed through to consumers in their entirety, 
leading to higher electricity prices, and thus higher profits [105]. Ultimately, the effect on 
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retail customers also depends on the degree of liberalization in the retail markets, so some 
of this effect of windfall profits can be abated through regulation of retail markets. For 
instance, in Spain regulations have stated that companies cannot recover the lost 
opportunity costs associated with freely allocated allowances, reducing this effect [105]. 
Additionally, in the UK, regulatory authorities have proposed that the market value of 
freely allocated allowances be recaptured to help customers in fuel poverty; however, the 
mechanism by which this would be achieved has yet to be established [105].  
One potential solution to the issue of freely allocated allowances leading to 
windfall profits is the idea of auctioning all allowances instead of allocating them freely 
[219]. While this idea would not lead to lower electricity prices, it would end the use of 
lost opportunity costs to pad the wallets of fossil fuel generators. Another advantage of 
such an approach is that significant revenue could also be raised for the governing 
authority to improve efficiency by other means and improve equity among citizens [105]. 
This approach could mitigate some of the political controversy as well regarding 
geographic EUA positioning, since revenue raised from auctioning would stay within 
national boundaries of the regulated entity. However, due to the economic power of the 
electricity suppliers, if they are not compensated in some way they are likely to oppose 
such market based mechanisms through their lobbying power [105].  
The problem of over-allocation is somewhat different than that of windfall profits. 
Generally, over allocation is understood to mean that the caps created by member states 
in their respective NAPs were modest to the point of creating a non-binding EU cap 
[105]. In this way, over-allocation is a signal to regulatory authorities that the cap should 
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be increased in order to achieve a binding regulatory policy. While abatement potential 
can be very difficult to estimate because it requires the use of estimates of what emissions 
would be in the absence of regulation, this problem can be addressed as the program 
continues. As such, establishing periods or phases within implementation, and assessing 
new information in real time can improve estimation techniques, allowing regulatory 
authorities to produce binding caps that don’t over constrain markets. This was 
accomplished to a limited extend in the first phases of the EU ETS, but can certainly be 
improved as aviation is integrated into the system. It should be noted though, as 
aforementioned, that aviation is expected to be a net producer of CO2 emissions. As such, 
it will likely maintain a long position throughout the foreseeable future, and be a net 
buyer of EUAs. 
What should be evident in this discussion, as Ellerman argues, is that the absence 
of data did not allow proper modeling of the expected behavior in the EU during the 
initial phases of the EU ETS [103, 105]. As such, policy makers were lacking the 
analytical tools necessary to fully understand the consequences of policy implementation, 
and lacked experience. Despite this fact, it has been shown in literature that “a successful 
market allows predictability for investment and thereby provides the certainty to make 
efficient investment decisions [103]”, which can theoretical be captured through 
objective modeling of the system. At this point in time, many of the models used to study 
the EU ETS have been shown to be over-simplified, omit important variables, and link a 
number of models based on inconsistent assumptions [106]. In the end, in order to ensure 
that future periods of the EU ETS are effective at meeting the goals outlined by the EC 
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and Kyoto Protocol, effective modeling paradigms and useful models for predicting 
macroeconomic behavior must be assessed.  
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APPENDIX D  
HISTORY OF EXPLORATORY MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
Due to the fact that the idea and terminology surrounding exploratory modeling 
has only been in existence since 1993, its use has been relatively concentrated by a few 
groups of researchers from RAND (Bankes, Lempert, Schlesinger) and Delft University 
of Technology (Augustinata, Delaurentis). However, in the last few years the idea has 
begun to gain traction in a number of fields, and is starting to see more widespread use. 
Most of the research using exploratory modeling has been focused on issues regarding 
climate change [18, 220], energy transitions, economic policy [221], and sustainable 
development [136]. In more recent years, exploratory modeling experienced a 
resurgence, largely through the work put forth by Augustinata from Delft University of 
Technology in the Netherlands, and was rebranded as exploratory modeling and analysis 
(EMA) [78].  
Foundations of Exploratory Modeling 
It has been proposed that “exploratory modeling is using computational 
experiments to assist in reasoning about systems where there is significant uncertainty” 
[222], such as the regulatory policies currently being addressed in commercial aviation. 
As such, one of the core tenets of exploratory modeling is the idea that analysts should 
explore a plethora of hypotheses about the system of interest by broadening the 
assumptions of a system model to the extent that it is useful and resources will allow [78, 
222].  The modeler is able to accomplish this because exploratory modeling treats the 
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outcome of a plausible system representation as a hypothesis about system behavior in 
order to ascertain the consequences of the given hypothesis. Ultimately, by exploring a 
very large set of such hypotheses (in theory an infinite number), the modeler can employ 
known data mining techniques to explore statements about system behavior that are 
generally true [78]. In this way, we are able to reason about the system of interest by 
asking, “if each of the hypotheses were correct what would it mean for the policy in 
question?”  
It should be noted here that this is a fundamental departure from probabilistic 
thinking in the sense that each model representation and run is treated as a deterministic 
hypothesis about the system being studied. For this reason, exploratory modeling does 
not require the assignment of probability or likelihood to uncertain variables, as would be 
required for sensitivity analysis or even scenario analysis. So, despite the fact that both 
probabilistic modeling and exploratory modeling aim to quantify and reduce uncertainty, 
and they both employ similar enablers (design of experiments, data mining techniques, 
etc.), they do so from fundamentally different perspectives. The reason for approaching 
the problem from a deterministic viewpoint is to allow for expanded exploration among 
many of the uncertain parameters which may not have knowable probability distributions.  
Types of Exploratory Modeling 
Due to the fact that exploratory modeling is inherently so general, since both 
parametric and non-parametric uncertainty can be searched across, the modeler is 
immediately confronted with the very real possibility that any given problem can be 
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infinitely large. While the foundational principles of exploratory modeling readily leads 
to this conclusion, the philosophy is to remain open to any number of possibilities; 
however, this philosophy does not exclude the potential to scope and focus a given 
problem using a priori information and even goals of the study. From its inception, this 
has been well understood, and Steve Bankes proposed a classification of exploratory 
modeling into three distinct types. These types of exploratory modeling are data-driven, 
question-driven, and model-driven exploratory modeling [222]. Each will be expanded 
upon further in this section.  
Data-driven Exploratory Modeling  
In data-driven exploratory modeling, a search is conducted through an ensemble 
of models for instances that are consistent with a given data set [222]. The goal here is to 
reveal underlying structure in the data by discovering regularities in the modeling results, 
although it should be noted that the process may produce many incorrect models. This 
process actually shares a great deal in common with specification search, in which 
iterative fitting of regression equations is conducted to obtain an equation that explains a 
significant portion of observed variability in data [223]. However, in data-driven 
exploratory modeling the equations or surrogate models created throughout the iterative 
process are kept along with the heuristics used to evaluate them for further analysis 
regarding model structure, while in specification search the result is simply the final 
equation or surrogate model resulting from the search through an ensemble of models. In 
a sense, there is a wealth of information that is lost by ignoring the process through which 
a best-estimate model is determined in specification search, and data-driven exploratory 
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modeling has found an application for the unused byproduct of the specification search 
process.  
Question-driven Exploratory Modeling 
Question-driven exploratory modeling begins with a question of interest or policy 
choice being considered and explores an ensemble of possibilities in the search for 
answers [222]. As such, question-driven exploratory modeling scopes the problem 
through a priori information regarding the purpose of the study, which is often made 
necessary where there is deep uncertainty, since an exhaustive search through all models 
and scenarios may be prohibitive. By posing these questions, we provide structure to the 
study, narrowing the focus of what should be discovered through the exploratory 
modeling process. In the context of uncertainty quantification and policy tradeoff 
analysis, specific questions can be asked and a priori information from literature used to 
scope such a study. 
This brings to light the importance of sampling for question-driven exploratory 
modeling. Borrowing from design of experiments (DoE), the sampling strategy ought to 
be designed to produce the maximum amount of information for the minimum 
experimental effort. Thus, for the question-driven approach, the sampling strategy should 
help answer the question of interest from a limited set of computational experiments. 
From early literature on exploratory modeling, examples of strategies provided include, 
uniform sampling across the ensemble (both parametric and nonparametric sources of 
uncertainty) to determine a range of plausible outcomes, searching for worst case 
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scenarios to provide risk-averse hedging strategies, listing scenarios where policy failures 
occur, and discovering bounding cases to support a fortiori arguments as well as those 
that reveal favorable alternatives [222]. In more recent uses of exploratory modeling, 
sampling strategies have expanded into the design of experiments literature, and current 
studies often use full factorial designs, Latin hypercube sampling, and Monte Carlo 
sampling [78]. That being said, it should also be noted that there is a great deal of 
ongoing research regarding adaptive sampling techniques that may be well suited to 
question-driven exploratory modeling that have yet to be employed.  
Model-driven Exploratory Modeling 
Finally, model-driven exploratory modeling differs from both data-driven and 
question driven exploration in the sense that an ensemble of models is searched without 
reference to a data set or policy question for the sole purpose of investigating the 
properties of the ensemble [222]. It has been noted that this type of investigation is useful 
for policy analysis whenever a new class of models is proposed to represent the system 
architecture, and subsequently, it is beneficial to first assess the properties of the models 
before determining whether the models will be useful [222]. This form of exploration is 
often useful in cases where multiple models are proposed that represent the same 
phenomenon at different resolutions or levels of fidelity. It can be beneficial to explore in 
what instances an aggregate model can be used to represent a higher resolution model, as 
well as when models of differing resolution may begin to significantly diverge. In the 
context of the policy studies considered here, this type of exploration may prove 
338 
 
important to a limited extent in validation of the final modeling paradigm chosen to study 
policy tradeoffs between emission trading schemes and the Aircraft CO2 Standard. 
Summary of Exploratory Modeling Types  
 In order to provide a quick reference to the reader for the classification scheme of 
exploratory modeling aforementioned, Table D.1 is provided below. Generally speaking, 
the public policy problems tackled in this dissertation align most favorably with the 
question-driven approach to exploratory modeling. The reason for this is threefold: 1) the 
system-of-systems considered, the global climate and civil aviation activities that produce 
CO2, is so highly complex that exploring all sources of uncertainty is infeasible; 2) CO2 
policy naturally lends itself to questions to be explored, such as, what future 
scenarios/policy alternatives allow the mitigation of CO2 production by goals set forth in 
the Kyoto Protocol?; 3) there are known classes of models and model structures that can 
be used to predict behavior of the civil aviation industry and resulting emissions 
(including system dynamics, general equilibrium, agent-based, and statistically regressed 
models).  
With that said, however, we should not be so quick to dismiss the usefulness of 
data-driven or model-driven exploratory modeling for the regulatory policy issues 
explored here. For instance, data-driven exploratory modeling can be used to explore 
model ensembles based on established best-estimate model structures. Due to the 
availability of the data that was originally used to validate best-estimate models, other 
plausible models can be discovered using the same data and established heuristics with 
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best-estimate models serving as a basis. This could in fact aid question-driven modeling 
in the sense that a more complete ensemble of models can be discovered and feed into the 
question driven approach. Additionally, with the cornucopia of different model classes 
and levels of aggregation used for emissions predictions purposes, model-driven 
exploratory modeling could provide valuable insights through comparison of previously 
vetted models. 
Table D.1: Exploratory Modeling Summary 
Exploratory Modeling 
Modeling Type How does it work? What is the Goal? 
Data-driven 
Search through an ensemble 
of models to find instances 
that are consistent with a 
given data set. 
Determine the structure of 
models that are consistent 
with the data. 
Question-driven 
Ask a question or present a 
policy choice and search 
through an ensemble of 
models in search of the 
answer. 




Search through an ensemble 
of models without reference 
to a given data set or policy 
question.  
To investigate the properties 
of new classes of models or 
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